Local Government Law

(Court opinion corrected 3/1/11.) Candidate for alderman was found to be in debt to City for $600 in parking tickets, and was thus ineligible for candidacy under Section 3.1-10-5(b) of Municipal Code. That section contains no requirement that a candidate must have received sufficient notice of debt, and thus Board of Elections erred in allowing candidate's name to appear on ballot by reason of insufficient notice. (HOWSE and EPSTEIN, concurring.)

Plaintiffs filed declaratory judgment action seeking declaration that Blair Assault Weapons Ban, a Cook County ordinance, was unconstitutional. Upon reconsideration of its prior judgment, in light of recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in McDonald v. City of Chicago, court affirmed its dismissal of the remaining counts in Plaintiffs' complaint. Ordinance is sufficiently detailed and substantially related to an important government objective; it is a ban on a subcategory of dangerous and unusual weapons, specifically identified and beyond ordinary handguns used for self-defense. Ordinance is sufficiently tailored and not impermissibly valgue even though it is broadly drawn; it is limited in restriction to certain rapid-firing or high-capacity arms. Insufficient facts alleged to show that Ordinance violates equal protection. (QUINN and NEVILLE, concurring.)

The one-year statute of limitations in Section 8-101(a) of Tort Immunity Act does not apply to cause of action for damages per Section 1-4-7 of Municipal Code. Language in Section 2-101(e) of Tort Immunity Act which states that nothing in the Act affects the liability of a local public entity or employee based on Section 1-4-7 of Municipal Code obviates the application of this one-year statute of limitations to Plaintiff's wrongful-demolition action. Plaintiff's suit for wrongful demolition is thus not barred by the one-year statute of limitations of Section 8-101(a) of Tort Immunity Act. (CHAPMAN and GOLDENHERSH, concurring.)

Plaintiff filed suit for declaratory and injunctive relief against developers and City, challenging formation of TIF District and Business District, and use of municipal sales taxes from project to reimburse developers for infrastructure improvements. Existence of 100-year-old underground mine, unused since 1940s, qualifies property as "blighted" within meaning of TIF Act, and impaired the sound growth of project area given evidence of need for remediation and nearby subsidence events. Farmland portion of TIF District was vacant through subdivision and therefore blighted, as whether a parcel is "vacant" under Act does not depend on how land was used or controlled but whether it was subdivided. Developers' contribution of $250,000 to City's revitalization project was not a reimbursable cost or "signing bonus", and did not void the Redevelopment Agreement.(CHAPMAN, concurring; SPOMER, dissenting.)

(Court opinion corrected 2/4/11.) Mayoral Candidate Emanuel satisfied residency requirement for candicacy. Meaning of residency requirement, for election purposes, has been long established, and Illinois law has been consistent on the matter. Municipal Code contains no indication that residency in Section 2.1-10-5(a) is intended to have anything other than its well-settled meaning. Board of Election Commissioners' factual findings as to Candidate's residency were not against manifest weight of evidence, as Candidate's acts fully support and confirm his declared intent not to abandon his Chicago residence. Board correctly determined that the Objectors had the burden of proof but had failed to prove, by preponderance of the evidence, that Candidate had abandoned his Chicago residency at any time during the one-year period before the upcoming February 22, 2011 election. (KILBRIDE, GARMAN, KARMEIER, and THEIS, concurring; FREEMAN and BURKE, specially concurring.)