Child Law

Defendant, age 17 at time of offenses, was convicted, after jury trial, of murder and attempted murder and sentenced to 50 years for murder and 30 years for attempted murder, to be served concurrently, to run consecutively with a separate 30-year sentence imposed for Defendant's prior and unrelated 1994 murder conviction. It was improper for court to consider day-for-day credit in determining whether Defendant's 50-year sentence constitutes de facto life. Court made no finding that Defendant's conduct showed irretrievable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond rehabilitation. Court ultimately found Defendant was not deserving of life imprisonment or de facto life. Sentence is unconstitutional under 8th amendment as applied to Defendant. Sentence vacated and remanded for new sentencing hearing. (LAVIN and PUCINSKI, concurring.)

State filed petition for adjudication of wardship alleging that the 14-year-old minor committed 2 counts of armed violence and 1 count of aggravated battery. Court denied State's motion for court to have the case declared an extended jurisdiction juvenile (EJJ) prosecution. The EJJ statute has been amended so that both the discretionary transfer (to adult court) provision and the EJJ provision of the Juvenile Court Act require the court to consider identical factors. Once the court found that the State had met its burden regarding the juvenile's age and probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed the alleged offenses, the court's evaluation was required to diverge into separate considerations for the transfer and EJJ motions. The court was required to treat each motion separately and evaluate the statutory factors as to the appropriate burden attached to each motion. Court's denial of State's motion to designate proceedings as an EJJ prosecution was an abuse of discretion as the court failed to do so as to that motion. (WELCH and VAUGHAN, concurring.)

Counsel, who was appointed to represent Respondent father on appeal, filed a second Anders motion to withdraw, claiming that there are no nonfrivolous issues to appeal. Counsel's statements in his motion, as to the efforts and progress counts, are not borne out by the record. The motion is insufficient, and counsel failed to follow the directions in appellate court's minute order in response to his first Anders motion to withdraw. Appellate court denied motion to withdraw, and case remanded to trial court for appointment of new counsel. (BRIDGES and HUDSON, concurring.)

Court found both Respondents were unfit parents and 4 months later found termination of their parental rights would be in the  minor children's best interests.Both Respondents stipulated at adjudicatory hearing that domestic violence occurred in the presence of the children. Court concluded that father's completion of services was superficial rather than demonstrable progress toward correcting injurious conditions. Court's finding that father failed to make reasonable progress was not against manifest weight of evidence. Mother did not complete services and presented no evidence.  Court's findings that it was in the children's best interests to terminate Respondents' parental rights were not against manifest weight of evidence. (DeARMOND and TURNER, concurring.)

State filed petition for adjudication of wardship, alleging that minor was neglected as his environment was injurious to his welfare. DCFS assigned case management responsibilities to Lutheran Children and Family Services (LCFS), which repeatedly failed to abide by court's orders and did not timely file necessary reports with the court. Court's determination that it was necessary to remove LCFS as case manager was proper and in best interests of the minor, as LCFS failed to fulfill its statutory duties. Court's order assigning DCFS as the case manager was an impermissible interference in DCFS's internal administrative procedures and infringes upon DCFS's explicit statutory authority to contract with outside service agencies and to designate a private agency or employee as a caseworker. (BOIE and BARBERIS, concurring.)

Appellate court erred in reversing trial court's decision to terminate Respondent mother's parental rights on the grounds that her privately retained attorney at several hearings on a neglect petition had a per se conflict of interest because the attorney was previously appointed as GAL for one of Respondent's children and appeared at 3 hearings on an earlier neglect petition. As GAL, attorney acted at the behest of the trial court, not the State, and she was never associated with the prosecution, and was not associated with the victim for purposes of the per se conflict rule. (GARMAN, M. BURKE, OVERSTREET, and CARTER, concurring; A. BURKE and NEVILLE, dissenting.)