Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff’s complaint under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), where defendant-debt collector sent letter to plaintiff stating that important information regarding her account was on back page of first page of letter, but instead provided important 30-day validation of debt notice on front of second page. While plaintiff contended that letter violated FDCPA by misdirecting her into believing that validation notice was not important, Ct. found no violation of FDCPA, where validation notice appeared in clear, readily readable font near top of page two, such that unsophisticated consumer would be expected to read it. Moreover, while language of first page referred to important information on back of first page, such language would not impose barrier for consumer to read contents of second page. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s contention that initial collection letter lacking validation notice on first page must clearly and unambiguously direct consumer to location of validation notice.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ requests for class action certification for two cases alleging that defendants violated Telephone Consumer Protection Act by sending unsolicited fax advertisements to plaintiffs. Legality of defendants’ actions may end up depending on whether fax was sent with permission or not and may also turn on adequacy of defendants' opt-out notices on faxes in question. Moreover, FCC had granted waivers of compliance with Solicited Fax Rule at issue in both cases. As such, there was enough issues regarding solicitation, permission and pre-existing relationships to support finding that class action was not superior mechanism for adjudicating potential class members’ cases.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in entering contempt order and sanctioning defendant $34,905 in attorney fees and costs associated with plaintiff’s efforts to obtain contempt order arising out of allegations that defendant had violated terms of prior consent judgment by continuing to infringe on plaintiff’s trademark. Record showed that defendant’s counsel failed to file written response to plaintiff’s motion for issuance of contempt order and failed to appear at hearing on plaintiff’s motion. As such, Dist. Ct. could properly sanction defendant for its counsel’s failure to file response or attend hearing, and fact that defendant eventually filed motion to reconsider issuance of instant sanction did not relieve it of any contempt sanction. Moreover, Dist. Ct. was not required to grant defendant’s motion for reconsideration, where defendant merely alleged that its local and national counsel had miscommunication as to who would file response and attend hearing.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-jail personnel’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-decedent’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated his 14^th Amendment rights, where plaintiff died after physician hired by jail over-prescribed methadone while plaintiff was detained and awaiting trial. Record showed that plaintiff had already settled claim against physician, and plaintiff failed to establish viable claim under objective reasonableness standard for pretrial detainees, where: (1) defendant-nurse merely administered methadone dosages pursuant to physician’s directive; and (2) nurse otherwise attended to plaintiff’s medical needs. Fact that nurse failed to take plaintiff’s vital signs on morning of his death demonstrated, at worst, act of negligence, which was insufficient  to support claim of inadequate medical care under 14^th Amendment. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in: (1) granting summary judgment filed by defendants-Sheriff and jail captain, since both individuals were not responsible for plaintiff’s medical care and took no steps to either contribute or detract from said care; and (2) granting defendant-County’s motion for summary judgment, since plaintiff failed to factually support claim that defendant made decision to house plaintiff in jail as opposed to hospital based on policy that favored cost savings over necessary medical treatment.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing as untimely certain counts of plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action against defendants-prison officials in which plaintiff claimed that defendants prolonged his sentence by extending his probation without authority based upon alleged violations that occurred after established 1995 conclusion of his probation. Applicable limitations period under Wisconsin law was 6 years, and instant claims were timely, since: (1) said period accrued in 2104, when circuit court invalidated sentence that had been imposed on one of plaintiff’s alleged violations of probation that occurred after 1995; and (2) plaintiff was in various forms of custody between initial 1995 improper extension of his probation and instant 2014 circuit court ruling. Also, Dist. Ct. erred in granting summary judgment motion filed by two defendants, where plaintiff presented evidence that, despite knowing plaintiff’s complaint that he was being held without legal authority, said defendants were deliberately indifferent to said complaint by failing to undertake any meaningful investigation to either confirm or disprove legality of plaintiff’s continued detention.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on grounds of legislative immunity plaintiffs-state senator and one of his constituents’ section 1983 action alleging that defendant-Senate Minority Leader violated their First Amendment rights by denying plaintiff-state senator certain resources granted to defendant for distribution to other Republican senators, where: (1) plaintiff state senator had been elected to Senate as Republican; and (2) defendant expelled plaintiff state senator from Senate Republican Caucus following state senator’s decision to run as Conservative Party candidate for Governor. Legislative Immunity applies only to legislators acting in their legislative capacity, and instant decisions by defendant about who is included within Republican Caucus and how to allocate resources to Caucus members are protected under said privilege. Ct. further noted that defendant’s decisions at issue in instant complaint did not serve to constructively evict plaintiff-state senator from state Senate, where state senator had access to other resources that would allow him to have his personal staff and to obtain assistance in drafting legislation.

