Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officials denied plaintiff due process when investigating and prosecuting murder charge against plaintiff by withholding exculpatory evidence, which resulted in plaintiff being convicted of said charge that was eventually overturned in plaintiff’s post-conviction petition. Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of Brady violations committed by defendants to withstand instant summary judgment, where: (1) defendants failed to disclose impeachment evidence indicating that key govt. witness, who had identified defendants as shooters, was actually unaware who had shot victim; (2) state’s case against defendants had no physical or forensic evidence linking plaintiff to instant murder; and (3) one defendant generated false statement for witness to hide fact that said witness had identified another individual as culprit in murder. Ct. similarly noted as Brady violation, fact that one defendant-police officer delayed tender (until eve of trial) of 40 hours of jail telephone calls from key witness, which effectively precluded defense counsel from discovering that said witness had claimed that he had been threatened and coached as to what to say to police. Dist. Ct. did not err, though, in granting portion of summary judgment motion with respect to plaintiff’s claim that defendants had fabricated evidence by coercing witness to generate false statements, where plaintiff failed to presented evidence that defendants knew that said statements, although coerced, were false.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison medical personnel provided constitutionally deficient medical care, where basis for dismissal was finding that plaintiff had obstructed discovery. Record showed that: (1) plaintiff falsely claimed that defendants had failed to adequately respond to plaintiff’s discovery requests; (2) plaintiff failed to answer straight-forward questions regarding his claim during deposition; and (3) plaintiff falsely accused opposing counsel of bringing contraband into prison. Fact that Dist. Ct. did not conduct hearing prior to imposing sanctions did not require different result, where plaintiff had opportunity to explain his conduct in response to order to show cause. Also, dismissal of plaintiff lawsuit was appropriate sanction, where prior warnings were ineffective, counsel was unable to obtain appropriate answers in deposition, and fines would be ineffective given plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in reducing plaintiff’s damages from $420,000 to $300,000 in plaintiff’s Copyright Act and common law claims for trespass and conversion, where plaintiff alleged that defendant wrongfully discarded plaintiff’s artwork and other items in rental storage unit after plaintiff had failed to pay rent on said unit. Jury awarded Plaintiff $120,000 in damages for four pieces of artwork protected under Copyright Act, and $300,000 in plaintiff’s common law claims for loss of all artwork and other belongings stored in rental unit. Instant reduction was proper to avoid plaintiff receiving double recovery, where jury’s damages assessment in common law verdict included same artwork covered under Copyright Act. Dist. Ct. also did not err in allowing defendant to question plaintiff about his 2003 conviction for making false statement to FBI, even though said conviction was over 10 years old. There is no absolute bar to admitting conviction that is over 10 years old, and no reversible error occurred, where use of said conviction did not skew jury’s verdict since plaintiff had obtained partial favorable verdict from jury.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for lack of standing plaintiff-divorced father’s section 1983 action against defendant-psychologist, who concluded that plaintiff had improperly used severe alienation tactics to drive wedge between plaintiff’s children and their mother, where plaintiff alleged that certain provision of Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act were unconstitutional to extent that they allowed state court to change plaintiff’s custody on showing that one parent endangered child’s physical/emotional health. Plaintiff could not use section 1983 action to press his claim, since: (1) defendant sued wrong party since defendant did not enforce any law; and (2) plaintiff could not sue State of Illinois, since State is not “person” for purposes of section 1983 action. Moreover, plaintiff would have preclusion issues even if he had standing to bring section 1983 action, since he could have raised instant constitutional issue in prior state-court proceeding that addressed custody issue.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs-female prisoners’ section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated their 4^th Amendment rights by conducting group strip search of between 8 to 10 inmates, where said inmates were required to stand naked next to each other, remove their tampons, spread their buttocks, and then stand on floor that was dirtied with menstrual blood. Ct. found that plaintiffs had only potential 8^th Amendment claim and held that Dist. Ct. could properly dismiss plaintiff’s 4^th Amendment claim, since: (1) visual inspections of prisoners are not subject to analysis under 4^th Amendment; and (2) while 4^th Amendment might apply to procedures that entail intrusions into plaintiffs’ bodies, plaintiff failed to show that prison staff touched any inmate during strip search. