Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-School Board’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-School Board member’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant violated her due process rights by launching investigation into plaintiff’s alleged bullying of student, and then publicly criticizing plaintiff for her handling of dispute with student. Plaintiff failed to establish any deprivation of constitutionally recognized liberty or property interest necessary to establish viable due process claim, as none of plaintiff’s alleged property interests, i.e., feeling of fair-dealing on part of govt., plaintiff’s mental and emotional well-being, and entitlement to processes mandated by state or defendant’s own policies was protected liberty or property interest for purposes of Due Process Clause. Ct. further noted that Constitution does not forbid official investigations carried out by public officials, and that defendant's investigation ended with no change in plaintiff’s legal rights or legal status.

In action alleging that employees of defendant made defamatory statements against plaintiff when refusing to fill prescriptions written by plaintiff, defendant was entitled to judgment with respect to three of four statements at issue in instant lawsuit, since: (1) plaintiff needed to show that employees who made statements knew that their statements were false; (2) while plaintiff established that certain individuals within defendant knew that said statements were false, plaintiff failed to present evidence that employees/speakers knew that said statements were false; and (3) any knowledge that defendant had as organization regarding veracity of statements could not be imputed to individuals who actually made statements. Also, defendant was entitled to new trial on fourth statement that plaintiff was “under DEA investigation,” where Dist. Ct. improperly precluded defendant from establishing defense that plaintiff was actually subject of DEA investigation, where defendant proffered evidence that plaintiff’s former employer had received subpoena from DEA for records of plaintiff’s former patients.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing instant claim by plaintiffs alleging that defendant breached contract to arbitrate plaintiffs’ dispute with third party, even though Dist. Ct. found that defendant was entitled to arbitral immunity. Record showed that defendant had remanded instant state-court breach of contract action to Dist. Ct., but that defendant had failed to establish that Dist. Ct. had jurisdiction to consider merits of case, where defendant had failed to establish requisite $75,000 amount in controversy threshold for diversity jurisdiction. Specifically, instant state-court complaint merely asserted that plaintiffs sought in excess of $50,000 in damages, and defendant could not point to fact that plaintiffs had alleged in underlying arbitration proceeding that they were entitled to $1 million in damages to satisfy $75,000 threshold, because amount at issue in arbitration proceeding did not count toward amount in controversy in instant breach of contract lawsuit between party to arbitration and arbitrator. Also, plaintiffs paid defendant only $1,800 to conduct underlying arbitration, and defendant could not point to legal fees plaintiffs paid during arbitration or in preparing instant lawsuit to satisfy $75,000 amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction. Moreover, mere presence of issue of federal securities law did not transform instant state-law contract claim into case arising under federal law, since federal question was not central to resolving whether defendant had breached instant contract.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s action alleging that Indiana statute, which prohibits “serious sexual offenders” like plaintiff from entering public schools, violates his right to vote under 1^st and 14^th Amendments, where said statute precludes him from voting at applicable voting poll place that is located within public school. Plaintiff, as felon, does not have constitutional right to vote, where section 2 of 14^th Amendment gives States “affirmative sanction” to exclude felons from voting, and although plaintiff had statutory right to vote that was limited by instant statute, Indiana statute precluding him from entering public school, while giving him alternative means to vote, satisfied rational basis test, where Indiana has legitimate purpose of keeping serious sex offenders away from schools, and instant ban covered only serious sex offenders from entering school property. Also, plaintiff failed to provide any data to support claim that sex offenders are not more likely to recidivate than other types of criminals.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action filed by plaintiff-prisoner, alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs concerning his injured toe and fractured jaw, where Dist. Ct. abused its discretion in denying plaintiff’s request for recruitment of counsel at summary judgment stage of case. Plaintiff’s case involved complex medical evidence that required specialized training to understand. Moreover, plaintiff’s incarceration in Arizona at time instant case was prosecuted added to difficulty for plaintiff to present his case, where injury arose in Indiana. Also, Dist. Ct. made only cursory references to factors used to determine whether recruitment of counsel was appropriate when denying plaintiff’s requests for recruitment of counsel without delving into plaintiff’s personal characteristics or specifics of his case. Also, Dist. Ct.’s failure to recruit counsel was prejudicial, where plaintiff was unable to respond to defendant’s summary judgment motion with admissible evidence, and where plaintiff could have, but was unable to obtain his medical records through proper means.

