Child Law

Juvenile court entered dispositional order finding Respondent motion fit, willing, and able to care for the minors and ordering their immediate return to her custody. Those portions of dispositional order are reversed and vacated, as against manifest weight of evidence and an abuse of discretion. Court is directed to enter a new dispositional order finding mother unable to parent the minors at this time and ordering them placed in custody of DCFS. Mother failed to seek medical treatment for infant and has uncertain relationship with father, who has failed to participate in any domestic violence services. Mother has failed to complete services and has alleged that father physically abused her and the minors. (LAVIN and COBBS, concurring.)

Court terminated parental rights of Respondent mother to her 4 children. Even at critical stages in termination of parental rights (TPR) proceedings, the right to be physically present is not absolute. Respondent's statutory rights were not violated when the TPR trial was held via Zoom. Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Respondent's motion for a continuance to sometime in the future when in-person hearings can be conducted with certainty that the COVID-19 virus will not be spread. The inference can be drawn the court was and is concerned about the spread of the virus to vulnerable persons, including Respondent's children, who are not old enough to receive the vaccine. (HOFFMAN and CONNORS, concurring.)

Petitioner, pro se, filed petition to establish his parentage and visitation rights as to the minor child. Respondent, a Minnesota resident who is the minor's maternal aunt and guardian, filed motion to dismiss petition, alleging that she had filed petition to adopt the minor that was pending in Minnesota. After a hearing, during which court was presented with a finalized Minnesota adoption order as to the minor, court granted aunt's motion to dismiss. After hearing, court denied Petitioner's motion to reconsider and motion for injunctive relief. Court properly gave full faith and credit to the Minnesota adoption order, as Petitioner failed to show that this order had been procured through extrinsic fraud or that the Minnesota court lacked jurisdiction. On its face and after limited inquiry, adoption order appeared to have been entered by a court with valid subject matter jurisdiction, and court was not allowed to inquire further into merits of adoption order and was required to give full faith and credit to that order, regardless of any irregularities. Court properly granted aunt's motion to dismiss parentage petition and properly denied motion to reconsider and motion for injunctive relief. (HOLDRIDGE and O'BRIEN, concurring.)

Court found infant twins to be neglected based on injurious environment, and placed them in custody of DCFS. Respondent and the father of the infants had a history of domestic violence, including a physical altercation at hospital the day prior the birth of the infants; and they admit to a history of drug abuse. Respondent mother has 3 other children in DCFS care after finding of abuse and neglect.  Stipulated evidence presented at adjudication hearing supports a finding that mother breached her duty to ensure a safe nurturing shelter for the minors. Court did not abuse its discretion in denying mother's request for a continuance, as mother failed to show good cause for her absence and the need for continuance. (DELORT and CONNORS, concurring.)

After hearing, court found it was in minor child's best interests to terminate Respondent's parental rights. Conflict of interest existed because Respondent was represented by an assistant public defender while the public defender was the guardian ad litem (GAL) and they had opposing positions. At two permanency review hearings, the two expressed opposing positions as to whether the State's goal of return home should be changed.  At best interests hearing, their positions were diametrically opposed when GAL recommended termination of parental rights and assistant public defender asked court to consider not terminating Respondent's parental rights. Conflict arose before Respondent admitted the unfitness allegations. in State's petition. (KNECHT and HOLDER WHITE, concurring.)

Defendant, then age 17, began a "pay for sex" arrangement with the victim (age 38), whom she and another person had planned to rob. However, the other person, during robbery attempt, shot and killed the victim. Defendant was convicted of multiple counts of 1st-degree murder predicated on doctrines of common-design accountability and felony-murder statute. Convictions were merged into single conviction for felony murder, and Defendant was sentenced to 25 years. Although Defendant did not kill or intend for a killing to occur, due process does not bar such conviction. Felony murder and accountability statutes do not require intent to commit murder, nor do they require that the resulting death be foreseeable. Felony-murder statute does not punish the wrongdoer based on what was or was not reasonably foreseeable. The fact that juveniles do not have the foresight of adults to appreciate the potential consequences of their actions is irrelevant to due process analysis. (McBRIDE and  BURKE, concurring.)

The COVID-19 pandemic justified the use of video conferencing for hearing at which Respondent father's parental rights were terminated. Minor has chronic respiratory ailments, and proceeding in court would increase risk of exposing her to COVID-19 because her foster parents would have to appear in court and then return home. The marginal benefit from an in-person proceeding, where credibility of witnesses is not disputed, does not justify increased risk to minor's health. Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Respondent father's motion for a continuance, as father did not show any prejudice from expeditious resolution of the case. (HYMAN and COGHLAN, concurring.)

Court entered order finding Respondent mother unfit and terminating her parental rights. The time to complain of alleged errors in the neglect proceeding passed long before Respondent filed her notice of appeal, as she failed to file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the dispositional order. Even where a respondent alleges ineffective assistance of counsel during adjudicatory phase of proceedings, appellate court lacks jurisdiction over such claims in an appeal from an order terminating parental rights. The only exception to this rule is where the court lacks personal jurisdiction over a defaulted parent due to, for example, improper service. Adjudicatory and dispositional orders are not within the procedural progression of orders terminating parental rights.  (JORGENSEN and HUDSON, concurring.)

Court did not violate Respondent parents' due process rights by using Zoom audio-video conferencing to conduct termination proceedings.The use of Zoom was necessary to further important state interests. To the extent Respondents have a confrontation right under the Adoption Act, the termination hearings conducted via Zoom did not infringe upon that right. (CONNORS and ODEN JOHNSON, concurring.)

Court terminated Respondent father’s parental rights to his 2 minor children. Father had no statutory or constitutional due process right to an in-person hearing during termination proceedings. Court did not misapply Rule 241 in conducting termination proceedings via Zoom videoconferencing platform or that the Zoom platform limited court’s ability to observe case participants and interfered with its ability to judge credibility of witnesses. (WELCH, concurring; WHARTON, dissenting.)