Federal Civil Practice

In section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officials violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights when three plaintiffs were arrested on battery charges that resulted in acquittals, Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in granting one defendant’s Rule 50(b) motion for judgment notwithstanding jury’s $260,000 verdict in favor of one plaintiff on excessive force charge against said defendant, under circumstances where jury found in favor of all other defendants with respect to all of plaintiffs' claims, and where Dist. Ct. found that plaintiffs’ counsel had committed multiple violations of its rulings on motions in limine that precluded parties from disclosing certain facts at trial. Instant sanction was within Dist. Ct.’s inherent authority and was warranted, where Dist. Court could find that plaintiffs’ counsel: (1) asked improper questions in attempt to elicit testimony barred by Dist. Ct.; (2) failed to properly prepare witnesses to prevent them from addressing issues barred by rulings on motions in limine; (3) had been dishonest with Dist. Ct. during investigation as to how newspaper acquired access to certain documents at issue in trial; and (4) improperly coached one plaintiff to alter her testimony regarding plaintiff’s alleged possession of notes that were not turned over to defendant pursuant to his discovery requests. Moreover, plaintiffs' counsel was warned several times throughout trial that sanctions were a possibility. Dist. Ct. could also look to plaintiffs' counsel disciplinary history when fashioning sanction.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant-paramedic’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-decedent’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant had violated plaintiff-decedent’s 4^th Amendment rights when defendant administered sedative to decedent to calm decedent down after decedent was discovered by police lying prone while nude in street and being combative with police. Although decedent died shortly after sedative was administered, case law did not clearly establish at time of 2014 incident that paramedic had “seized” arrestee or that paramedic was subject to 4^th Amendment limits on excessive force by sedating arrestee, who otherwise appeared to paramedic as suffering from medical emergency prior to officials taking arrestee to hospital. Also, plaintiff’s state-law medical malpractice claims against paramedic and others should be dismissed without prejudice, where plaintiff had failed to comply with Indiana law requiring plaintiff to submit case to medical review panel prior to filing instant lawsuit, since said directive is substantive feature of Indiana statute that must be enforced in federal court.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing as untimely plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant-police officials violated his 5^th Amendment rights by interrogating him without providing Miranda warnings and then giving testimony about his unwarned statements at his 2007 and 2012 trials that resulted in convictions that were reversed in 2010 and 2014 respectively. Under Heck, plaintiff was barred from proceeding on any 1983 claim alleging instant 5^th Amendment violation (and hence any limitations period did not start) until conviction where his statements were used was overturned. As such, plaintiff’s claim for use of said statements at his 2007 trial was time barred, because that conviction was reversed in 2010, or more than two years after instant action was filed in 2015. However, defendant’s claim with respect to his 2012 trial was timely, since that conviction was overturned in 2014. Ct. noted, though, that defendants would be free to assert any claim preclusion affirmative defense, where trial court had previously rejected in criminal proceeding plaintiff’s claim either that defendants had taken his statements without previously giving him Miranda warnings, or that he was in custody at time certain statements were made.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s 4^th Amendment rights by executing warrant that authorized defendants to search for drugs and specific individual in plaintiff's home, where: (1) warrant was supported by information supplied by tipster, who testified in front of trial court that issued warrant that she regularly purchased drugs from said individual at plaintiff’s home for six-month period; and (2) defendants searched plaintiff’s home for two-hour period and failed to find said individual or any drugs. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that warrant lacked probable cause, where probable cause finding could be based on tipster’s testimony alone, and where issuance of warrant entitled defendants to search plaintiff’s home without risk of personal liability. Also, length of time to conduct instant search was not excessive, where plaintiff admitted to having gun, and where plaintiff’s disordered home appeared as drug-distribution point to defendants.

