Child Law

Defendant, age 17 at time of offense, was convicted, after bench trial, of 1st degree murder which occurred in 2006, and was sentenced to 33 years. Defendant failed to show that his trial counsel performed ineffectively. Court properly denied Defendant's motion for new trial based on counsel's alleged ineffectiveness. Considered on its own, the 33-year sentence is not a de facto life sentence. Sentences were also imposed for 3 unrelated offenses that Defendant had to serve consecutively with his 33-year sentence: a 2005 robbery offense (6 years), a 2007 aggravated battery offense (4 years), and a 2007 possession of contraband in a penal institution (4 years). Defendant received credit for the consecutive sentences in his unrelated offenses, so his time in prison will not exceed 40 years. As the sentence is not a life sentence, the U.S. and Illinois Constitutions' protections for juvenile offenders are not implicated. No abuse of discretion in court's weighing of aggravating and mitigating evidence.(WALKER and PIERCE, concurring.)

Court found Respondent mother's son to be a neglected minor. Court properly accepted admission to the 2 counts in the State's petition for adjudication of wardship and temporary custody, and stipulation of minor's biological, noncustodial father. This admission was admissible as against him, and although he admitted that he did not have personal knowledge of the statements made in the admission, he could be bound by it, but this admission was not admissible as against Respondent, as she could not be bound by someone else's admission. (JORGENSEN and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)

Respondent, age 15 and 16 at time of offenses, was found guilty of 10 counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault of a 7-year-old girl whom his mother babysat. Record contains sufficient information on the individualized statutory factors; court was not required to explicitly evaluate each factor on the record. Respondent's indeterminate sentence (at 3 mos. shy of his 19th birthday) to Department of Juvenile Justice, not to exceed his 21st birthday, is not excessive. A sex offender evaluation report is not a document whose content would be expected to trigger a Krankel inquiry, and court would not be expect to search report for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. As Respondent denied committing the crime on any date, he is not prejudiced by any discrepancy in date of offense. Evidence was sufficient to establish that Respondent committed specific offenses alleged in all counts alleged in State's petition. (CATES and VAUGHAN, concurring.)

One week after the injury occurred, Mother brought her 9-month-old infant to the hospital with a broken tibia. She had brought her 3-year-old child to the hospital with a broken tibia the week earlier. Mother could not provide a viable explanation for how the injuries occurred. After shelter care hearing, the Mother's 2-year-old and 3-year-old children were removed from Mother's custody and were placed with their biological father, who lived in a separate household. At dispositional hearing, the State, DCFS, and the GAL recommended Father be granted custody and guardianship, but Mother disagreed. Mother failed to establish that Father was unable to care for the children, as there was no evidence showing that granting custody and guardianship to Father would be injurious in any way to the children. Court's dispositional order granting custody and guardianship to DCFS was an abuse of discretion. Court erred in relying on Father's inconsistent voluntary child support payments, as these were due to Father's job changes and job loss. Section 2-27(1) of Juvenile Court Act requires finding to encompass some reason other than financial circumstances alone.  (WELCH and MOORE, concurring.)

Defendant, age 16 at time of offense, and his older sister (age 20 at time at offenses) were charged with 1st degree murder for killing their father and their father's girlfriend. Defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement and was sentenced to 90 years and a consecutive sentence of 20 years, and found him eligible for the extended-term sentence due to the exceptionally brutal and heinous nature of the killing. Sentence was a de facto life sentence, and record does not show that court considered Defendant's youth and its attendant characteristics. Sentence violates the 8th amendment. Sentence vacated and remanded for new sentencing hearing.  (LYTTON, concurring; SCHMIDT, dissenting.)

(Court opinion corrected 2/22/21.) Defendant, age 16 at time of offenses, was convicted of 1st degree murder, armed robbery, and residential burglary in 1991, and sentenced to an extended 70-year prison term for murder, 20 years for armed robbery, and 15 years for residential burglary, all to run concurrently. This is a de facto life sentence, even though Defendant is eligible for day-for-day credit. Court failed to fully consider Defendant's youth and it attendant circumstances in imposing the 70-year sentence; sentence violates 8th amendment. Court erred in dismissing Defendant's successive postconviction petition. Sentence vacated, and remanded for resentencing. (ROCHFORD and DELORT, concurring.)

Court terminated parental rights of both parents to their 2 minor children. After 17 days of hearings, court denied petition of maternal grandparents, residents of Alaska, for custody or guardianship of the minor children, and granted petition of foster mother for custody or guardianship. DCFS failed to notify maternal grandparents that minors were in the care of DCFS, although DCFS learned of their interest one month after State filed petition for adjudication of neglect.  The minors' best interests trump the grandparents' interests in maintaining their biological family. Given the highly deferential standard of review, court's order is not against manifest weight of evidence.(HARRIS and HOLDER WHITE, concurring.)