Federal Civil Practice

Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys accrued in successful action seeking to enforce $9 million arbitration award that had been confirmed by Dist. Ct. and had been affirmed by Ct. of Appeals, since commercial parties that refuse to comply with arbitrator’s decision presumptively must pay attorney fees of prevailing party. Moreover, as sanction, plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees accrued in its subsequent effort to collect said fees where defendant has refused to pay said fees, has filed another action with arbitrator dealing with propriety of said fees and has filed subsequent separate action in California District Court seeking order to relieve it of any obligation to comply with instant arbitration order in spite of final decision by Ct. of Appeals. Ct. of Appeals also directed counsel for defendant to show cause why they should not be jointly and severally responsible under section 1927 for paying approximately $272,000 in fees accrued by plaintiff (outside of fees accrued by plaintiff in California action) and observed that District Court was free to entertain any motion by plaintiff seeking to enjoin defendant from pursuing California action.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-City’s motion for summary judgment in action alleging that plaintiff was entitled to certain structures and underground gas-collecting wells/pipes at defendant’s city landfill after lease between defendant and plaintiff’s predecessor-in-interest had been terminated. Instant lease allowed predecessor to construct and operate instant gas-collection project at defendant’s landfill, but also allowed defendant right to retain, at no cost, said structures and underground wells/pipes that predecessor had installed once lease had been terminated. As such, even though plaintiff had acquired predecessor’s assets through liens and security interests that ripened after predecessor had gone through bankruptcy proceedings, plaintiff could not establish, for purposes of unjust enrichment claim, that it had “better claim” to said structures and underground wells/pipes, since applicable lease gave predecessor no post-termination rights to said property, but rather gave said rights to defendant.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s due process rights and right to freedom of association by denying his requests for visits with his daughter in 2004 and 2013. While prison officials cannot permanently or arbitrarily deny inmates’ requests for visits with family members, where said denials are not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, Dist. Ct. could properly dismiss as untimely plaintiff’s lawsuit challenging 2004 denial, where instant lawsuit was filed more than six years after said denial, and where notion of “continuing violation” did not apply, since said denial was concrete act that could have been redressed at time of denial. Also, dismissal of complaint with respect to 2013 denial was appropriate where, at time plaintiff sought permission to visit daughter, plaintiff had failed to obtain completed questionnaire from daughter’s legal guardian that would have established guardian’s consent to said visit.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting motion for summary judgment filed by defendants-federal govt., as well as certain county prison officials at correctional facility that had intergovernmental agreement to house federal prisoners, in Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) action by plaintiff-father of disabled infant, where plaintiff alleged that defendants committed medical malpractice during infant’s delivery while infant’s mother was inmate at said correctional facility. Defendant-federal govt. was entitled to sovereign immunity from instant lawsuit, where, under Logue, 412 US 521, employees of county correctional facility were not federal employees, but rather independent contractors due to federal govt.’s lack of control over facility’s day-to-day operations. Moreover, choice by Deputy U.S. Marshall to place inmate in instant facility was discretionary act that precluded plaintiff from prevailing against federal govt., especially where placement at said facility was warranted in view of facility’s medical facilities and late-stage nature of inmate’s pregnancy. Also, with respect to employees of instant facility, Dist. Ct. could properly find that said defendants were entitled to immunity under section 4-105 of Ill. Tort Immunity Act, since plaintiff failed to show that said defendants, through willful or wanton acts, failed to take reasonable action to summon medical care under circumstances where said defendants were unaware that inmate or her pregnancy were in danger prior to morning when inmate gave birth to infant.

