Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiffs’ lawsuit alleging that defendants violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights by initiating proceedings that resulted in placement of plaintiffs’ two eldest children in foster-care, where: (1) said children ran away from home; and (2) plaintiffs claimed that defendants had failed to accommodate their view of family organization and management with respect to plaintiffs’ Orthodox Judaism faith. Dist. Ct., in noting that said children were now adults, dismissed case as moot and further found that dismissal was appropriate under Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Ct. of Appeals, though, found that Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply, since plaintiffs did not seek to alter state court’s placement of their children. However, Ct. of Appeals found that dismissal was appropriate because their lawsuit lacked requirement of justiciability, since plaintiffs merely wanted advisory opinion that would, in essence, improperly tell state court judges how to rule on now closed case. Fact that plaintiffs had 12 other minor children did not require different result, since Younger doctrine would require federal court to abstain from any similar future case in order to allow state court to determine any constitutional issues arising out of foster-care placement of plaintiff’s children.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on forum non conveniens grounds plaintiffs’ breach of warranty/negligence actions arising out of personal injuries incurred during their trip to resort managed by defendants in Dominican Republic, where travel contract that plaintiffs signed with defendants contained forum-selection clause requiring that plaintiffs litigate their dispute with defendants in Delaware County, Pennsylvania. Forum-selection clause channeling litigation to non-federal forum is enforced through doctrine of forum non conveniens. Moreover, plaintiffs did not cite to any exceptional public interest justification to override instant contractual choice of forum. Ct. rejected plaintiffs’ claim that Dist. Ct. committed procedural error by basing dismissal on application of forum non conveniens doctrine when defendants did not specifically cite said doctrine in their dismissal motion, where Ct. of Appeals noted that consideration of said doctrine was proper since defendants had asked Dist. Ct. to enforce forum-selection clause.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying certain defendants-police officers’ motion for summary judgment, even though said defendants argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to plaintiffs’ claims that they were subjected to false arrest on murder charge, and that certain defendants conspired to violate their constitutional rights by failing to intervene to prevent unconstitutional conduct. Record showed that all three plaintiffs either had murder charge dismissed or were found not guilty in trial on murder charge, after defendants had obtained alleged confessions from plaintiffs to said murders. With respect to false arrest claim, Dist. Ct. could properly find that there were material factual disputes bearing on question as to existence of arguable probable cause, where: (1) jury could conclude that murder victim had actually committed suicide; (2) alleged confessions of two plaintiffs were unreliable based on facts fed to them by defendants; and (3) physical evidence undermined one plaintiff’s confession. Moreover, defendants could not seek review of Dist. Ct.’s order in instant interlocutory appeal by asking Ct. of Appeals to reweigh evidence to come to different conclusion with respect to existence of probable cause. With respect to plaintiffs’ failure to intervene claim, Dist. Ct. could properly find existence of agreement among defendants, where: (1) said defendants allegedly extracted and used unreliable confessions; and (2) reasonable officer would have known that impermissible pressure had been used to obtain said confessions. Fact that certain defendants were not present at time of plaintiffs’ arrests did not require different result.

In action under 42 USC section 1981 alleging that defendant-hospital racially discriminated against plaintiff-physician with respect to terms and conditions of his contract with defendant when defendant allegedly failed to stop hostile behavior by plaintiff’s colleagues, Dist. Ct. did not err in allowing defendant to present impeachment evidence regarding past negative incidents involving plaintiff during his prior employment with other entities, where plaintiff previously testified that he had “untarnished” reputation in medical community prior to his contractual relationship with defendant. Moreover, plaintiff forfeited any argument that use of said impeachment materials was improper because they contained information gathered during peer-reviews that was privileged under state statutes, since plaintiff had failed to assert before Dist. Ct. that said evidence was privileged under Rule 501. Also, federal courts apply federal common law evidentiary privileges, which do not recognize peer-review privilege. Too, defendant was otherwise entitled to ask plaintiff about facts pertaining to his own past and reputation regardless of whether any peer-review committee had investigated those incidents or complaints.

Dist. Ct. did not err in approving as constitutional defendant-City’s proposed reapportionment map of aldermanic districts within City, where said map was drafted in response to 2010 consent decree that had been entered after finding that prior map had diluted voting opportunities based on race. While equal protection clause requires that officials be elected from voting districts that had substantially equal populations that had less than ten percent deviation from each other, City’s justification for instant overall 12 percent deviation was legitimate, where City explained that proposed map: (1) had goal of changing existing wards as little as possible; (2) used natural boundaries of major thoroughfares as dividing lines; and (3) increased ward’s compactness and eased voter confusion that had existed in prior map. Also, plaintiffs failed to present evidence that City employed any discriminatory criteria in its proposed map. Ct. further rejected plaintiffs’ argument that they had right to submit alternative map to Dist. Ct. for its consideration, since City had sole responsibility under consent decree to reapportion ward map, and City otherwise provided plaintiffs opportunity to submit input to proposed map.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiffs’ state law actions alleging that defendants-manufacturers of “Depo-T” testosterone replacement drug failed to properly label said drug by adequately warning consumers of drug’s dangers. Basis of said dismissal was Dist. Ct.’s finding that defendants could not change instant drug label to add additional warnings because FDA regulations prohibited defendants from making unilateral labeling changes, where: (1) “Depo-T” had originally been approved via abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) process applicable for generic drugs; and (2) defendants’ current label conformed to what FDA had directed should appear on said label. Moreover, Ct. in Mensing,564 U.S. 604, held that state-law failure-to-warn claims against manufacturers of generic drugs were preempted by federal law. Fact that “Depo-T” eventually became reference listed drug (RLD) for its family of testosterone replacement drugs did not require different result.

