Traffic/DUI

Defendant was convicted, after stipulated bench trial, of aggravated DUI. Plain language of statute required only that Defendant’s conduct in DUI was a proximate cause of other driver’s injuries, not sole or immediate cause. That other driver’s own conduct contributed to injuries would not relieve Defendant of criminal liability. Thus, court’s decision to preclude evidence that other driver was not wearing her seat belt did not deny Defendant the ability to present a defense. Retrograde extrapolation evidence as a method of estimating a person’s BAC has general acceptance in its relevant scientific community. Court did not abuse its discretion in finding State’s expert qualified to render opinions on topic of retrograde extrapolation. (STEIGMANN and DeARMOND, concurring.)

Defendant was arrested for DUI. Court granted Defendant's petition to rescind his statutory summary suspension (SSS). Court erred in sustaining Defendant's hearsay objection during SSS hearing. State attempted to elicit testimony from arresting officer explaining what he learned during his investigation and why he believed he had probable cause to arrest Defendant for DUI. When a defendant challenges whether arresting officer had reasonable grounds for arrest, officer's testimony, even if it includes hearsay, is permissible during SSS hearing as it provides court with necessary information to rule on petition to rescind SSS. Court's ruling is affirmed because of forfeiture, as State did not make this argument as to hearsay to trial court or to appellate court. (HARRIS and APPLETON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of speeding and disobeying a traffic control signal in Village. Defendant appealed pro se, arguing that court erred in not accepting his "defense" that Village failed to show relevant speed limit signs, traffic control devices, and road markings complied with Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices and speed limit was established based on an engineering study. The speed limit and traffic signs and devices are presumptively valid, and Defendant failed to rebut that presumption with competent evidence. (NEVILLE and PUCINSKI, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with DUI after a single-vehicle motorcycle accident. Defendant filed motion to suppress results of a blood-alcohol analysis that was done at hospital on night of accident, contending that blood draw was an unlawful search. Filing of a motion to suppress does not establish that a search took place. Defendant bore burden, at suppression hearing, to show that his blood was drawn but he failed to offer any evidence to establish that fact, and thus failed to establish that element of his prima facie case. No evidence was shown that any individual who may have drawn Defendant's blood did so while acting at the behest, or under the influence, of the police. Even if blood was drawn from Defendant at hospital, it was a private search that did not implicate the 4th amendment.(KARMEIER, FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, and THEIS, concurring.)

Officer pulled Defendant over because of erratic driving. Defendant failed 3 field sobriety tests because he could not follow instructions. These observations were sufficient to justify Defendant’s arrest for DUI. As officers found Defendant’s actions and behavior inconsistent with his blood alcohol level, it was reasonable for officer to request that Defendant undergo blood or urine testing to determine if he was under the influence of drugs. Officer read Defendant a “Warning to Motorist” prior to requesting that he submit to a breath test. Officer was not required to provide Defendant with new warnings again, when he was asked to submit to urine or blood test less than one hour later. (HOLDRIDGE and SCHMIDT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of DUI. Court abused its discretion in extending speedy trial term for 60 days so prosecutor could present his one witness, a state trooper. Prosecutor did not act with due diligence, as he did not make effort necessary to bring his witness to court in sufficient time to secure his presence before speedy trial term expired. Prosecutor requested 3 continuances, and Defendant had answered ready for trial on multiple trial dates, with delays totaling 160 days solely due to prosecutions’ inability to bring state trooper to court. Conviction reversed, and remanded with directions to enter order discharging Defendant. (PUCINSKI and HYMAN, concurring.)