Child Law

Appeal arising out of circuit court’s denial of the State’s petition to adjudicate a minor a ward of the court due to an injurious environment under section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act. On appeal, the State argued that the minor was subject to an injurious environment based on the respondent mother’s attempted murder of the minor’s newborn brother. The appellate court agreed with the State and reversed the circuit court’s judgment. (FITZGERALD SMITH and HOWSE, concurring)

Respondent appealed circuit court’s order finding her unfit to care for her minor child, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and arguing that the dispositional finding violated her constitutional rights. The appellate court affirmed, finding the record sufficiently showed respondent had unresolved mental health issues that placed the minor child at significant risk of harm and that her constitutional rights were not violated. (HAUPTMAN and LYTTON, concurring)

Respondent appealed trial court finding of abuse and neglect arguing that the notice and verification provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act were implicated and that the trial court erred in its finding where there was no corroboration of statements by two minors. The appellate court affirmed, finding that a brief reference to unsubstantiated Indian heritage was not sufficient to implicate the provisions of the ICWA and that the trial court did not err in failing to make a determination on the applicability of the Act. The appellate court further found that the minors’ statements provided sufficient corroboration for each other and that the trial court’s findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. (FITZGERALD SMITH and LAVIN, concurring)

Respondent was adjudicated a delinquent minor and sentenced to conditional discharge. Respondent appealed arguing the trial court committed plain error when it failed to appoint a guardian ad litem sua sponte, that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to move for appointment of a guardian ad litem and for failing to move to suppress evidence, and that the State did not present sufficient evidence to prove intent to deliver. The appellate court affirmed, finding that while a GAL should have been appointed the trial court’s failure to appoint one sua sponte was not arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable and did not constitute error where there is no statutory requirement that a guardian ad litem be appointed. The appellate court further found a motion to suppress would not have had merit and that the evidence was sufficient. (DEARMOND, concurring and KNECHT, dissenting)

Respondent appealed from the trial court’s finding that her minor child was neglected on the basis that his environment was injurious to his welfare and that he was anticipatorily neglected based on previous findings relating to the child’s siblings. The appellate court reversed, finding that the State did not establish that the minor was neglected by a preponderance of the evidence where it did not present evidence establishing that the child was born with THC in his system or that use of marijuana during pregnancy posed a risk to the unborn child and, as a result, that the evidence supported the conclusion that the minor was cared for and healthy. The appellate court further declined to apply the doctrine of anticipatory neglect because of the amount of time that had passed since the prior neglect findings. (SCHOSTOK and BIRKETT, concurring)

Respondent mother appealed from a trial court finding of abuse of her minor children. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s finding of abuse because, while respondent had a history as a victim of domestic violence, the abuser was no longer a member of the household at the time of the filing of the petition for adjudication. As a result, the court could not find that the minors were abused due to a substantial risk of physical injury. (McBRIDE and BURKE, concurring)

Respondent mother appealed from trial court’s denial of her motion to vacate an order placing temporary custody of her minor children with the Department of Children and Family Services, arguing that the temporary custody hearing did not happen within 48 hours of the minors being taken into protective custody. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court did not err in denying the respondent’s motion to vacate its temporary custody order where the hearing was scheduled to begin within the 48-hour time requirement and where there was a minimal delay in starting the hearing and no party was prejudiced by the delay. (SCHOSTOK and BIRKETT, concurring)

Respondent appealed from a trial court order finding him unfit to parent his minor son and terminating his parental rights on the basis that the trial court erred by conducting the termination proceedings in a hybrid in-person/remote format. The appellate court affirmed finding, first, that respondent’s brief failed to comply with multiple subsections of Supreme Court Rule 341(h) and, second, that the hybrid hearing procedure did not violate the respondent’s rights to procedural due process or confrontation. (BRIDGES and McLAREN, concurring)

Case involving the placement of a minor who was placed in foster care shortly after birth. The question before the appellate court was whether foster parents who have had a minor in their home for more than a year have a statutory right to intervene in placement proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act. The court answered the question in the affirmative, reversed the trial court order denying intervention, and remanded for further proceedings. (McBRIDE and BURKE, concurring)