Remand was required for Dist. Ct. to consider merits of plaintiff’s lawsuit seeking declaration that Indiana’s statute that prohibited entities from being both beer and liquor wholesalers was preempted by Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act. Dist. Ct. dismissed plaintiff’s lawsuit as unripe, where plaintiff had broken off proposed business relationship with liquor wholesaler, after Indiana Commission had failed to provide definitive ruling as to whether said proposed relationship with liquor wholesaler violated instant prohibited-interest statute based on plaintiff’s shared ownership interest in third-party-beer wholesaler. However, while instant appeal of dismissal was pending, Indiana Supreme Court found in separate litigation that plaintiff’s shared ownership in beer wholesaler was sufficient for plaintiff to be treated as beer wholesaler for purposes of Indiana’s prohibited-interest laws. As such, plaintiff’s lawsuit was ripe for consideration by Dist. Ct., where plaintiff now faced standing threat of prosecution under prohibited-interest statute arising out of proposed business relationship due to ruling by Indiana Supreme Court.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s right to direct upbringing of her infant child, where, upon birth of her child, defendants-various hospital and DCFS officials referred plaintiff to DCFS, then made “indicated” finding that plaintiff posed substantial risk of physical injury to her child, and then pressured plaintiff to accept certain in-home services offered by DCFS. Plaintiff could not bring section 1983 action against University of Illinois Bd. of Trustees in charge of hospital, since University is arm of State, which is not among “persons” covered under section 1983. Moreover, hospital social worker who referred plaintiff to DCFS had immunity under Illinois ANCRA statute, 325 ILCS 5/9, with respect to plaintiff’s state claims against her. Moreover, plaintiff’s claims that social worker did not have reasonable concern of neglect did not amount to required accusation that social worker had malicious or dishonest intent in making referral. Also, social worker made good faith referral, where record showed that plaintiff had lack of support system, had discordant relationship with her mother who lived with plaintiff and had recent psychiatric hospitalization. Also, remaining defendants were entitled to qualified immunity due to plaintiff’s failure to identify case law that would have indicated that defendants’ intervention into plaintiff’s child-care was unlawful.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in dismissing plaintiff’s breach of contract and tort actions after plaintiff failed to abide by two Dist. Ct. orders directing him to produce copies of his tax returns and certain bank records that defendants had requested in discovery, and after Dist. Ct. had warned plaintiff that his failure to produce said documents could result in dismissal of his actions. Moreover, Dist. Ct.’s statement that dismissal of plaintiff’s actions was due to his “failure to cooperate in discovery” and his “pattern of dilatory conduct” demonstrated that Dist. Ct. adequately assessed whether plaintiff’s neglect in pursuing his case was sufficiently serious to warrant dismissal. Fact that Dist. Ct. did not expressly consider potential of imposing lesser sanctions did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants obstructed his access to courts in violation of his First Amendment rights by providing him with inadequate access to prison law library, confiscating his trust fund account to repay advanced litigation costs, and denying him adequate legal storage boxes and supplies. Confiscation of trust fund account to repay advanced litigation costs was proper under Gaines, 790 F.2d 1299. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly dismiss on timeliness grounds plaintiff’s claims regarding denial of adequate access to prison law library, as well as to legal storage boxes and supplies, since plaintiff’s complaint was filed more than two years after he had exhausted any internal administrative remedies regarding said claims. Also, with respect to any of plaintiff’s underlying lawsuits, plaintiff failed to show existence of any prejudice arising out of any alleged inadequate access to either prison law library, prison supplies or prison storage boxes.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment in action alleging that fire at plaintiffs’ home was caused by defective lithium battery cell contained in laptop, where said motion was granted after Dist. Ct. had granted defendants’ motion to exclude opinions of plaintiff’s two experts that attributed fire to said battery cell. Opinion of one expert was properly excluded under Daubert and Rule 702, where underlying premise of expert’s opinion that battery cell caused fire was contrary to generally accepted battery science and was unsupported by tests contained in articles cited by said expert that established proposition that battery cells did not react uniformly when exposed to external fire. Moreover, opinion of second expert was properly excluded since it was based in part on discredited finding of first expert. As such, dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint was proper since there was no expert testimony to support plaintiffs’ claim that battery cell was defective.

In action by several assistant store managers employed by different franchisees of Jimmy John’s against franchisor Jimmy John’s alleging violation of Fair Labor Standards Act (FSLA) with respect to non-payment of overtime, Dist. Ct. lacked authority to issue anti-suit injunction that would preclude other assistant store managers from filing similar claims in other district courts against franchisees until claims of instant store managers against Jimmy John’s (on alleged joint employer theory) had been resolved. Ct. of Appeals rejected Jimmy John’s claim that All Writs Act allowed issuance of anti-suit injunction in instant matter to prevent duplicative litigation, to avoid inconsistent rulings and to protect integrity of Dist. Ct.’s pretrial orders regarding discovery on joint employer issue and notice procedures, since: (1) Jimmy John’s is not party in enjoined franchisees cases and said franchisees could not be joined in instant case where Dist. Ct. lacked personal jurisdiction over out-of-state franchisees; (2) any potential effect that decision in enjoined cases could have on instant action did not justify issuance of anti-suit injunction; and (3) Dist. Ct. did not mention need to protect its pretrial rulings as reason for issuance of anti-suit injunction. Also, issuance of anti-suit injunction was not appropriate under Dist. Ct.’s inherent authority, where Dist. Ct. failed to make necessary findings regarding traditional equitable requirements for issuance of injunction in compliance with Rule 65 such as existence of irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law.