Local Government Law

Appellant, a recycling company, appealed from a decision of an administrative hearing officer that denied certain relocation expenses claimed by appellant after its property was taken by the defendant through eminent domain. On appeal, the plaintiff alleged that the hearing officer misapplied the law and committed reversible error when it affirmed the amount paid by the Village based on estimates the Village obtained from multiple contractors where the plaintiff had elected to self-move. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the village’s hearing officer did not err in his determination that the amount paid was appropriate based on the evidence presented. (ODEN JOHNSON and C.A. WALKER, concurring)

The plaintiff appealed from an order of the circuit court suppressing evidence obtained after the defendant submitted to field sobriety testing and was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of village ordinances. The appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the village did not have the authority under SCR 604(a) to bring an interlocutory appeal in conjunction with a matter seeking to enforce a violation of a village ordinance. (HODLRIDGE and ALBRECHT, concurring)

Plaintiff filed a petition for injunctive relief seeking to enforce a provision of its municipal code that the defendant was continuously violating. The trial court found that the defendant was in violation with the code, but ruled in the defendant’s favor after balancing the equities and finding that enforcing the rule would be an undue imposition on the defendant. The supreme court reversed the trial court, holding that where the ordinance explicitly allowed for injunctive relief the only question to be determined by the trial court was whether the city met its burden of proving a continuous violation and that the trial court had no discretion to balance the equities. (THEIS, NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, HOLDER WHITE, ROCHFORD, and O’BRIEN, concurring)

Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking an injunction to stop the City of Joliet from annexing and developing a proposed industrial business park, alleging that it would constitute a public and private nuisance and that the pre-annexation agreement was null and void. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis that the complaint did not state a valid cause of action. The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that plaintiffs properly pled a cause of action for private nuisance as to some of the plaintiffs and that the plaintiffs adequately stated a claim for common-law public nuisance. The appellate court affirmed dismissal of the count of the complaint seeking to invalidate the pre-annexation agreement on the basis that the allegation that the contract was vague did not qualify as an illegal or unauthorized act of a public body. The appellate court also found that the trial court properly dismissed a count of the complaint alleging a violation of the Open Meetings Act. (BRENNAN and ALBRECHT, concurring)

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the Village of Oak Brook alleging that it held a closed meeting in violation of the Open Meetings Act and that it wrongly denied a request for records pertaining to the meeting in violation of the Freedom of Information Act. The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, ordered that the village disclose the requested records, and ordered that the village pay attorneys fees. The village appealed and the appellate court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The appellate court found that the village did not satisfy the collective-negotiating-matters exception to OMA because there was no active or imminent collective bargaining when it held its closed session and that the village did not discuss probable or imminent litigation and, as a result, the trial court did not err when it entered summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. However, the appellate court further found that the trial court erred when it required disclosure under FOIA without consideration of whether any of the requested documents were privileged attorney-client communications because privileged communications are exempt from disclosure. (McDADE and ALBRECHT, concurring)

Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants petitioning for a writ of mandamus requiring that alleged incremental taxes owed to the village be paid and for declaratory judgment regarding payments and alleged violations of the Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act. The trial court grated defendant’s motion to dismiss and plaintiff appealed. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that the TIF district at issue did not exceed the statutory 23-year limitation period because it required 24 payments instead of 23 payments and, as a result, the circuit court erred when it granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice. (BOIE, concurring and VAUGHAN, specially concurring)

Plaintiffs brought a lawsuit against Cook County challenging the county’s use of transportation tax revenue and arguing that it was unconstitutional under a constitutional amendment that was adopted in 2016. The appellate court considered two orders of the circuit court, the first of which was a grant of a summary determination of a major issue in which the circuit court found that the plaintiffs were unable to challenge the County’s expenditures under previous fiscal years. The second order granted summary judgment in favor of the county by finding that the county’s spending in fiscal year 2023 complied with the constitutional amendment. The appellate court affirmed the first order but vacated the second, finding that the county did not establish that its spending complied with the amendment. The appellate court also concluded that the plaintiffs had not definitely shown that the county’s spending violated the amendment. (HOWSE and McBRIDE, concurring)