Traffic/DUI

Court erred in granting Defendant's motion to suppress evidence and in granting his petition to rescind statutory summary suspension (SSS) of his driver's license. Trooper showed no coercive behavior and no physical force or show of authority to restrain Defendant's liberty. Thus, his encounter with Defendant, prior to trooper observing signs that Defendant was under the influence, was consensual and not a seizure. Trooper could reasonably have concluded that Defendant was experiencing distress, as Defendant was driving 20 mph under speed limit, then slowed and stopped in front of him on shoulder of a dark and deserted rural road in middle of night, any alleged seizure was reasonable under community caretaking doctrine. No unreasonable seizure in trooper taking Defendant's license and registration back to squad car, as Defendant offered them to trooper, and as there is evidence that a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity had arisen by then. (CHAPMAN, concurring; WELCH, dissenting.)

Defendant was aware of pending aggravated DUI felony charges when he pled guilty to misdemeanor charge of DUI which arose out of same set of circustances as felony charges. A defendant is not entitled to use Double Jeopardy Clause as a sword to prevent State from completing its prosecution on remaining charges. Thus, double jeopardy does not bar State from pursuing felony charges that were pending at the time that Defendant pled guilty to the lesser-included misdemeanor charges. (TURNER and HARRIS, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 12/14/16.) Defendant was charged with DUI. Court properly granted Defendant's petition to rescind statutory summary suspension (SSS). Officer administered field sobriety tests in improper fashion by asking Defendant to perform them on a wet surface while it was raining, so that probative weight to be given those tests is significantly impaired. Despite weather conditions, Defendant's performance on tests was reasonable, which would not lead a reasonably cautious person to believe Defendant was impaired by alcohol. The fact that Defendant had bloodshot and glassy eyes, without being confirmed by some other factor, does not rise to level of probable cause. (O'BRIEN and CARTER, concurring.)

Court erred in granting Defendant's petition to rescind statutory summary suspension (SSS).  Defendant admitted that she failed to check her blind spot before changing lanes, causing another vehicle to drive into the ditch. Evidence presented at hearing, as to Defendant's erratic driving, strong odor of burnt cannabis in her vehicle, and presence of cannabis and paraphernalia in her vehicle were sufficient to lead a reasonably cautious person to believe Defendant was driving while under influenced of cannabis. (CARTER, concurring; HOLDRIDGE, specially concurring.)

Court's finding that Defendant failed to make a prima facie case for rescission of his statutory summary suspension (SSS), after being charged with DUI, was not against manifest weight of evidence. Officer's testimony that he "probably" began observation period within 15 minutes of arriving at police station, although he stated that he observed Defendant for 29 minutes, did not mandate that officer's testimony be discredited entirely. Officer was in "substantial compliance" with 20-minute observation period, and it is not required that officer record time when 20-minute observation period began. No denial of due process  in State failing to disclose to Defendant prior to hearing that officer would testify that he began 20-minute observation period before he read warning to Defendant, as time at which warning was giving, in relation to commencement of observation period, was not material under U.S. Supreme Court Brady v. Maryland decision. (SCHOSTOK and McLAREN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated DUI. Court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress evidence. Officer was acting in his community caretaking capacity when he approached Defendant's vehicle out of concern no one exited vehicle after 5 minutes at 1:20 a.m., then found Defendant slumped over the driver's seat. Defendant then showed symptoms of intoxication, and officer detected odor of alcoholic beverage, providing officer with reasonable, articulable suspicion. Court did not improperly consider Defendant's prior DUI convictions at sentencing.(STEIGMANN and APPLETON, concurring.)

Petitioner (Will Co. State's Attorney) seeks mandamus pursuant to Rule 381 against Respondent judge, asking court to compel Respondent to vacate a 1/6/16 sentencing order, and to classify as a Class 2 felony a Defendant's 3rd DUI, and to resentence Defendant as a Class X offender. Defendant's 3rd DUI conviction constitutes aggravated DUI and is a Class 2 felony, as charged in indictment. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(2)(B) demonstrates unambiguous legislative intent to classify a 3rd DUI conviction as a Class 2 felony, and Section 501(d)(2)(A) demonstrates unambiguous legislative intent to classify it as a Class 4 felony only if no other provision in Section 11-501 is applicable. As Defendant has at least 2 prior Class 2 felony or higher convictions, he must be sentenced as a Class X offender on his aggravated DUI conviction in this case. (KARMEIER, FREEMAN, THOMAS, GARMAN, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with DUI, and he submitted to blood and urine testing which revealed presence of alprazolam (Xanax), a controlled substance. Court granted Defendant's petition to rescind statutory summary suspension (SSS), as Defendant presented a valid prescription for Xanax. As Defendant had burden of making prima facie case for rescission of SSS, it was his burden to show that alprazolam did not affect his ability to operate a motor vehicle. Remanded for opportunity for Defendant to present evidence to show that he complied with prescription and could drive safely, and for State opportunity to present evidence to negate Defendant's claim.(CHAPMAN and CATES, concurring.)

Blue Island police officer observed Defendant's vehicle improperly parked on street within City of Chicago. Officer ticketed Defendant for improper parking on roadway, a petty offense; and DUI. Sections 7-4-7 and 7-4-8 of Municipal Code gave officer full authority and power to go into any part of police district that encompassed Blue Island, including Chicago (because it is an adjoining municipality in same county), to exercise that authority and power. Court erred in granting Defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence solely on legal issue of jurisdiction. Remanded for court to reconsider its ruling on Defendant's motion to quash and suppress after making factual findings and credibility determinations.(HYMAN and NEVILLE, concurring.)