Child Law

(Court opinion corrected 2/1/2021.) Respondent minor was adjudicated delinquent for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon and unlawful possession of a firearm. State failed to produce the gun, or a photograph or documentary evidence of the existence of the gun. State proved that the weapon officer saw and recovered was a "handgun". Officer testified that Respondent, who was sitting in the back seat of a vehicle police stopped when they viewed 4 persons in the back seat, was holding the firearm in his right hand, and that the firearm was small and could be concealed on the person.  Trial judge found officer credible but found Respondent not credible. (HYMAN and PIERCE, concurring.)

Defendant, age 17 at time of offense, was convicted, after bench trial, of 1st-degree murder and sentenced to 30 years, plus an additional 25-year firearm enhancement. Defendant is entitled to a new sentencing hearing. At sentencing hearing, trial court made no reference to Defendant's age or to any youth-related factors before imposing sentence. At all 3 proceedings before sentencing judge, the court did not consider the Miller v. Alabama factors before imposing a de facto life sentence. Upon remand, sentencing court may impose a de facto life sentence only upon finding of irretrievable depravity, or incorrigibility, and court may make appropriate sentencing decision only after considering the Defendant's youth and its attendant characteristics. Under the new sentencing scheme, the firearm enhancement is no longer mandatory. (LAMPKIN and REYES, concurring.)

Court made Respondent mother's 4 children wards of the court and found her to be an unfit mother. Order must be vacated, and remanded to trial court to send notice to Bureau of Indian Affairs and any Native American tribes or nations with potential relationships with the children. State presented no evidence as to the parents' treatment of 3 of their children, but relied exclusively on the doctrine of anticipatory neglect. Evidence that the father, who no longer resides with mother, may have injured infant, when mother left infant in father's care, does not show that mother neglected or abused her children. State did not prove that minors suffered neglect or abuse, but record shows that childrent suffered from the order separating them from their mother. (HYMAN and PIERCE, concurring.)

Defendant, age 16 at time of offense, was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st-degree murder and sentenced to 100 years. Court abused its discretion by disregarding evidence of Defendant's extensive rehabilitation and improperly considering certain sentencing factors during resentencing hearing. Court made no finding of irretrievable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond possibility of rehabilitation. A peer specifically instructed Defendant to shoot the victim. Court improperly stated that peer pressure was an "irrelevant factor", and used it as an aggravating factor.  Peer pressure is clearly identified as a mitigating factor in sentencing statute for juveniles.Defendant's sentence reduced to 25 years with 3 years of mandatory supervised release. (MIKVA and GRIFFIN, concurring.) 

Consolidated appeal from 3 child protection cases in which court vacated appointment of Public Defender's (PD) office for a parent, and all stakeholders involved disagree with the propriety of that vacatur. No case law supports court's conclusion that the assigned assistant PDs were inadequately trained to litigate in the Early Childhood Court or had rendered inadequate or erratic representation. Illinois Supreme Court rules allow internal training at PD's office to satisfy requirements for representation in child custody cases. Record does not support court's concerns about continuity of representation. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings in 2 cases; appeal dismissed as to 1 case in which the Respondent father acquiesced in the appointment of alternative counsel.(WALKER and PIERCE, concurring.)

Respondent voluntarily accepted parentage in court under oath after repeatedly refusing to comply with court's previous order to submit to DNA testing. Court had the right to compel Respondent to submit to DNA testing on the public guardian's motion, as the minor's parentage was at controversy, and mother had identified Respondent as one of 2 persons who could be the minor's father, and the other person did take a DNA test which ruled him out as the father. Court was not obligated under Parentage Act to enforce its order for DNA testing by holding Respondent in contempt when he refused. Respondent's voluntary acknowledgement of parentage under oath satisfied the Parentage Act and obviated the need for DNA testing. (GORDON and REYES, concurring.)

After evidentiary hearing, court found that minor was not abused or neglected and dismissed adjudication petition on State's motion. Court's determination that there was no probable cause of minor's abuse and neglect is not against manifest weight of evidence. State had commenced proceedings on minor's behalf based on suspected physical abuse of another minor who lived int he same household. Once there was medical evidence that negated some of the allegations as to that other minor, showing that a portion of the abuse was attributable to a medical condition, State moved to dismiss this petition.  Court was obligated to dismiss the petition once it determined there was no probable cause, and court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing petition.  (LAMPKIN and REYES, concurring.)

Court entered adjudication order making 14-year-old minor a ward of the court due to substantial risk of physical injury that would likely impair minor's emotional health. Court properly considered the entirety of Respondent  mother's medical records, and the finding of abuse was not against manifest weight of evidence.Records described mother's mental health issues, for which she was not taking her medicine as prescribed. Mother directed violence and physical aggression toward her mother, in front of minor and where minor intervened to break up the altercation. (LAMPKIN and REYES, concurring.)

Defendant, age 17 at time of offense, was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon and sentenced to 80 years. Sentence, which is a life sentence, is vacated, and remanded for a new sentencing hearing with instruction to consider Defendant's youth and its attendant characteristics, under the juvenile sentencing scheme per section 5-4.5-105 of Unified Code of Corrections. No error in prosecutor stating that reasonable doubt is up to the jury to decide, and that the parties are not allowed to define it in Illinois. Prosecutor did not attempt to define reasonable doubt and she did not elaborate on its meaning.(CARTER and SCHMIDT, concurring.)