Local Government Law

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit seeking equitable relief under the Freedom of Information Act. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff regarding requests for disclosure of certain 911 recordings. Defendant appealed, arguing that the 911 recordings were exempt from disclosure, or, in the alternative, that the trial court erred when it required the defendant to either produce the recordings using computer software to mask the caller’s voice or to create transcripts of the calls. The appellate court reversed, finding that while there is no blanket rule against disclosure of of 911 calls, the calls are exempt from disclosure where they disclose the identity of the callers. The appellate court then explained that the defendant was not required to create new records either by using voice-altering software or providing a transcript and, as a result, the recordings were only available in a form that was exempt from disclosure. (ALBRECHT, concurring and McDADE, concurring in part and dissenting in part)

Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of similarly situated individuals, appealed from the trial court’s denial of their complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the City of Carbondale’s ordinance authorizing fees related to driving infractions, which resulted in vehicles being towed, was facially unconstitutional. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court’s calculation of minimum cost for an ordinance violation was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, that the trial court did not err when it found that the amounts received by the city pursuant to the statutory remittance were not relevant in determining whether the ordinance fees were reasonable, and that plaintiffs did not meet their burden of showing that there was a lack of any reasonable relation between the fee and the cost of the service. (BOIE and MOORE, concurring)

Defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court finding her guilty of violating a municipal ordinance. Defendant argued on appeal that she was denied the opportunity to plead guilty without having to appear because the information contained on the citation was incorrect and that the citation failed to identify the nature of the offense, which impeded her ability to prepare a defendant. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the defendant ultimately had the opportunity to plead guilty and that the citation sufficiently notified her of the nature of the charge. (HUTCHINSON and SCHOSTOK, concurring)

Defendants appealed from the trial court’s grant of a preliminary injunction to the plaintiff blocking the defendants from abolishing the office of the county auditor. Defendants argued on appeal, among other things, that the plaintiff lacked standing to obtain a preliminary injunction. The appellate court agreed and reversed and remanded, finding that the plaintiff lost any right she had to the office of the auditor when voters approved a referendum in favor of eliminating the office of the county auditor. (CAVANAGH and STEIGMANN, concurring)

Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against defendant for inverse condemnation after refusing to grant the defendant a temporary construction easement to use portions of plaintiff’s property as a staging area for construction equipment. The trial court granted a preliminary injunction to plaintiffs, which plaintiffs alleged that the defendant then violated. The trial court found the defendant in indirect civil contempt for violating the injunction, imposed a daily fine, and ordered that defendant’s pay plaintiffs’ attorneys fees. Defendant appealed from the injunction, the finding of contempt, and the attorneys fees award. The appellate court found that the prohibitory order lacked specificity and, as a result, that the preliminary injunction was unenforceable. The appellate court further explained that even if the preliminary injunction had been clear, the court would have vacated the finding of contempt because the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant without the plaintiffs first making the requisite evidentiary showing. (LAMPKIN and ROCHFORD, concurring)

In a Freedom of Information Act action, defendant appealed from an order of the trial court finding that the defendant violated FOIA by failing to disclose records requested by the plaintiff. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendant argued that the records were exempted under section 7(1)(o) of the FOIA and that disclosure of the records would jeopardize the security of its system. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the requested records, which were an index of the tables and columns used by the defendant in a records database, were “file layouts” within the meaning of section 7(1)(o) and were exempt from disclosure. (THEIS, NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, CUNNINGHAM, ROCHFORD, and O’BRIEN, concurring)

Defendant appealed from a trial court order finding a property abandoned pursuant to section 11-31-1(d) of the Illinois Municipal Code and issuing a judicial deed transferring the title of the property to the plaintiff, City of Danville. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that the city did not meet the first statutory requirement for a finding of abandonment, that the property was tax delinquent for two or more years or bills for water service were outstanding for two or more years, and that strict construction was required where the language of the statute was clear and unambiguous. (WELCH and BARBERIS, concurring)

Plaintiffs sued the City of Chicago claiming that the city’s shared housing ordinance violated the Illinois Constitution and challenged the provisions of the ordinance relating to home inspections, the primary-residence rule, excessive noise, and banning single-night rentals. The circuit court granted the city’s motion to dismiss and the plaintiffs appealed. The appellate court affirmed, finding that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge some provisions of the ordinance, that plaintiffs did not exhaust their administrative remedies on other claims, and that other claims failed based on the facts contained in the complaint alone because the city had a rational basis for its disparate treatment of types of property owners. (HYMAN and COGHLAN, concurring)