Federal Civil Practice

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s verdict in favor of plaintiffs-two inmates in defendant-county’s jail, in section 1983 action alleging that defendant-guard sexually assaulted plaintiffs over three-year period during their incarceration, where record showed that guard’s assaults were predatory and criminal, so as to support jury’s $2-million compensatory award to each plaintiff, as well as its $3.75 million punitive damages award to each plaintiff. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in denying county’s motion for judgment as matter of law, where record failed to contain necessary link between guard’s assaults and county's policies. Ct. also rejected plaintiffs’ claims that: (1) defendant’s policies did not provide adequate measures to prevent sexual assaults by its guards; (2) county was deliberately indifferent to obvious need to update its sexual assault policies, even though jail had no prior history of sexual assaults; (3) county promoted toxic culture within jail; and (4) county failed to properly train its guards to avoid sexual assaults. Plaintiff further failed to show that guard was highly likely to sexually assault plaintiffs. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in directing plaintiff’s counsel to pay $66,191.75 in attorney fees to defendants as sanction for defending against defendants’ motion for summary judgment, where discovery on plaintiff’s retaliatory discharge claim indicated that there was no evidentiary support for such claim. Record showed that: (1) after Dist. Ct. had granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, Ct. of Appeals found that plaintiff had failed to produce any admissible evidence to support claims identified by plaintiff on appeal; and (2) Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff’s responses to motion for summary judgment were laden with disingenuous and misleading statements and contained statement of facts that did not comply with Local Rule 56.1 standards. Ct. further noted that counsel’s duty to conduct reasonable investigation into law and facts is renewed at each stage of litigation, including summary judgment stage, and that instant fee award was based on time spent by defendants’ counsel in drafting Rule 11 letters, seeking summary judgment and requesting instant fees. Fact that defendants had not filed formal “motion for sanctions” prior to seeking instant Rule 11 sanctions did not preclude them from obtaining said sanctions, where defendants’ counsel had previously sent letters and emails to plaintiff’s counsel threatening to seek Rule 11 sanctions if plaintiff continued with instant litigation.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-prison official’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical condition (i.e., lack of left hand) by failing to accommodate or otherwise take any action in his request for lower bunk-bed pass, where said failure led to plaintiff’s slip and fall 11 days later while attempting to climb down from top bunk. While Dist. Ct. found that defendant was not deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s condition because defendant had no authority to issue lower bunk pass, plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to create triable fact on deliberate indifference issue, where record showed that others in prison had authority to issue lower bunk-bed pass, and, according to plaintiff, defendant had failed to make any effort to alert said personnel to allow him to obtain said pass.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison medical officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s back condition by either repeating ineffective treatments for his back or failing to prescribe other, more “better” treatments/medicines because they were too expensive. Plaintiff failed to present evidence that defendants’ treatments/medicines caused him any harm, where plaintiff failed to identify any treatment/medicines that would have been more effective in treating his back.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s motion under Rule of Crim. Pro. 41(g) for return of property seized by govt., where govt. had initiated administrative forfeiture proceedings under 18 USC section 983 with respect to plaintiff’s watch, $4,035 in cash, plaintiff’s car and nine firearms that had been seized following his arrest on wire fraud charge. Govt. sent plaintiff required notice that plaintiff needed to submit claim for each property seized, and record showed that after govt. denied plaintiff’s claims, plaintiff failed to request reconsideration, which triggered govt.’s entry into “Declaration of Abandonment.” Plaintiff could not use Rule 41(g) to seek return of his property, since instant administrative forfeiture proceedings were civil in nature, and Rule 41(g) could only be used in criminal proceedings. As such, plaintiff’s claims that seized property was illegally seized or that govt. violated plea agreement in seeking instant forfeiture was outside scope of Ct.’s review. Ct. further noted that although govt. had failed to abide by certain deadlines in seeking instant forfeiture, plaintiff failed to raise said failure in Dist. Ct. or on appeal.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated his 8^th Amendment rights by providing inadequate nutrition through prison “brunch” program that served only two meals per day. Record showed that brunch program provided adequate nutrition as designed, and plaintiff failed to show that instant defendants were aware of his claim that subordinate prison staff were not serving brunch menus as designed in brunch program and were instead providing inadequate amounts of food to prisoners.

Ct. of Appeals dismissed plaintiff’s appeal of dismissal of her Title VII and ADA actions, where: (1) plaintiff missed relevant 30-day deadline for filing notice of appeal under 28 USC section 2107(a); and (2) while plaintiff timely filed motion to extend time to file notice of appeal, plaintiff’s excuse for seeking extension was fact that she was attempting to find counsel to take case. Instant 30-day deadline for filing notice of appeal is jurisdictional, and plaintiff’s unsworn and unsupported statement that she needed extra time to obtain counsel was insufficient to demonstrate excusable neglect or good cause as required under 28 USC section 2107(c).

Dist. Ct. erred in finding that prohibition for possession of firearms on individuals who have been convicted of crimes having maximum sentences exceeding one year, as contained in 18 USC section 922(g)(1), violated Second Amendment, even though Dist. Ct. found that section 922(g)(1) prevents nonviolent felons from possessing firearms. Ct. of Appeals found that Dist. Ct. decision conflicted with Kanter, 919 F.3d 437.  Moreover, Ct. of Appeals held that section 922(g)(1) applied to plaintiff, where, as here, his maximum sentence on his wire fraud conviction exceeded one year, even though plaintiff received sentence of  three-years' probation.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant’s refusal to place his name on primary ballot for Cook County Sheriff due to his inability to obtain 8,236 valid signatures violated his 1^st and 14^th Amendment rights. Instant access requirement was only slight burden, and burden of obtaining said signatures was justified by Illinois’s legitimate interests in preventing voter confusion, blocking frivolous candidates from ballot and protecting integrity of elections. Plaintiff obtained over 5,400 valid signatures, and Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that strict scrutiny analysis applies whenever statute imposes higher ballot-access requirement for countywide office than 5,000 valid signature requirement for statewide offices.

In section 1983 action alleging that defendant-election board’s decision to not approve in-person early voting satellite offices for elections taking place from 2010 to 2016 violated voters’ First and 14^th Amendment rights, Ct. of Appeals vacated Dist. Ct.’s Consent Decree that required defendant to establish five in-person early voting satellite offices for future general elections and two in-person early voting satellite offices for primary elections. Defendant changed voting scheme after issuance of Consent Decree, which replaced precinct-based structure at time of issuance of Consent Decree with vote center plan that required County to have two in-person early voting satellite offices for primary elections and six in-person early voting satellite offices for general elections. As such, Ct. found that vacatur of Consent Decree was required because both parties agreed that Decree should no longer be in effect given change in voting scheme.