Child Law

Court entered order removing Respondent, who had no biological relationship to minor, as minor's plenary guardian for cause cause, based on Respondent's refusal to obey court orders and to meet with the GAL and her willingness to substitute her judgment for that of the court. Respondent was not prejudiced by lack of statutory notice or any formal deficiencies in procedure. Respondent was give ample opportunity to rebut contentions that she did not cooperate with GAL. Evidence supports court's removal for good cause, and that Respondent was willing to substitute her own judgment for that of the court. (HUTCHINSON and ZENOFF, concurring.)

Defendant, age 16 at time of offense, was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st-degree murder on theory of accountability, and sentenced to 37 years. Jury found the State failed to prove that Defendant was armed with a firearm during the commission of the offense. One report indicated that Defendant had a cognitive disability, but State's clinical psychologist expert disagreed and stated that he had a learning disability and an emotional disability. Court agreed with State's expert and found that Defendant fully understood his Miranda rights and made a conscious decision to waive them.  Defendant lacked the ability to understand his Miranda rights and therefore could not knowingly and intelligently waive those rights. Court should have suppressed his statements to the police. Error was reversible and there was insufficient evidence to convict him such that retrial would offend double jeopardy principles. (GORDON and LAMPKIN, concurring.)

Court's order, finding Respondent mother an unfit parent and that it was in best interests of minor to terminate her parental  parental rights, was not against manifest weight of evidence. No error in admission of service plans or testimony of prospective foster mother about service plans. Minor, age 14, had multiple mental health issues and was on the autism spectrum, and had suffered physical abuse by Respondent's paramour. Minor was offered appropriate placement with prospective foster mother who had fostered 25 other children and had experience with children on the autism spectrum. (BIRKETT and BURKE, concurring.)

Respondent, age 17, was found guilty, after bench trial, of robbery, attempted robbery, 2 counts of aggravated battery, and 2 counts of battery. He was adjudicated delinquent and sentenced to 1 year of probation. His adjudications for simple battery should be vacated under the one-act, one-crime doctrine, as they are based on same conduct as the aggravated battery adjudication. The probation condition of "no gang activity" satisfied 1st amendment and due process concerns; it was reasonably related to Respondent's rehabilitation. A history of gang activity is not a prerequisite for imposing this condition which is a basic preventative measure. Condition is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. (McBRIDE and HOWSE, concurring.)

Court denied Defendant leave to file a successive postconviction petition. Defendant, age 16 at time of offense, was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder, home invasion, and residential burglary, and sentenced to a de facto life sentence of 50 years. Sentencing court failed to consider whether Defendant was beyond rehabilitation and was permanently incorrigible. Evidence was presented on his potential for rehabilitation. Forensic psychiatrist opined that Defendant's drug abuse problem could be rehabilitated by confinement and by a drug treatment program, and his personality disorder could be treating with counseling. Sentence was unconstitutional and in violation of U.S. Supreme Court's 2012 Miller v. Alabama decision. Remanded for new sentencing hearing.(MIKVA and CONNORS, concurring.)

Court entered order terminating parental rights of Respondent mother to her 2 minor children. Per se conflict of interest rule applies, as Respondent's attorney in fitness hearing served as GAL 6 years earlier for one of Respondent's minor children in earlier proceedings. Although attorney's representation of different clients was not simultaneous, goal of juvenile proceedings was clearly compromised.(HOLDRIDGE, concurring; WRIGHT, dissenting.)

Court granted State's petition for adjudication of wardship and for temporary custody against Respondent mother, alleging that he son was in injurious environment because of multiple incidents involving alcohol consumption and domestic violence. Court properly entered ruling of unfitness, as clear and convincing evidence at hearing showed that Respondent lacked interest, concern, and responsibility as to minor. Termination of parental rights was not against manifest weight of the evidence, and was in best interest of minor. Minor had been with his foster parents for 1 1/2 years at time of hearing, other than for a few days, since he was 8 days old, and Respondent cannot provide a stable, permanent home for the minor and failed to make reasonable efforts to visit the minor and nurture parent-child bonds. (LYTTON and HOLDRIDGE, concurring.)

Court terminated parental rights of Respondent mother as to her daughter, now age 14, so that child could be freed for adoption by her present foster parents. Child had been exposed to Respondent's alcohol use and mental health issues for most of her life. Court's finding that termination of parental rights is necessary to provide permanency and stability in child's life is not against manifest weight of evidence. (MIKVA and CONNORS, concurring.)