Plaintiff, a village municipality, filed a lawsuit against defendants alleging that they breached a redevelopment agreement the parties had entered into regarding a marina property. The trial court granted two motions for summary judgment which disposed of defendants counterclaims against the plaintiff as well as their third-party claims against village officials. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that the trial court erred when it concluded that the defendants lacked an ownership interest in the property at issue. (ROCHFORD and MARTIN, concurring)
This case presents question as to whether trial court properly reversed administrative law judge’s order that upheld taxes and penalties imposed on plaintiff by Cook County Department of Revenue pursuant to Cook County Retail Sale of Gasoline and Diesel Tax Ordinance arising out of plaintiff’s book-out transactions involving contracts where deliveries of fuel were to occur in future, under circumstances where there was no change in fuel location and no change in fuel inventories. Appellate Court, in reversing trial court, found that plaintiff had failed to rebut Department’s prima facie case that instant contracts were taxable sales under Fuel Tax ordinance. Appellate Court, though, reversed the Department’s imposition of penalties, where plaintiff’s decision not to pay said tax resulted in reasonable interpretation of ordinance.
Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-Town’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action, alleging that Town’s ordinance, which precluded certain convicted sex offenders from living within 6,500 feet from each other, violated Ex Post Facto Clause of Constitution, where, according to plaintiff, said ordinance had effect of retroactively increasing punishment for his sex offense conviction. Ct. of Appeals held that plaintiff was entitled to evidentiary hearing with respect to said provision, where: (1) instant provision effectively established form of banishment for convicted sex offenders, where ordinance effectively established ceiling beyond which no convicted sex offender could reside in Town; and (2) defendant failed to establish that said provision is reasonably related to goal of protecting Town’s children, especially where other provision in ordinance precluded convicted sex offenders of residing within 6,500 feet of “protected locations” associated with places where children congregate. Dist. Ct., though, did not err in granting defendant’s summary judgment motion with respect to plaintiff’s claim that ordinance violated his substantive due process rights or Ex Post Fact Clause with respect to provision that precluded plaintiff from living within 6,500 feet from protected location.
Plaintiff appealed from the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant on plaintiff’s complaint alleging violations of the Freedom of Information Act. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the circuit court did not err when it concluded that the defendant’s search for missing third-party reports was adequate and consistent with FOIA and that public bodies are not required to make a demand on a third-party who is delinquent or otherwise non-compliant with its obligation to submit reports. The appellate court further found that the circuit court properly granted summary judgment for defendant relating to a request for raw data based on an undisputed affidavit stating that the defendant did not keep such data. (C.A. WALKER and ODEN JOHNSON, concurring and specially concurring)
Plaintiff filed a three-count complaint against defendant for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and equitable estoppel. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss and plaintiff appealed, arguing, among other things, that amendments to the Illinois Gambling Act did not render a redevelopment agreement between the parties void. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed, finding that the city lost the authority to enter into the redevelopment agreement and that estoppel was not available because the agreement was void. (HUTCHINSON and SCHOSTOK, concurring)
Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant-Village denied him procedural due process by taking his home (to which he had contract for purchase) and demanding that he and his family vacate said home without giving plaintiff adequate notice and opportunity to be heard. Allegations in complaint indicated that defendant had acquired said home from titleholder for use as municipal park. While Dist. Ct. held belief that plaintiff could not proceed on instant claim because plaintiff had failed to allege that he lacked adequate post-deprivation remedy, Ct. of Appeals found that instant claim could proceed, where there was no obvious reason why defendant could not have given plaintiff advance notice and pre-deprivation hearing prior to seizing plaintiff’s home. Moreover, Ct. found that Dist. Ct.’s reliance on Parratt, 451 U.S. 527, was misplaced, where, unlike instant case, fact pattern in Parratt concerned situation where pre-deprivation hearing was impractical. As such, core principles of federal due process required some kind of hearing prior to State’s deprivation of person’s property, and plaintiff sufficiently alleged that he was injured by defendant’s failure to give adequate notice and pre-deprivation hearing, which rendered him unable to oppose transfer of his property.
Plaintiff filed a lawsuit seeking equitable relief under the Freedom of Information Act. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff regarding requests for disclosure of certain 911 recordings. Defendant appealed, arguing that the 911 recordings were exempt from disclosure, or, in the alternative, that the trial court erred when it required the defendant to either produce the recordings using computer software to mask the caller’s voice or to create transcripts of the calls. The appellate court reversed, finding that while there is no blanket rule against disclosure of of 911 calls, the calls are exempt from disclosure where they disclose the identity of the callers. The appellate court then explained that the defendant was not required to create new records either by using voice-altering software or providing a transcript and, as a result, the recordings were only available in a form that was exempt from disclosure. (ALBRECHT, concurring and McDADE, concurring in part and dissenting in part)
Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of similarly situated individuals, appealed from the trial court’s denial of their complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the City of Carbondale’s ordinance authorizing fees related to driving infractions, which resulted in vehicles being towed, was facially unconstitutional. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court’s calculation of minimum cost for an ordinance violation was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, that the trial court did not err when it found that the amounts received by the city pursuant to the statutory remittance were not relevant in determining whether the ordinance fees were reasonable, and that plaintiffs did not meet their burden of showing that there was a lack of any reasonable relation between the fee and the cost of the service. (BOIE and MOORE, concurring)
Defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court finding her guilty of violating a municipal ordinance. Defendant argued on appeal that she was denied the opportunity to plead guilty without having to appear because the information contained on the citation was incorrect and that the citation failed to identify the nature of the offense, which impeded her ability to prepare a defendant. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the defendant ultimately had the opportunity to plead guilty and that the citation sufficiently notified her of the nature of the charge. (HUTCHINSON and SCHOSTOK, concurring)
Defendants appealed from the trial court’s grant of a preliminary injunction to the plaintiff blocking the defendants from abolishing the office of the county auditor. Defendants argued on appeal, among other things, that the plaintiff lacked standing to obtain a preliminary injunction. The appellate court agreed and reversed and remanded, finding that the plaintiff lost any right she had to the office of the auditor when voters approved a referendum in favor of eliminating the office of the county auditor. (CAVANAGH and STEIGMANN, concurring)
