Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in action alleging that Indiana statute (House Enrolled Act No. 1337) violated Constitution where it: (1) prohibited person from performing abortion if said person knows that woman is seeking abortion for certain enumerated reasons; (2) instructed those performing abortion to inform woman of said enumerated provisions; and (3) amended provisions in statute to require that aborted fetus be disposed of in same manner as human remains. Enumerated provisions in statute, which prohibited abortion if reason for abortion is because of race, color, national origin, ancestry or gender of fetus, as well as because fetus has been diagnosed or had potential diagnosis of Downs syndrome or any other disability, violated woman’s 14^th Amendment right to terminate her pregnancy prior to fetus’s viability without undue interference from State. Ct. rejected defendants’ contention that although woman may terminate her pregnancy if she decides prior to becoming pregnant, she has no right to terminate pregnancy if she determines after becoming pregnant that she does not want particular child. Ct. further found that fetal disposition provisions violated substantive due process because said provisions had no rational relationship to legitimate state interest. (Partial dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant violated his due process rights by failing to pay plaintiff severance pay following termination of his employment contract as Village Manager. Defendant failed to allege that he had legitimate claim of entitlement to renewal of his employment contract, and instant claim was mere state-law action that otherwise failed to satisfy requirements for diversity jurisdiction. Fact that plaintiff alleged federal theory of relief in form of purported due process violation did not require different result, and instant contract allowed defendant to terminate plaintiff without cause. As such, plaintiff had, at most, right to hearing to determine whether he gets severance pay, which is question of state law only. Also, Ct. rejected plaintiff’s contention that any procedure granted to plaintiff in instant contract created property interests protected by federal Constitution. Result would be different if instant contract had given plaintiff right to remain in job unless he committed misconduct.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs’ class action alleging that defendant committed unfair and deceptive business practices under Illinois and Missouri statutes by advertising and selling one-hour massages but providing instead massages that lasted only 50 minutes. Plaintiffs’ lawsuit was subject to enhanced pleading requirements under Rule 9(b), where instant claim sounded in fraud because it relied upon same baseline allegation that defendant intentionally misled consumers by hiding information about length of massage time on its website. Moreover, plaintiff seeking recovery under Illinois statute failed to establish any damages arising out of defendant’s representation, since there was no allegation in complaint that her belief about length of massage caused her to make appointment for said massage. With respect to claim arising under Missouri statute, plaintiff failed to state in complaint what she saw on defendant’s website that led her to believe that she was paying for one hour of massage time, or what she paid for said massage. Also, Dist. Ct. could properly dismiss complaint with prejudice, where plaintiffs did not request from Dist. Ct. leave to amend complaint or suggest ways in which they might cure defects. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiffs’ action under section 2 of Voting Rights Act (Act), alleging that procedure set forth in City of Chicago that allows its Mayor to appoint (as opposed to citizens being allowed to vote for) members of City’s School Board deprives black and Latino citizens of their right to vote. Section 2 of said Act does not guarantee that any given public office be filled by election rather than by appointment, civil service system, or some other means, and no court has understood section 2 of said Act to require that any office be filled by election. As such, instant appointive positions are outside scope of Section 2 of said Act. Moreover, plaintiffs could not establish Equal Protection Clause claim, where: (1) Ct. in Sailors, 387 U.S. 105 found that appointing school board members was constitutionally permissible; and (2) all citizens of Chicago have equal influence by voting for Mayor, who, in turn, appoints school board members. Ct. also noted that instant dispute was not whether black and Latino voters’ influence was diluted by casting ballots in size of jurisdiction of Chicago.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing pro se plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant-police officer, who arrested plaintiff on suspicion of driving while intoxicated, ignored plaintiff’s obvious need for medical attention after her arrest and refused to take plaintiff to hospital to treat her excessive bleeding condition. Plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently alleged 4^th Amendment violation that defendant had acted unreasonably in denying her medical care for her profuse uterine bleeding, and defendant’s police report that was attached to amended complaint established that defendant had been aware of said bleeding. Moreover, record did not support Dist. Ct.’s belief that plaintiff had pleaded herself out of court by attaching police report to her amended complaint that contradicted certain allegations in her amended complaint, where: (1) mere attachment of police report that was authored by defendant did not make said documents part of complaint that would form basis of finding that plaintiff had pleaded herself out of court; (2) allegations in amended complaint contradicted claims in defendant’s police report; and (3) Dist. Ct. erred in crediting content of police report over plaintiff’s allegations in her amended complaint at this stage of proceedings. Also, content of police report did not deny plaintiff’s essential allegation that defendant did not take her to hospital for purpose of treatment of her medical needs.

