Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-City’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendant’s policy, that precluded plaintiffs from registering as sex offenders under Illinois Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA) because they were homeless, violated their due process rights. Plaintiffs’ right to register under SORA is not cognizable liberty interest, which precluded plaintiffs from establishing due process claim. Fact that plaintiffs’ failure to register under SORA might imprison them in future did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s request to dismiss on preemption grounds plaintiff’s state-court action, alleging that defendant-manufacturer of Paxil (brand-name version of paroxetine) was negligent in failing to warn in said drug’s label that there was association between use of said drug and suicide in older adults. Record showed that in 2007, FDA had approved language in instant label that use of said drug had association with suicide in individuals under age 24, and that FDA had repeatedly denied defendant’s request to change label to include similar warning for older adults. As such, federal law preempted instant state-law claim that defendant should have included warning of suicide for older adults under these circumstances. Moreover, plaintiff failed to show that defendant had acquired new evidence demonstrating suicide risk for older adults subsequent to 2007 FDA directive to defendant and others to use language in subject label that is at issue in instant lawsuit, so as to allow defendant to include adult suicide warning in label under CBE regulations.

In action seeking civil forfeiture of $100,120 that police seized from one claimant on train bound for Seattle, Washington, after dog registered positive reaction for presence of drugs in bag containing said cash, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying claimants’ request for spoliation instruction under circumstances where govt. had exchanged seized cash for cashier’s check shortly after said seizure, which precluded claimants from testing seized cash for presence of drugs. While Dist. Ct. agreed with claimants that said instruction was warranted, record also showed that claimants had waived said issue, where prior Dist. Ct. judge had denied claimants’ similar request, and claimants failed to appeal said ruling in prior successful appeal of entry of summary judgment in govt.’s favor. Moreover, instant Dist. Ct. did not err in giving instruction that told jury that govt. need not link seized funds to specific controlled substance transaction or show that claimants had committed controlled substance offense, and that govt. need only show that seized funds were linked to some unidentified unlawful controlled substance transaction. Too, record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s finding that seized cash was subject to forfeiture, where: (1) one claimant, who fit drug courier profile, purchase one-way train ticket and gave conflicting reasons for carrying instant large quantity of cash; (2) another claimant gave unsupported explanation that he had acquired said cash from legitimate employment; and (3) dog, with perfect track record for discovering drugs, gave positive alert for presence of drugs in bag with seized cash.

In section 1983 action filed by plaintiff-prisoner against defendant-provider of medical services to prison, in which jury awarded plaintiff $10,000 in compensatory and $500,000 in punitive damages arising out of defendant’s decision to deny doctors’ request for surgical evaluation of plaintiff’s ankle, where defendant instead treated said ankle conservatively, Dist. Ct. erred in reducing punitive award to $50,000 without giving plaintiff option to either accept said reduction or participate in new trial on issue of all damages. Although Dist. found that jury’s punitive damages award violated due process clause, said reduction to 5 times compensatory award was arbitrary, and defendant had never requested that Dist. Ct. reduce punitive damages award without giving plaintiff option of new trial on damages. As such, remand was required to allow plaintiff to make such election. Ct. further declined to rule as to whether punitive damage award in section 1983 action at five times compensatory award would violate either constitutional of statutory limitations.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting plaintiff-debtor’s motion for summary judgment in action alleging that defendant-debt collector violated section 1692c(a)(2) of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) by serving debtor directly with copy of default judgment motion in underlying state-court proceeding to collect on said debt, where attorney had appeared on behalf of plaintiff at two court proceedings without filing either written entry of appearance or other pleading on behalf of plaintiff. Under Ill. Supreme Ct. Rule 11, defendant was required to serve plaintiff, as party to lawsuit, with copy of default judgment motion, since Rule 11 states that lawyer becomes attorney of record only if he or she files written appearance or other written pleading on behalf of plaintiff. As such, there could no violation of FDCPA, since Rule 11 required that defendant serve plaintiff with said motion. Ct. further noted that section 1692c(a) of FDCPA explicitly allows debt collector to communicate with represented debtor, where, as here, court of competent jurisdiction permits it to do so.

In action alleging that defendants breached contract calling for plaintiff-law firm to provide legal services, under circumstances where plaintiff sent engagement letter, which set forth hourly fees and other terms, which was never signed by defendants, and where plaintiff nevertheless provided said legal services, Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing as untimely plaintiff’s related claim for unjust enrichment, since: (1) applicable limitations period for such claim was five years; (2) said services were rendered in 2009, and thus any claim accrued on date said services were provided; and (3) plaintiff waited until 2016 to file instant lawsuit. However, Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing as untimely plaintiff’s breach of contract claim, since: (1) instant engagement letter, though unsigned, qualified as written contract for purposes of Illinois limitations law; and (2) applicable limitations period for written contracts is 10 years. Ct. rejected Dist. Ct.’s belief that fact that defendants had not signed engagement letter meant that five-year limitations period for unwritten contracts applied.

