Local Government Law

Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against defendant for inverse condemnation after refusing to grant the defendant a temporary construction easement to use portions of plaintiff’s property as a staging area for construction equipment. The trial court granted a preliminary injunction to plaintiffs, which plaintiffs alleged that the defendant then violated. The trial court found the defendant in indirect civil contempt for violating the injunction, imposed a daily fine, and ordered that defendant’s pay plaintiffs’ attorneys fees. Defendant appealed from the injunction, the finding of contempt, and the attorneys fees award. The appellate court found that the prohibitory order lacked specificity and, as a result, that the preliminary injunction was unenforceable. The appellate court further explained that even if the preliminary injunction had been clear, the court would have vacated the finding of contempt because the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant without the plaintiffs first making the requisite evidentiary showing. (LAMPKIN and ROCHFORD, concurring)

In a Freedom of Information Act action, defendant appealed from an order of the trial court finding that the defendant violated FOIA by failing to disclose records requested by the plaintiff. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendant argued that the records were exempted under section 7(1)(o) of the FOIA and that disclosure of the records would jeopardize the security of its system. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the requested records, which were an index of the tables and columns used by the defendant in a records database, were “file layouts” within the meaning of section 7(1)(o) and were exempt from disclosure. (THEIS, NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, CUNNINGHAM, ROCHFORD, and O’BRIEN, concurring)

Defendant appealed from a trial court order finding a property abandoned pursuant to section 11-31-1(d) of the Illinois Municipal Code and issuing a judicial deed transferring the title of the property to the plaintiff, City of Danville. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that the city did not meet the first statutory requirement for a finding of abandonment, that the property was tax delinquent for two or more years or bills for water service were outstanding for two or more years, and that strict construction was required where the language of the statute was clear and unambiguous. (WELCH and BARBERIS, concurring)

Plaintiffs sued the City of Chicago claiming that the city’s shared housing ordinance violated the Illinois Constitution and challenged the provisions of the ordinance relating to home inspections, the primary-residence rule, excessive noise, and banning single-night rentals. The circuit court granted the city’s motion to dismiss and the plaintiffs appealed. The appellate court affirmed, finding that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge some provisions of the ordinance, that plaintiffs did not exhaust their administrative remedies on other claims, and that other claims failed based on the facts contained in the complaint alone because the city had a rational basis for its disparate treatment of types of property owners. (HYMAN and COGHLAN, concurring)

Plaintiff appealed from the circuit court’s dismissal of her qui tam complaint filed on behalf of the City of Chicago and against the defendants seeking penalties and interest for their alleged failure to collect and remit lease taxes as required by the Chicago Municipal Code. At issue on appeal was whether plaintiff’s claim was barred by the City’s false claim act. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that plaintiff’s claim was barred by section 1-22-030(e) of the Chicago Municipal Code because her lawsuit concerned the application, interpretation, or enforcement of a tax ordinance. (MIKVA and C.A. WALKER, concurring)

In a tax rate objection complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the 2017 levy imposed by the Woodridge Park District was unlawful because the park district had an allegedly illegal excess accumulation in its corporate fund. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and found that the levy was unlawful. The district defendant appealed, arguing that there was no excess accumulation of funds. The appellate court reversed, finding that the trial court erred in granting the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment because the district was not accumulating funds beyond what it historically spent to run the park district. (BRENNAN and ALBRECHT, concurring)

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging that the defendant violated the Freedom of information Act when it sought payment for the cost of copying a hard drive and obtaining a storage device in response to a FOIA request submitted by plaintiff. The trial court entered an order requiring the defendant to provide the plaintiffs with all documents stored on the computer that was subject to the request but noting that the lawsuit could have been avoided if the plaintiffs had made a reasonable attempt to clarify their request before filing suit. The trial court also denied plaintiffs’ request for fees, costs, and civil penalties. Plaintiffs appealed the order denying their motion for fees, costs, and civil penalties. The appellate court affirmed, finding, first, that the denial of attorneys fees and costs was consistent with the purposes of the FOIA’s fee-shifting provision because litigation was not necessary to ensure compliance and, second, that the defendant’s attempt to pass the costs of copying the hard drive on to the plaintiffs was not made in bad faith and, as a result, the trial court properly denied plaintiffs’ request for civil penalties. (DAVENPORT and McDADE, concurring)

Plaintiff sued the City of Chicago, two police officers, and two city employees for injuries he suffered when he was shot by a third party, which plaintiff argued was the result of the negligent and willful and wanton conduct of the police officers. The trial court dismissed the suit, finding that the defendants were immune pursuant to section 4-102 of the Local Governmental and Tort Immunity Act. The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615, but reversing the trial court’s dismissal pursuant to section 2-619 by finding that the question of whether the officers were executing or enforcing any law at the time of the occurrence was a question of fact. (C.A. WALKER and TAILOR, concurring)