Federal Civil Practice

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider appellant’s appeal of Dist. Ct. order denying motion to reopen action under exception to Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) that he and other Hungarian Jews brought against various entities of Hungarian government for damages sustained during Holocaust. Record showed that: (1) in original FSIA action, appellant and others were directed to exhaust their remedies in Hungarian courts prior to seeking relief under instant action; (2) third-party class member in original action subsequently sought and was denied relief in Hungarian courts; and (3) Dist. Ct. attributed underlying motion to reopen to said third-party instead of instant appellant. As such, Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider appeal of Dist. Ct’s denial order because instant appellant was not subject to order denying motion to reopen. Accordingly, only third-party could have filed any appeal of Dist. Ct.’s order.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants subjected plaintiff to unlawful search and arrest that resulted in criminal charges to which plaintiff had ultimately been acquitted. Record showed that informant, who had been reliable in past, supplied defendants with information about guns in plaintiff’s apartment, and that defendants had brought informant to judge who issued two search warrants. Dist. Ct. could properly find existence of probable cause so as to defeat plaintiff’s claims contained in his section 1983 complaint due to submission of informant’s tip to judge. Moreover, plaintiff waived any argument regarding dispute over existence of informant, since: (1) plaintiff had failed to raise issue in Dist. Ct.; and (2) plaintiff had relied on existence of informant when making different argument in front of Dist. Ct. Plaintiff also waived any Brady claim regarding defendant’s alleged failure to procure fingerprint evidence, since plaintiff had never alleged said claim in his amended complaint.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for want of personal jurisdiction claim by Illinois plaintiff that defendants-citizens of Pennsylvania, California and Texas subjected plaintiff to conspiracy by filing fraudulent lawsuits in Pennsylvania, California and Texas regarding exposure of defendants' clients to asbestos allegedly manufactured by plaintiff. Parties conceded that Dist. Ct. lacked general personal jurisdiction over defendants, and Ct. of Appeals found that plaintiff did not establish specific personal jurisdiction over defendants, since defendants' directing pleadings, discovery and other litigation communications to plaintiff in Illinois, who faced said litigation in other states, was insufficient to create specific personal jurisdiction over defendants, where plaintiff was only link between defendants and instant Illinois forum. This especially true, Ct. found, since any unlawful conduct at issue in instant lawsuit was targeted at litigation conducted in other states.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s action alleging that defendant violated their due process rights by disconnecting their water service, where basis of defendant’s motion was its claim that res judicata precluded plaintiffs from proceeding on instant claim due to settlement of prior class action that contained same allegations as instant complaint. Language in settlement of prior action provided that prior claim was “fully, finally and forever resolve[d], discharge[d] and settle[d]…on behalf of named plaintiffs and entire class,” which was defined as all customers of defendant’s water department who had their water service terminated. Moreover, plaintiffs conceded that there was identity of causes of action, as well as identity of parties with respect to prior and instant actions. Ct. of Appeals also found that settlement of prior action served as final judgment for purposes of applying res judicata, where settlement and dismissal of prior claim with prejudice completely resolved case among instant parties.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff’s action under Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), alleging that defendant’s printing of “In God We Trust” on U.S. currency violated RFRA, as well as plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. While plaintiff argued that instant motto amounted to government endorsement of “monotheistic” concept of God, which conflicted with his religion and forced him to affirm religious message that was opposite of what he espoused, Ct. of Appeals found that printing motto on U.S. currency was neither unconstitutional nor violation of RFRA, since any religious content in motto did not go beyond statutory or constitutional boundaries. Ct. further noted that printing of motto on currency was related to legitimate governmental objective of acknowledging aspect of nation’s heritage.