Plaintiffs-former Illinois residents now living in U.S. territories of Puerto Rico, Guam and Virgin Islands lacked standing to make equal protection challenge to Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act that required States to allow U.S. citizens living outside United States to vote in federal elections, where: (1) said Act defined “United States” to include instant territories; (2) Act's definition of "United States" precluded plaintiffs from voting in federal election in Illinois because, for purposes of said Act, they still resided within United States; and (3) instant Act, which did not preclude Illinois from providing ballots to plaintiffs, was not responsible for plaintiffs not receiving federal ballot. Moreover, while Illinois’ overseas-voting law similarly precludes plaintiffs from obtaining federal elections ballot, because Illinois law also includes instant territories in definition of “United States,” said law need only satisfy rational basis test for doing so in instant equal protection challenge, even though plaintiffs would have received federal ballot under Illinois law had they lived in other territories, since plaintiffs have no special right to vote in federal elections simply because they used to live in Illinois. Also, different treatment that Illinois gives to residents of various territories was rational at time Illinois law was enacted in 1979, since territories excluded from definition of “United States” at that time were more similar to foreign countries as opposed to incorporated territories where plaintiffs now reside.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state claim plaintiff’s action alleging that 2011 amendments to Ill. Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) that labeled him “sexual predator” because of his 1983 rape conviction and because he had committed 2013 felony theft conviction violated ex post facto clause as applied to him, where: (1) his term of required registration for his 1983 rape conviction had expired prior to 2011 amendments; and (2) 2011 amendments would require that he register as sex offender for rest of his life. Pleadings failed to show that amendments to SORA had any retroactive effect, since 2011 amendments stiffened penalty only for plaintiff’s 2013 felony theft conviction, which occurred after 2011 amendments took effect. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s argument that 2011 amendments to SORA were retroactive because they attached new disability to his 1983 rape conviction.

In section 1983 action by plaintiff alleging that defendant-police officer lacked probable cause to arrest him on DUI charge and used excessive force when arresting him, Dist. Ct. did not err in rejecting plaintiff’s proposed jury instruction that informed jury that although he had been convicted of DUI charge, he had pending petition for leave to appeal from denial of his related post-conviction petition, where Dist. Ct. gave instruction informing jury that it had been conclusively proven that plaintiff had been driving under influence of alcohol on day of his arrest. All elements of collateral estoppel had been met when Ill. Supreme Ct. denied plaintiff’s petition for leave to appeal on his direct appeal on DUI conviction, and although plaintiff could properly argue in Dist. Ct. that he did not have full and fair opportunity to argue issues in his post-conviction that challenged his criminal conviction, Ill. Supreme Ct. eventually denied leave to appeal from denial of post-conviction petition. As such, any error with respect to Dist. Ct.’s failure to consider issues in post-conviction petition before giving his criminal conviction preclusive effect was harmless. Also, Dist. Ct. could properly preclude plaintiff from introducing portion of arrest report indicating that he was not visibly under influence of alcohol five hours after his arrest, where said evidence could not have affected outcome of trial, where other evidence at time of arrest strongly showed that plaintiff was intoxicated. Too, Dist. Ct. could enter partial verdict in instant section 1983 action, where jury could not reach verdict on remaining count against different defendant-police officer based on unrelated incident arising out of plaintiff's incarceration.

Ct. of Appeals remanded to Dist. Ct. plaintiff-risk retention group’s appeal of order that granted defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment in action seeking declaration that defendants’ interpretation of Wisc. statute (section 101.654(2)(a)) that required plaintiff’s insured shareholders (as dwelling contractors) to obtain Certificate of Authority issued by state agency to satisfy their financial responsibility requirements, as opposed to obtaining insurance through plaintiff, which was not otherwise authorized in Wisconsin to provide insurance to said shareholders. While plaintiff alleged that section 101.654(2)(a) was preempted by Liability Risk Retention Act and that defendants’ interpretation of section 101.654(20(a) violated its equal protection and due process rights, record showed that section 101.654(2)(a) had been amended during instant appeal that would thus allow dwelling contractors additional option to select insurer that was eligible to provide insurance as surplus lines insurer in one or more states in order to satisfy its financial responsibility requirements. As such, Ct. of Appeals remanded matter back to Dist. Ct. for determination as to whether plaintiff qualified to provide insurance under amended section 101.654(2)(a), which may moot instant case.