In section 1983 action by plaintiff-prisoner alleging that defendants-prison officials used excessive force and exhibited deliberate indifference to his medical needs, Dist. Ct. abused its discretion in denying plaintiff’s sixth request for recruitment of counsel filed near start of his trial. While Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion when denying plaintiff’s first five requests for recruitment of counsel, as record showed that plaintiff appeared competent to represent himself with assistance of jailhouse lawyer during pre-trial phase of case, Dist. Ct. failed to adequately evaluate plaintiff’s competency to represent himself with respect to 6^th request for recruitment of counsel since: (1) jailhouse lawyer had been transferred to different prison and could no longer assist plaintiff; and (2) Dist. Ct. failed to consider added burdens on plaintiff to litigate case by himself, where instant trial before jury took place via video-conference, and where said trial required plaintiff to draft trial-related pleadings, to develop questions for his own witnesses and cross-examine defendants’ witnesses, and to prepare for opening and closing statements.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-police officer’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant made unlawful entry into plaintiff’s home, where search warrant did not clearly describe plaintiff’s apartment, since warrant listed “Apartment 1,” while plaintiff’s apartment was “1A.” While police normally must clear up any ambiguity prior to conducting search, instant search was not unlawful, where: (1) defendant was not aware at time of search that there was another apartment in building; and (2) defendant produced reliable contemporary documents indicating that plaintiff’s apartment was correct target of search authorized by ambiguous warrant and had confirmed with tipster that plaintiff’s apartment was where she had purchased drugs. Moreover, defendant had arguable probable cause to arrest plaintiff, even though defendant did not exactly match description of individual that was subject of search, since: (1) defendant testified that he could not be sure that plaintiff was not subject of search warrant, and plaintiff otherwise failed to produce identification to confirm his claimed identity; and (2) defendant arrested and released plaintiff within 15 minutes after defendant confirmed that plaintiff was wrong person.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s verdict in favor of defendants-police officials in section 1983 action alleging that defendants had violated plaintiff’s 4^th Amendment rights during search of his apartment during hot pursuit of another individual whom defendants believed had entered into plaintiff’s home. Defendants’ warrantless entry into plaintiff’s home did not violate 4^th Amendment, since: (1) said entry was accompanied by exigent circumstances where defendants received report that actual culprit had discarded gun while being chased by police shortly before entry into building containing plaintiff’s apartment; and (2) reasonable person in position of defendants would not have known that plaintiff’s apartment was separate from apartment that culprit had actually entered. Also, defendants had probable cause to conduct investigatory stop of plaintiff, where plaintiff had same last name and hair style as actual culprit, and where plaintiff acted aggressively toward defendants when they entered plaintiff’s home. Also, defendants had probable cause to arrest plaintiff on charges of resisting arrest and obstruction of justice, where plaintiff had failed to comply with directives of defendants and had physically struggled with one defendant before being placed under arrest.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-restaurant’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s action alleging that defendant violated Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), where third-party sent unsolicited fax to plaintiff “on behalf of defendant,” indicating that third-party was teaming up with defendant for “Lunch N’ Learn” opportunities for doctors to make presentations to companies, where said opportunities would come with complementary food from defendant. Dist. Ct. did not err in using agency principles to find that instant fax was not sent on behalf of defendant, where defendant was not aware that defendant was going to send any fax to anyone, and where defendant did not give third-party permission to use defendant’s logo in fax. As such, plaintiff was required under TCPA to show that third-party had express actual authority to send fax on defendant’s behalf or had implied or apparent authority to do so, which plaintiff had failed to show. Fact that Dist. Ct. had precluded plaintiff from deposing two individuals did not require different result, even though plaintiff had claimed that said individuals had relevant information on issues in case, where: (1) Dist. Ct. had based its refusal to depose said individuals on plaintiff’s failure to indicate how it was going to proceed against three of four defendants who had been served with instant complaint, but who had failed to make appearance; (2) Dist. Ct. could properly based instant refusal on need to avoid possibility of duplication of discovery efforts should any of three of said defendants decide to make appearance and wish to also depose said witnesses; and (3) plaintiff could only speculate as to what said individuals might be able to say with respect to defendant’s permission to have third-party send fax.