In wrongful death action by plaintiffs-representatives of their son-NHL hockey player who died after overdose of opioids, alleging that defendant-hockey league breached its duty under players’ collective bargaining agreement to monitor and curb son’s drug addiction when administering its substance abuse program, Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing said action, where plaintiffs failed to file response to portion of defendant’s motion to dismiss. Defendant asserted, among other things, in motion to dismiss that plaintiffs had failed to state viable cause of action, and record showed that while plaintiffs had addressed certain aspects of instant motion to dismiss, they had failed to address contention that complaint failed to state viable cause of action. As such,

Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that resolution of parties’ condemnation action barred plaintiffs from proceeding against defendant in instant action under Fair Housing Act, where both actions concerned same apartment complex, and where condemnation action resulted in final decision. While plaintiffs conceded that final decision in condemnation action collaterally estopped them from proceeding on instant action, they nevertheless argued that Dist. Ct. violated their 7^th Amendment right to jury trial in making decision to conduct trial on condemnation action before proceeding with instant Fair Housing Act claim. However, sequence of proceeding on instant claims was determined by plaintiffs’ pretrial actions with respect to both claims.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-window manufacturer’s motion for summary judgment in state-court action by plaintiffs-window supplier and certain homeowners (that had been removed to federal court), alleging that defendant breached service agreement that required plaintiff to make repairs for defendant’s windows installed in homeowners’ homes in exchange for plaintiff getting 3 percent discount on purchase of defendant’s windows, as well as defendant’s promise to supply needed repair parts at no cost. Record showed that plaintiff-window supplier received discounts and parts, and Ct. rejected plaintiffs’ claim that defendant should have either reinstalled or replaced defective windows, since applicable contract did not call for such a remedy. However, Dist. Ct. should not have entertained homeowners’ breach of warranty claims since: (1) no homeowner satisfied $75,000 amount in controversy requirement to support removal of their claims to Dist. Ct.; and (2) homeowners’ warranty claims were not sufficiently similar to plaintiff-window supplier’s contractual claim against defendant (that did satisfy all requirements for removal jurisdiction) to qualify for federal court consideration under supplemental jurisdiction. Moreover, under section 28 USC section 1441(c), there is no jurisdictional obstacle to removing whole lawsuit and then sending homeowner’s claims back to state court.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff-probationer’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-probation officer and assistant state’s attorney violated his constitutional rights by taking measures to “kidnap” him to Florida, where plaintiff spent 106 days in prison without defendants obtaining court orders to do so. Record showed that at time of alleged incident, plaintiff was serving terms of probation on both Florida and Illinois convictions relating to possession of child pornography, and that plaintiff had not passed “sexual history” polygraphs required under terms of probation and had refused defendant-probation officer’s demand to sign behavioral agreement that added additional rules to plaintiff’s probation. Plaintiff’s claim that he was wrongfully forced to return to Florida was untimely, since he failed to file instant action within two years from date of his release from Florida prison. Moreover, both defendants were entitled to absolute immunity with respect to portion of complaint alleging that defendants either filed unwarranted petitions to revoke or extend his probation or sought to have him comply with existing terms of his probation, since alleged misconduct by both defendants concerned performance of their official acts. Also, Younger doctrine required Dist. Ct. to abstain from taking jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claim that probation officer was continuing to exercise improper supervision of him since plaintiff was essentially asking Dist. Ct. to intervene in ongoing state matter.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiffs’ motion to remand matter back to state court, where plaintiffs’ class action, alleging that defendant had violated Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act (FACTA) by printing credit/debit card receipts that included expiration dates of said cards, had been removed to Dist. Ct. and in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss instant matter based on fact that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to bring instant cause of action. While Ct. of Appeals agreed with defendant that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing since plaintiffs alleged mere violation of FACTA without alleging any injury in fact, Ct. further found that Dist. Ct. lacked jurisdiction over instant complaint to enter any dismissal order due to plaintiffs’ lack of standing. Thus, Dist. Ct.’s only recourse was to remand matter back to state court for further proceedings. Ct. rejected defendant’s argument that Dist. Ct. had jurisdiction because complaint alleged violation of federal statute (FACTA) and further found that defendant, as party invoking federal jurisdiction upon its removal of complaint from state court, had burden of establishing that all elements of jurisdiction, including plaintiffs’ Article III standing, existed at time of removal. Ct. also noted that should plaintiffs be able to establish standing in state court through amendment of complaint, defendant would be able to seek removal of case to Dist. Ct. through 28 USC section 1446(b)(3).