Child Law

(Court opinion corrected 7/22/20.) Respondent, age 16, was charged with offenses including 1 counts of aggravated possession of a stolen motor vehicle (PSMV); it was alleged that Respondent was driving a stolen Jeep and failed to stop after an officer signaled. After bench trial, Respondent was found guilty of PSMV, and the remaining offenses were merged into that offense. Evidence is insufficient to identify Respondent as the person driving the stolen vehicle beyond a reasonable doubt. Officer's eyewitness testimony cannot be reasonably accepted as proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Officer was the only witness who had an opportunity to view the driver, and he had only one opportunity to view the driver, which lasted just moments and from a poor vantage point, when it was raining and cloudy and both vehicles were in motion. (ELLIS and McBRIDE, concurring.)

Defendant, age 17 at time of offense, was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder of one person, and aggravated battery with a firearm of another person; and jury found that Defendant personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused victim's death. Defendant's cumulative 78-year sentence was a life sentence. Life in prison without parole is disproportionate unless the juvenile defendant's crime reflects irreparable corruption. Court failed to understand and consider the unique characteristics attending youth. Remanded for a new sentencing hearing. (PUCINSKI and COGHLAN, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 10/1/19.) Defendant, age 17 at time of offense, was convicted, after bench trial, of 1st degree murder and sentenced to 40 years. No ineffective assistance of counsel in counsel's alleged failure to move to strike hearsay evidence, as court did not include this hearsay evidence as among its reasons for verdict, and whether to move to strike is a matter of trial strategy. Illinois Supreme Court has held that sentences of 40 years or less are not de facto life sentences. As Defendant's sentence was exactly 40 years, it is not a de facto life sentence. The three years of mandatory supervised release are not included in calculation of total number of years of "prison sentence" for purpose of eighth amendment analysis. Sentence does not shock the moral sense of the community, and does not violate proportionate penalties clause, as Defendant committed a premeditated, gandland-style execution. (McBRIDE and BURKE, concurring.)

Court found Respondents unfit to parent their two minor children, and that the minors' best interest favored terminating their parental rights. Even if admission of hearsay statements was erroneous, there was enough other evidence to support the court's neglect finding. State presented sufficient evidence that mother failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the minors, and evidence showed that she was unable to parent the minors independently and continuously failed to appreciate risks.The concept of reasonable progress is judged by an objective standard, base upon the amount of progress measured from the conditions existing at the time custody was taken from the parent. The best interest factors show that the minors' best interest favored terminating mother's parental rights. (SCHMIDT, concurring; LYTTON, specially concurring.)

Court entered a dispositional order finding Respondent parents unfit to parent their daughter. Court had no sufficient grounds for rejecting the opinions of all the experts  (therapists and counselors who treated mother and daughter, and who all found mother fit to parent her daughter); and the witnesses (father's mother and sister, who recommended that daughter be returned to mother's custody) who knew the family best. Order is reversed and remanded for order finding Respondent mother fit to parent daughter and returning her to mother's custody. (GRIFFIN and HYMAN, concurring.)

Court found Respondent mother unfit to parent her two minor children, and finding that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate her parental rights. Court was diligent in hearing relevant testimony to make an informed judgment on mother's fitness. Evidence was clear and convincing that mother failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of children during the relevant 9 month period; mother refused services, did not regulate her emotional outbursts, failed to consistently attend services, and failed to show that she was implementing strategies and skills learned in services. (HYMAN and WALKER, concurring.)

Court entered order terminating Respondent father's parental rights as to his son.Most of the evidence presented at best interest hearing pertained to Respondent's fitness rather than to child and his current placement. Although casework and child's caregivers did not testify at best interest hearing, the best interest report was int he court file and was considered by court without objection. Court thus considered the best interest report and report was given its natural probative effect. Evidence was clear as to child's need for permanency. Child, age 3 at time of permanency review hearing, had been in foster care for more than 2/3 of his life. Court's finding that it was in child's best interest to terminate Respondent's parental rights was not against manifest weight of evidence. (McDADE and SCHMIDT, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 5/13/20.) Court held fitness hearing and found that Respondent parents were unfit to parent their minor daughter, by reason of their failure to complete the services required by the service plans. After a best interest hearing, court found that it was in the best interests of the minor that Respondents' parental rights be terminated. Court failed to satisfy requirements of section 2-18(4)(a) because it failed to elicit any testimony as to the production of the service plans. State failed to provide any testimony, other than that of one caseworker, or evidence to satisfy the 3-prong foundational requirements for business records exception.Court erred by allowing caseworker to testify as to information she gleaned from reading the case file. She became a caseworker on this case 2 months after the close of the relevant 9-month time period measuring unfitness. (LYTTON and WRIGHT, concurring.)

Court adjudicated Respondent minor, age 17 at time of incidents, delinquent of 3 counts of robbery, and found he was a habitual juvenile offender and ordered him committed to Department of Juvenile Justice until age 21.No ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to seek suppression of statements he made to the police on basis of no waiver of Miranda rights. No reasonable probability exists that Respondent would have been found not guilty of robbery if his statements to detective had been suppressed. Juvenile Court Act sets forth no explicit admonishments that court must give a juvenile offender prior to waiving right to jury trial. Respondent was not entitled to receive any specific admonition as to penalties of an adjudication as a habitual juvenile offender before making an effective waiver. Record reflects that Respondent made a valid jury trial waiver. (DeARMOND and CAVANAGH, concurring.)

Defendant, age 16 at time of offense, was convicted of attempted murder, aggravated battery with a firearm, and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, and was sentenced to 18-year term with an additional mandatory 20-year enhancement for personally discharging a firearm, for a total of 38 years. Mandatory imposition of firearm enhancements for juveniles no longer reflects Illinois's evolving standard of decency. Applying the 20-year mandatory firearm enhancement to Defendant violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois constitution, especially as in this case a tense exchange occurred between victim and Defendant that resulted in impulsive and reckless decision-making behavior to which young minds are more susceptible. Court erred in denying Defendant's motion for leave to file successive postconviction petition alleging an as-applied proportionate penalties clause violation.(McDADE, concurring; SCHMIDT, dissenting).