In action alleging that defendant-debt collector violated Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) by suing plaintiff in wrong forum, Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss instant action based on plaintiff’s $5,000 settlement of its similar action against plaintiff’s creditor, even though plaintiff had settled all claims except for claim against defendant for statutory damages under FDCPA, and where jury subsequently awarded plaintiff $200 in statutory damages as well as $69,393.75 in attorney fees and $772.95 in costs. Record showed that plaintiff sued defendant and creditor under FDCPA, as well state statutory claim, and instant release did not apportion any of $5,000 settlement to any particular claim. Moreover, plaintiff is generally entitled to only single recovery for single injury regardless of how many defendants could be liable for said injury or how many different recoveries could apply to single injury. As such, Dist. Ct. should have granted defendant’s motion to dismiss on mootness grounds instant FDCPA action, where: (1) plaintiff agreed to dismiss all of her claims against creditor for $5,000 without allocating any recovery to any particular claim; (2) instant claim for FDCPA statutory damages was capped at $1,000; (3) Dist. Ct. erred by attributing settlement funds to other claims to exclusion of FDCPA damages; and (4) plaintiff had only single claim for $1,000, regardless of number of defendants plaintiff sued under FDCPA. Also, instant settlement precluded plaintiff from obtaining any attorney fees, costs or statutory damages.

In section 1983 action by plaintiff-estate of decedent pre-trial detainee alleging that defendants-prison officials and prison medical personnel violated decedent’s due process rights by failing to timely intervene while decedent underwent hunger strike that resulted in decedent’s death, Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ summary judgment motion, where record showed that said defendants relied reasonably on assurances given by medical professionals that decedent’s medical needs were being taken care of. However,

In class action in which class members contested defendant-airline’s decision to stop honoring in-flight drink vouchers for “Business Select” customers, Dist. Ct. erred in denying request by objector seeking $80,000 in attorney fees and $1,000 incentive award arising out of objector’s successful attempt to obtain more drink vouchers for class members than what was called for in original settlement of class action, where objector sought said fees and award from $1.8 million in fees paid to class counsel. While Dist. Ct. based said denial on belief that requiring class counsel to pay objector’s fee and incentive award would undo supplemental agreement between parties that gave additional vouchers to class members and additional fees to class counsel, Ct. of Appeals found that settlement agreements should not be read to bar objector’s request arising out of his efforts in adding value to settlement. Moreover, objector’s counsel should receive fees for improving instant settlement, where: (1) payment of requested fees/award by class counsel had no effect on defendant’s obligations under either settlement agreement; (2) settlement agreements did not bar fee request by objector; (3) objector’s efforts resulted in creation of common fund of additional drink vouchers for benefit of class members; and (4) instant $80,000 fee request represented only 10 percent of value of additional vouchers. Ct. further noted that it would be opposed to any additional fee request by class counsel.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff’s pro se request for issuance of certificate of innocence under circumstances where: (1) plaintiff’s conviction on charge of federal program fraud was reversed by Ct. of Appeals, which had observed that govt. could have proceeded against plaintiff on mail or wire fraud charges; (2) plaintiff was subsequently acquitted of mail fraud and fraud under 18 USC section 2314 charges; and (3) plaintiff needed certificate of innocence to establish his damage claim under 28 USC sections 1495 and 2513 for unjust conviction and imprisonment. Plaintiff’s petition was dismissed without any response from government and without any meaningful opportunity for plaintiff to be heard. Moreover, Dist. Ct. applied too strict pleading standard by requiring plaintiff to provide independent evidentiary submissions, where such evidence was not required under Rule 8. Fact that plaintiff did not spell out evidence supporting his petition did not require different result. Upon remand, Dist. Ct. must allow govt. opportunity to respond to said petition and must make independent determination as to whether plaintiff’s conduct constituted any crime under federal or state law.

In class action under Telephone Consumer Protection Act that resulted in settlement which called for defendant to make $700,000 available to pay class members,

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s False Claims Act complaint for failure to state valid claim, where plaintiff alleged defendants violated said Act by making material false statements in that defendants knowingly sold products to U.S. from non-designated countries even though defendants had filed Trade Agreements Certificates that affirmed that they would only sell products from designated countries. Instant qui-tam action required plaintiff to comply with enhanced pleading requirements for fraud set forth in Rule 9(b), and plaintiff conceded that he could not allege that defendants made any express misrepresentations to govt. Moreover, although plaintiff attempted to premise instant action on implied false certification theory, plaintiff failed to supply underlying details demonstrating what had actually occurred at individualized transactional level for each defendant. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s argument that Rule 9(b) standard should be relaxed, where plaintiff did not have access to detailed information that would substantiate his claim. Fact that plaintiff had complied reports showing that defendants sold thousands of non-compliant products over three-year period did not require different result.