Local Government Law

Dist. Ct. erred in finding that it lacked authority under Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act to enjoin assessment imposed by defendant-Drainage District when it altered pre-existing formula to assess plaintiffs-railroads for costs associated with maintaining flood levees erected to protect plaintiffs' and other individuals' land within District. Assessment imposed on plaintiffs and other landowners is properly viewed as tax, and District's tax discriminated against plaintiffs so as to potentially entitle them to injunction under Act where formula used to assess tax on plaintiffs' land overstated value of said land when compared to other industrial and commercial properties. On remand, Dist. Ct. should enjoin instant assessment and permit defendant to craft different formula.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-City officials' motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs' section 1983 action alleging that defendants denied plaintiffs' equal protection rights on account of their race when defendants approved proposed expansion of plaintiffs' subdivision over their protests that said expansion would exacerbate problems associated with retention pond located in their subdivision. While plaintiffs alleged that defendants gave more favorable treatment to residents of different subdivision, plaintiffs failed to establish through competent evidence racial make-up of residents of comparable subdivision, and record otherwise showed that proposed comparable subdivision was not sufficiently similar to plaintiff's subdivision where comparable subdivision had different zoning classification and did not have retention pond.

In section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officials violated plaintiff's 4th Amendment rights when, without warrant, they entered and searched her home for fugitive whom defendants believed had previously entered plaintiff's home, Dist. Ct. did not err in instructing jury that plaintiff bore burden of showing by preponderance of evidence that reasonable officer would not have believed that crime suspect was in plaintiff's home, since instruction correctly stated applicable law. Moreover, record supported jury's finding in defendants' favor given evidence that police received tip during search for fugitive that fugitive was located in back porch adjacent to plaintiff's home.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials' motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff's 4th Amendment rights by arresting her on charge of resisting peace officer without probable cause and used excessive force when they pepper-sprayed plaintiff during his arrest. Videotape supported defendants' claim that they had probable cause to arrest plaintiff on resisting peace officer charge where plaintiff backpedaled from officer after being told he was being arrested on outstanding arrest warrant and repeatedly rebuffed officer's attempt to grab his wrist to place him under arrest. Issue as to whether underlying arrest warrant was procured through false testimony was irrelevant given existence of probable cause on resisting peace officer charge. Moreover, use of pepper spray was reasonable given number of times plaintiff thwarted officer's attempt to take him into custody, and given fact that plaintiff had not submitted to officer's authority at time officer used pepper spray.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiffs' request for issuance of preliminary injunction seeking to bar enforcement of portion of Chicago's Responsible Gun Owners Ordinance that prohibited all firing ranges within City. Dist. Ct erred in finding that certain organizational plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge instant ordinance, and in finding that instant ban did not violate anyone's Second Amendment rights. Moreover, Ct. of Appeals held that instant ban placed severe burden on core Second Amendment right of armed self-defense, especially where ordinance tied issuance of required gun permit to required training at firing range, and that defendant bore burden of establishing strong public-interest for justifying said ban. Ct. further found that issuance of preliminary injunction is appropriate where: (1) plaintiffs' challenge had strong likelihood of success on merits given that defendant failed to provide any evidence to establish that defendant's concerns about threats to public safety were realistic; (2) balance of harms favored plaintiffs; and (3) harm to plaintiffs' Second Amendment rights could not be remedied by damages.