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-out-of-state title insurance company’s action alleging that defendant-Commissioner discriminated against plaintiff, where he imposed fines for regulatory violations that were greater than fines imposed on similar in-state title companies. Plaintiff had waived instant issue on appeal, where plaintiff had previously signed agreement to pay said fines that included clause that plaintiff had “waived right to judicial review of the matter.” Fact that lawyer for plaintiff told plaintiff that it faced potential $9.5 million fine if it did not agree to instant $70,082 fine and $42,202 consumer reimbursement did not constitute duress, since there were no threats of violence, and lawyer’s mention of potential $9.5 million fine was accurate statement of law.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in plaintiff’s motion to stay her extradition to Lithuania to stand trial on four charges arising out of plaintiff’s custody battle over her niece, after Magistrate Judge had initially certified plaintiff as extraditable, Secretary of State had granted Lithuania’s extradition request, and plaintiff had filed habeas petition challenging Magistrate’s and Secretary of State’s orders. Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiff was unlikely to prevail on her challenge to Magistrate Judge’s certification order where: (1) plaintiff failed to show that her custody-related charges amounted to “relative political offenses;” and (2) Magistrate Judge could properly find that said charges were supported by probable cause based on multiple statement of witnesses who observed plaintiff’s conduct while authorities were attempting to obtain custody of plaintiff’s niece. Fact that plaintiff presented video that partially recorded custody incident did not require different result. Ct. also rejected plaintiff’s claims that: (1) Secretary of State violated her constitutional right to hearing before Secretary prior to Secretary’s grant of extradition, or that she would face atrocious procedures and punishments if forced to stand trial in Lithuania; and (2) stay was warranted due to pendency of legislation that would have excluded her from scope of relevant extradition treaty.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing as untimely plaintiff’s libel claim, alleging that defendant posted on websites certain defamatory statements indicating that plaintiff was “scam and fraud” and “stole money,” even though defendant had updated one posting that was within relevant one-year limitations period. While pro se plaintiff argued that Dist. Ct. improperly failed to offer him opportunity to amend his libel claim and to advise him on how to do so, Rule 15(a)(2) does not require Dist. Ct. to offer parties legal guidance on how to amend their pleadings, since such requirement would force Dist. Ct. to go outside their roles as neutral judges. Ct. further found that updating untimely 2011 posting with timely 2015 post, without changing content of 2011 post, was insufficient to escape “single-publishing” rule that precludes plaintiff from alleging timely defamation claim, since 2015 posting related back to 2011 posting.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff-university student’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-university and university officials violated his due process rights by suspending him, which resulted in loss of Navy ROTC scholarship, after finding that he was guilty of sexual violence against female student, where defendants used unfair procedures to obtain guilty finding. Plaintiff adequately alleged that university deprived him of protected liberty interest to pursue naval occupation, and that university used unfair procedures when determining his guilt, where: (1) university did not disclose its evidence to plaintiff; (2) two of three panel members admitted to not reading investigation report; and (3) decision-makers found that accuser was more credible without speaking to accuser and without accuser supplying sworn statement regarding her claim of sexual misconduct. However, university officials could properly assert qualified immunity with respect to plaintiff’s individual capacity claims, but plaintiff could proceed against said officials on his official capacity claims seeking injunctive relief to obtain reinstatement and expungement of instant guilty finding. Plaintiff also adequately alleged Title IX claim, where he asserted that university discriminated against him on account of his gender, where plaintiff claimed that university had financial motive to find him and other males guilty of sexual assault.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s class action, alleging that defendant, which services plaintiff’s federally-backed student loans, made misrepresentations regarding how plaintiff and others could proceed when experiencing difficulties in paying off said loans, and that said misrepresentations violated Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act. While Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff’s action was preempted by federal Higher Education Act (HEA), which prohibits state laws that mandate disclosure requirements concerning said loans, instant action concerned alleged affirmative misrepresentations, as opposed to failures by defendant to disclose certain information. As such, any borrower who reasonably relied on said misrepresentations to his or her detriment is not barred by HEA from bringing state-law consumer protection and tort claims against defendant-loan servicer.