Local Government Law

The Illinois Supreme Court addressed governmental immunity in a case arising out of the alleged intentional or reckless refusal of a 911 operator to dispatch emergency services. The court held that local government defendants were not immune to suit under section 4-102 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act because the complaint was instead governed by the limited immunity provided by section 15.1(a) of the Emergency Telephone System Act. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint premised on wrongful death and survival by finding that the actions of the defendants were not a proximate cause of harm to the plaintiff under the condition/cause analysis. (ANNE M. BURKE, NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, and CARTER concurring. GARMAN and MICHAEL J. BURKE, specially concurring.)

Plaintiffs, a coalition of contracting firms in the public transportation construction and design industry, filed suit for declaratory and injunctive relief against Cook County alleging that the county was diverting revenues generated from transportation-related ordinances in contravention with the Safe Roads Amendment to the Illinois Constitution. The circuit court dismissed, finding the plaintiffs lack standing. The appellate court reversed on the issue of standing, but affirmed the circuit court’s determination that there had been no violation. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that the plaintiffs had associational standing to bring the action, that the County’s interpretation of the Amendment was not reasonable, and that the Amendment properly limited the power of home-rule units in the context of transportation spending. The court reversed the circuit court’s dismissal of the complaint and remanded for further proceedings. (ANNE M. BURKE, NEVILLE, MICHAEL J. BURKE, OVERSTREET, and CARTER, concurring. THEIS, dissenting.)

The Illinois Supreme Court held that the defendants, several police officers and their municipal employers, did not have immunity under section 4-106(b) of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act in an action where the plaintiff was injured by a fleeing vehicle during a police chase. The court found that the person the police officers was chasing was not “an escaped or escaping prisoner” within the meaning of the Act, explaining that the officers did not have direct control of the person or the ability to limit the person’s freedom of movement to a particular place, as was required for section 4-106(b) to confer immunity to the officers, and that a “show of authority” by itself was not sufficient to establish that a person was being held in custody. (ANNE M. BURKE, GARMAN, THEIS, NEVILLE, MICHAEL J. BURKE, and OVERSTREET, concurring)

Plaintiff filed a class-action lawsuit alleging that the City of Chicago had an ongoing practice of improperly issuing central business district metered parking tickets outside the boundaries of the district. The trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the basis that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Plaintiff appealed arguing that exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine prevented dismissal of his complaint. The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, agreed and reversed the trial court order finding that plaintiff was not required to exhaust the administrative remedies because it could not have provided him with the injunctive and monetary relief that he was seeking. (HARRIS, concurring, and ODEN JOHNSON, dissenting, with opinion).

Plaintiff, a surviving spouse of a deceased police officer, appealed the trial court’s order affirming the Board’s determination that while she was entitled to receive survival pension benefits, she was not entitled to receive them immediately but, rather, she was entitled to benefits on the date that her deceased husband would have turned 60 years old. The appellate court interpreted the language of section 3-112 of the Illinois Pension Code and affirmed the trial court, finding that had decedent lived he would not have been eligible to collect benefits until he was 60 years old, and that the plaintiff could not collect more than decedent was entitled to at the time of his death. (HARRIS and MIKVA, concurring)

Main issue on appeal was whether entities that held valid public way use permits for vault space underneath a public sidewalk had a duty of care to a pedestrian who was injured when she tripped and fell on an uneven portion of the sidewalk. The appellate court found that the scope of duty was governed by the terms of the permit, which created a contractual obligation on behalf of the permit holder to comply with the Municipal Code and to maintain the sidewalk above the vault. The appellate court reversed the trial court orders to the contrary and remanded for further proceedings, including the determination of whether the parties breached their duty of care. (FITZGERALD SMITH and COBBS, concurring)

Personal injury case against multiple defendants arising out of injuries plaintiff sustained when she slipped and fell on a puddle of water leaking from a water cooler inside a commercial building that was occupied by a school. The circuit court granted motions to dismiss filed by the school district defendants on the basis that they were immune under section 2-105 of the Local Government and Governmental Tort Immunity Act. The appellate court reversed, finding that section 2-105 was directed only toward local public entities whose function is to conduct formal health and safety inspections of properties other than their own and that the defendants failed to meet their burden of proving they were immune from plaintiff’s claims of negligence arising out of their alleged failure to inspect the water cooler prior to using it at a school function. (LAMPKIN and MARTIN, concurring)

Plaintiff brought suit seeking disclosure of documents related to an officer-involved fatal shooting pursuant to FOIA. The circuit court granted plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment holding that the confidentiality provisions of the Juvenile Court Act pertaining to law enforcement records of minors did not apply to deceased minors. The CPD appealed and the appellate court reversed in part and affirmed in part, finding that the circuit court’s conclusion that FOIA’s privacy provisions did not apply “at all” to law enforcement records of deceased minors was incorrect and, as a result, there remained a material issue of fact with respect to whether any of the requested records may be disclosed. The appellate court remanded the matter to the circuit court to conduct further proceedings to determine whether any records may be disclosed without violating the confidentiality provisions applicable to the law enforcement records of minors. (REYES and LAMPKIN, concurring)

Matter arising from the clerk of McHenry County’s refusal to place a proposition to dissolve the McHenry Township on the November 2020 general election ballot by finding that it violated the statutory prohibition against placing “the same proposition” on the ballot within 23 months because a proposition to dissolve the township was rejected by voters in the March 2020 primary election. The plaintiff filed for a writ of mandamus and the circuit court dismissed the complaint pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appellate court reversed, holding that the clerk lacked the statutory authority to refuse to place the referendum on the ballot and was obligated to perform the ministerial act of placing the proposition on the ballot. While on appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the township withdrew its brief and aligned with the county in its opposition to the appellate court opinion. Because this did not resolve the litigation and because the issue, despite being moot, could arise again in the future the Illinois Supreme Court addressed the arguments raised by defendants and affirmed the appellate court, finding that the clerk was not authorized by the Election Code to prohibit the proposition from appearing on the ballot on the grounds that it violated section 28-7 of the Election Code. The court did not determine whether the proposition actually violated section 28-7. (ANNE M. BURKE, GARMAN, THEIS, NEVILLE, OVERSTREET and CARTER, concurring)