Local Government Law

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging wrongful termination of contract and tortious interference with contract and the defendant, a municipality, terminated a contract for information technology services. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss on the basis that the contract was void because it contained a 60-month term that exceeded the length of the term of the mayor in office at the time the contract was entered into, in violation of section 8-1-7(b) of the Illinois Municipal Code and plaintiff appealed. The appellate court reversed, finding that the municipality properly exercised its home rule authority when its board of trustees voted to pass the resolution approving the contract and, in doing so, the municipality superseded the Municipal Code and entered into a contract that exceeded the limitations of section 8-1-7(b). (MITCHELL and MIKVA, concurring)

Plaintiff appealed from the administrative decision of the defendant, the Illinois Liquor Commission, that affirmed a decision by a city liquor control commission not to renew the plaintiff’s liquor license after the plaintiff failed to meet the city commission’s deadlines to provide documentation for its renewal application. The appellate court affirmed, explaining that it could not find that the state liquor commission clearly erred in finding that the city liquor control commission did not abuse its discretion by declining to renew the license where plaintiff was provided written notice of the date by which the plaintiff’s application submissions were due. (C.A. WALKER and TAILOR, concurring)

The City of Joliet appealed from a judgment of the appellate court that reversed administrative decisions made by the city finding the plaintiffs liable for non-compliance with the city’s ordinances prohibiting overweight and/or over length vehicles. To resolve the appeal, the Illinois supreme court considered whether section 1-2.1-2 of the Illinois Municipal Code constitutionally preempted the city’s home rule authority and whether the ordinance violations at issue were properly subject to administrative adjudication under the city’s municipal code. The supreme court affirmed in part and vacated in part, finding that section 1-2.1-2 did not preempt the city’s home rule authority, but that the hearing officer’s administrative decisions were precluded by the Joliet Code of Ordinances. (THEIS, NEVILLE, HOLDER WHITE, CUNNINGHAM, and ROCHFORD, concurring. O’BRIEN took no part in the decision)