Plaintiff could not proceed on his action under Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Act (RARPA) seeking additional attorney fees, arising out of plaintiff’s prior state court action against defendant seeking compensation for land needed for road project. Plaintiff sought more than $110,000 in attorney fees in prior state court action that resulted in $7,100 settlement for plaintiff’s land, and state court found that plaintiff was entitled to only $31,561 in attorney fees. As such, res judicata applied to preclude plaintiff from seeking additional attorney fees in instant action, where both actions concerned same transaction, and where plaintiff could have sought relief under RARPA in prior state court action. Moreover, state court determined that attorney fee award exceeding $31,561 would be unreasonable, and state court’s resolution of that issue is conclusive on attorney fee issue.

Dist. Ct. did not err in sanctioning defendant’s counsel $500 under Rule 11 and granting plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees sustained in responding to defendant’s motion for fees as “prevailing party” in Copyright Act action, under circumstances where plaintiff had previously settled case with defendant for $7,000, and where plaintiff had dismissed case with prejudice after defendant had paid plaintiff settlement figure. Dist. Ct. could properly view defendant’s motion for attorney fees as frivolous, even though defendant had argued that it was prevailing party because plaintiff had dismissed case with prejudice after plaintiff had filed answer, since defendant’s position was wholly unsupported by case law. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly impose $500 sanction under Rule 11 because defendant was misleading in its motion for fees, since it failed to note in motion that case had been settled and that it had paid plaintiff pursuant to said settlement. Also, Dist. Ct. properly granted plaintiff’s motion for fees under 28 USC section 1927, where defendant’s motion for fees as prevailing party was made in “objective bad faith,” since reasonably careful attorney would have known that said request was legally unsound.

Dist. Ct. erred in entering partial judgment in favor of certain defendants-prison officials in jury trial on plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that said defendants retaliated against him for filing prior grievances and lawsuits by issuing phony disciplinary report and for conducting sham disciplinary hearing. With respect to both claims, Dist. Ct. improperly overlooked plaintiff’s testimony that provided reasonable basis from which reasonable jury could infer retaliatory motive, where plaintiff testified that: (1) two defendants orchestrated plaintiff’s late return to his cell to trump up false disciplinary charge; and (2) defendants-hearing officers stated during hearing on said charge that plaintiff should not have filed prior grievances/lawsuits if he did not want to be in his current predicament. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s initial request for recruitment of counsel, where plaintiff failed to indicate that he had previously attempted to recruit counsel. Moreover, Dist. Ct. was not required to revisit issue in plaintiff’s subsequent request for recruitment of counsel, even though plaintiff alleged that he had made efforts to retain counsel, where initial request had been properly resolved.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunction in section 1983 action alleging that defendant-Clerk of Circuit Court of Cook County violated its First Amendment rights by not making newly filed complaints immediately available to press at moment of receipt of said complaints by her office, instead of making said complaints available only after processing and accepting said complaints, which could take as long as three days. Ct. of Appeals, in noting that newly filed appeals in its clerk’s office and in clerk’s office of U.S. Supreme Ct. also undergo administrative processes prior to making said filings available to public, found that Dist. Ct. should have abstained from exercising jurisdiction over instant case, since principles of comity, equity and federalism dictated that plaintiff’s action be first considered by state courts regarding how state court clerks manage their filing procedures and timing of press access.