In section 1983 action by plaintiff-prisoner alleging that defendants-prison officials were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s medical needs, Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff’s lawsuit pursuant to “merit-review hearing” to screen case under 28 USC section 1915A, after finding that plaintiff had impermissibly joined two sets of unrelated claims against different defendants, and after finding that plaintiff, who did not file amended complaint, could not use Rule 59(e) to seek reconsideration of initial dismissal order. While Rule 59(e) did not apply, Dist. Ct. could reconsider instant initial interlocutory order that dismissed case with leave to replead complaint before entering final order, and plaintiff’s claims regarding deliberate indifference to his medical needs and defendants’ alleged interference with his legal mail were sufficiently related so as to allow plaintiff to proceed on both matters in single lawsuit, where plaintiff claimed that alleged interference with his legal mail precluded him from filing timely indifference to his medical needs claim. Ct. further noted that there was no transcript of instant merit-review hearing in record on appeal and found that all Dist. Cts. are required to docket either transcript (at public expense if warranted) or digital recording of said hearing.

In section 1983 action alleging that defendants-University administrators and other students improperly excluded plaintiffs-students from student government by unseating certain elected officers and replacing them with another student government organization, Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiffs’ action against certain defendants, who had not been served with instant complaint while matter was pending in state court and had not been served with amended complaint within 120 days after case had been removed to federal court. Under Rule 4(m), plaintiffs were required to serve defendants with amended complaint within 120 days after date of removal to federal court, and while Dist. Ct. had discretion to give plaintiffs more time to serve defendants, Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in dismissing instant defendants from case due to lack of service. Also, with respect to properly served defendants, record showed that plaintiffs’ claim that defendants had violated their right to organize student government was moot, where: (1) plaintiffs’ request for prospective injunction relief would have been pointless, because 4 years had passed since last alleged wrongful act; (2) several elections had occurred subsequent to last wrongful act, and thus instant dispute over student govt. offices expired when subject terms to said offices had expired; and (3) any plaintiffs who are still on campus are free to persuade current student govt. to pass legislation favorable to their interests. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in dismissing with prejudice certain claims that were properly determined to have been misjoined, since appropriate remedy would have been to merely sever said claims or to dismiss said claims without prejudice.

Ct. of Appeals had jurisdiction to consider plaintiff-prisoner’s appeal of orders entered by Magistrate Judge in plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-three prison guards were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. Record showed that Magistrate Judge dismissed one defendant upon initial screening prior to time state had agreed to have Magistrate Judge consider case on its merits and subsequently granted motion for summary judge filed by remaining two defendants at time after state had given consent under 28 USC section 636(c) to have matter proceed before Magistrate Judge. As such, no remand for entry of final order by Dist. Ct. was required, where: (1) record showed that state’s agreement to have Magistrate Judge proceed on matter covered all three defendants; and (2) said agreement essentially ratified initial order dismissing third defendant from case. As such, record showed that all parties had consented to proceeding before Magistrate Judge by time said judge had entered final judgment dismissing entire action.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiff-City’s motion for issuance of preliminary injunction in action that challenged defendant’s conditioning of plaintiff’s receipt of Byrne JAG grant funds, that allocated money for state and local law enforcement expenses, by requiring that plaintiff give federal authorities notice of individuals in state or local custody who were believed to be aliens and provide federal authorities access to said individuals prior to their release from custody. Defendant could not, under separation of powers doctrine, use sword of federal funding to conscript state and local authorities to assist federal authorities in civil immigration enforcement, especially where Congress, which authorized federal funds at issue, did not impose any immigration enforcement conditions on receipt of said funds. Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that 34 USC section 10102(a)(6) authorized him to impose instant conditions on grant recipients. Dist. Ct. could also impose instant preliminary injunction on nationwide basis. (Partial dissent filed.)

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider appeal by defendants-police officers of Dist. Ct.’s order denying their motion to dismiss on plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants coerced plaintiff into making false confession to crime, even though defendants asserted that they were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to plaintiff’s action. Although collateral-order doctrine permits immediate appeals from denials of motions to dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity at pleading stage where said motions raise only pure legal questions, collateral-order doctrine did not apply because instant appeal raised questions of fact that concerned interpretations regarding contents of videotaped confession, as well as factual issue regarding whether certain statements made to plaintiff during his interrogation were coercive.