In successful section 1983, class-of-one equal protection action alleging that defendants-Village and Village officials engaged in campaign of regulatory harassment with respect to three of plaintiff's housing properties, plaintiff was not entitled to new trial on issue of damages, even though plaintiff claimed that Dist. Ct. allowed witness to make impermissible reference to wealth of plaintiff’s owner. Reference to plaintiff’s owner as being in boat in Mediterranean was too insignificant to have effect on jury’s $2 million verdict with respect to one of plaintiff’s three properties, and brief reference to owner’s wealth during closing argument was not objected to at time of reference. Also, record supported $1 nominal damages award with respect to plaintiff’s other two properties, where: (1) jury could believe expert’s testimony that defendant’s alleged conduct in denying plaintiff business license, interfering with business operations and refusing to grant application for conditional use permit had no effect on value of one property; and (2) record showed that other property was not affected by defendant’s conduct. Dist. Ct. also could properly award attorney fees that represented only one-third of what plaintiff had requested, where: (1) jury awarded only nominal damages to two of three of plaintiff’s properties; (2) plaintiff prevailed in only one of several causes of action; and (3) plaintiff received only $2 million out of total $20.5 million sought in all three actions.

Dist. Ct. did not err in entering judgment on pleadings in defendant’s favor on plaintiff’s civil RICO action against defendants under 18 USC section 1964(c), alleging that defendants conspired among themselves to drain assets from third-party that owed $70 million judgment to plaintiff so that plaintiff could not satisfy its judgment against third-party. Under RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 136 S.Ct. 2090, private RICO plaintiff must allege and prove domestic injury to its business or property, and plaintiff could not establish domestic injury arising out of defendants’ alleged conduct, where: (1) plaintiff’s property in form of $70 million judgment is intangible asset; (2) intangible asset is located where plaintiff’s injury occurred, which for plaintiff was its principal place of business; and (3) plaintiff’s principal place of business is Singapore, which precluded plaintiff from pleading plausible claim under civil RICO.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s action alleging that defendants-participants in Wisconsin “John Doe” proceeding violated Stored Communications Act (Act) when defendants obtained search warrants from state court judge that sought plaintiff’s electronic records as part of investigation into alleged illegal campaign coordination between certain issue-advocacy groups and candidate for elected office, where defendants executed said warrants through internet service without giving notice to plaintiff. Plaintiff conceded that search warrants issued by state court judge were valid pursuant to Wisc. law, and defendants otherwise were entitled to assert Act’s good-faith defense, where defendants followed prescribed procedures of John Doe investigation when seeking search warrants and in investigating possible violations of state’s election laws. Fact that instant warrants were subsequently quashed by change in law did not preclude defendants from asserting good-faith defense. Moreover, defendants were also entitled to qualified immunity, where plaintiff’s claim that instant trial court judge lacked authority under Act to issue said warrants was not clearly established at time of alleged violation.

Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that defendant’s 2015 “Christmas Spectacular” school program did not violate 1^st Amendment’s Establishment Clause, even though program spent 4.5 minutes explaining and performing songs that represented Hanukkah and Kwanzaa, as well as two minutes in which nativity scene was depicted and 20 minutes in which Christmas songs with religious lyrics were performed. Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate Establishment Clause violation under either endorsement, coercion or purpose tests, where: (1) nativity scene did not have significant role in program; (2) performance of Christmas carols did not inevitably convey religious message; and (3) overall 90 minute program was primarily non-religious, with first half of program containing songs conveying non-religious aspects of holiday season. Fact that Christmas songs dominated program versus songs devoted to Hanukkah or Kwanzaa did not require different result. Ct. rejected plaintiffs’ contention that program coerced audience members and students to conform to Christianity religion, since no one was required to partake in any religious activity during program.

Dist. Ct. did not err in awarding plaintiff’s former counsel $87,500 in attorney fees on quantum meruit basis, under circumstances where plaintiff had terminated counsel after counsel had represented plaintiff in products liability action and had received from defendant in said action $250,000 offer to settle case, but before plaintiff had accepted said settlement offer. Plaintiff and counsel had entered into contingency fee agreement calling for counsel to receive 35 percent of any recovery, and record supported instant $87,500 fee award, given fact that: (1) attorneys spent 25 hours on case from retention to discharge, and support staff spent 102.6 hours on said matter; (2) lead attorney had highly qualified reputation; (3) underlying lawsuit concerned complex products liability matter; (4) instant 35 percent contingency was within usual and customary charge; and (5) plaintiff did not perform any additional work other than to accept settlement. Fact that instant award equaled amount counsel would have received under contingency fee contract did not require different result.