Local Government Law

Plaintiff filed a FOIA enforcement action seeking to receive records of certain 911 recordings. The defendant sheriff’s office argued that the records were exempt from disclosure because they contained confidential statements made by individuals who filed complaints or provided information to law enforcement and that the calls could not be altered or redacted to protect the speaker’s identity. The trial court held that the plaintiff was entitled to either an altered audio recording or a transcript of the 911 calls. The sheriff’s office appealed, and the appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the 911 calls were not exempt from disclosure and that the sheriff’s office was required to provide the calls using audio masking software. The appellate court reversed the trial court order requiring the sheriff’s office to provide written transcripts. (McDADE, specially concurring in part and dissenting in part, and DAUGHERITY, specially concurring in part and dissenting in part)

Plaintiff brought an action to foreclose special assessment liens on property owned by the defendant and, when defendant failed to appear, the trial court entered an order of default and judgment of foreclosure and sale. More than two years later the defendant filed a petition for relief from judgment pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The trial court granted the petition and vacated the prior orders and the plaintiff appealed. The appellate court reversed, finding that the section 2-1401 petition was not filed within the two-year limitations period and that the limitations period was not subject to equitable tolling. (HUDSON, concurring and SCHOSTOK, specially concurring).

The sole issue on appeal was whether, in a county with a county executive form of government, the power to appoint a person to fill a vacancy in an elected county office resided with the county executive or the chair of the county board. The supreme court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, which found that under the plain terms of section 25-11 of the Election Code, the power of appointment resided with the chair of the county board. (THEIS, NEVILLE, MICHAEL J. BURKE, OVERSTREET, CARTER, and HOLDER WHITE, concurring)

Plaintiff as special administrator of an individual who died after a physical altercation with a police officer filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the officer, his employer, a hospital, and a physician. The village and the police officer filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the officer was entitled to absolute immunity from civil suit under section 4-102 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act and that the plaintiff had failed to show that the officer’s use of force was without legal justification and resulted from willful and wanton conduct under section 2-202. The trial court granted the motion under both sections and plaintiff appealed. The appellate reversed, finding that a reasonable person could conclude that the officer was not providing police protection service when the decedent was at the hospital and finding a question of fact existed as to whether the officer engaged in willful and wanton conduct. (ODEN JOHNSON and TAILOR, concurring)

Case of first impression regarding whether and how Illinois voters can recall their elected municipal officers. Village board adopted a resolution placing referenda on the ballot to establish a recall procedure and to recall the incumbent mayor. The circuit court held the referenda were invalid, but the order was stayed and village voters approved both referenda. The appellate court stayed the certification of the results pending its review. On review, the appellate court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment and concluded that the referenda were improperly drafted and, as a result, were ineffective. (CUNNINGHAM and CONNORS, concurring)

Plaintiff filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a finding that a purchase and sale agreement between the defendant and a private developer was void because it did not follow state law, that the ordinance approving zoning changes to the property violated the plaintiffs’ procedural and substantive due process rights, and that certain meetings related to the proposed sale and development of the property violated the Open Meetings Act. The trial court dismissed the complaint and plaintiffs appealed. The appellate court affirmed, finding that village had authority as a home rule unit to enter into a purchase and sale agreement and that this did not conflict with the provisions of the Illinois Municipal Code relating to the sale of surplus property, that proper notice was provided of the proposed zoning changes, and that the relief requested by the plaintiffs to void actions taking during the public meetings was not available because the meetings were open and not closed. (LAMPKIN and MARTIN, concurring)

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit seeking to enforce a records request issued under the Freedom of Information Act. The City of Chicago had refused to produce the requested documents under two exemptions contained within the Act. At issue on appeal was whether the circuit court could account for changed circumstances when determining whether the withholding of public information was proper. The Supreme Court adopted a “time-of-request” approach and held that unless the FOIA exemption stated otherwise, the circuit court should review the withholding of information under the circumstances as they existed when the public body made its decision. (ANNE M. BURKE, THEIS, NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, and CARTER, concurring. HOLDER WHITE took no part in the decision.)

Plaintiff filed suit against the City of Chicago to challenge a zoning ordinance that changed the types of establishments allowed in a building owned by the plaintiff as well as claims based on the conduct of the local city council alderman. The circuit court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety and with prejudice under section 2-619 by finding that plaintiff failed to state a claim for substantive due process or equal protection violations and that the allegations of the complaint, which referenced noise levels and drug and alcohol abuse at the subject property, satisfied the rational basis test. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the plain language of section 2-201 of the Local Government and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act provided absolute immunity to the city. The Supreme Court also affirmed, but found that the alderman was immune because his conduct reflected a determination of policy and the exercise of discretion and because he was not liable due to discretionary immunity, the City also was not liable. (THEIS, NEVILLE, MICHAEL J. BURKE, and CARTER, concurring. ANNE M. BURKE and HOLDER WHITE took no part in the decision.)

Plaintiff, a reporter for an independent news organization, alleged that the City of Chicago Police Department failed to comply with a FOIA request to produce documents and videos relating to a 2018 homicide. The police department had claimed that certain records were exempt from disclosure under sections 7(1)(d)(i) and (vii) of the Act. The trial court ruled in favor of the police department, finding that an investigator's affidavit provided clear and convincing evidence that disclosure of the records would interfere with an ongoing investigation. Plaintiff appealed and the appellate court affirmed. (McBRIDE and BURKE, concurring)