Child Law

Defendant, age 16 at time of offense, was convicted as an adult, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder and of personally discharging the firearm that caused victim's death, and was sentenced to 50 years. This sentence, although discretionary, is considered a de facto life sentence. There is no evidence that trial court considered Defendant's particular immaturity and impetuosity or peer pressure from the gang he belonged to. Thus, Defendant established prejudice needed to file his successive postconviction petition and is entitled to a sentence taking those factors into account. (HALL and REYES, concurring.)

(Modified upon denial of petition for rehearing 8/27/20.) Defendant, age 16 at time of offense, was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder and of personally discharging the firearm that caused the victim's death, and was sentenced to 50 years. The findings in Illinois Supreme Court decisions in Miller and Buffer cases as to the 8th amendment apply to Defendant, and he is entitled to a sentence that takes the Miller factors into account. There is no evidence that trial court considered Defendant's particular immaturity and impetuosity or peer pressure from the gang he belonged to. Defendant established the cause and prejudice needed to file a successive postconviction petition on his claim that a 50-year sentence for a minor violates the 8th amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. (HALL and REYES, concurring.)

Defendant, age 17 at time of offense, was convicted of murder and sentenced to 75 years. The "mere possibility" that Defendant may earn enough good-conduct credit to complete his sentence after serving 37.5 years is not a meaningful opportunity for release based on maturity and rehabilitation. The 75-year sentence is a de facto life sentence. Sentencing court failed to consider Defendant's age and age-related characteristics or determined that he was a juvenile whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility. Court did not consider whether Defendant was pressured or otherwise influenced by his father and the other older men that he joined in committing the murder. Court did not consider his prospects for rehabilitation. (GORDON and BURKE, concurring.)

Respondent father appealed court's denial of his motion for continuance made jut before trial to terminate his parental rights. Respondent visited minor only one time, for 45 minutes, during the 3 years case was ongoing, although a court order provided for visitation. Caseworkers repeatedly rated his progress as unsatisfactory, and he failed to keep in contact with his attorneys. Court provided Respondent with an opportunity to be heard, but he decided not to be present for trial and for other important stages of the case. Respondent failed to take steps to assert or protect his rights, and has failed to show that his due process rights were violated. (PIERCE n WALKER, concurring.)

State filed a delinquency petition alleging that Defendant, then age 29, was charged with 1st degree murder he had committed at age 14. Defendant could have been transferred from juvenile to criminal court had proceedings commenced while he was a minor. Defendant's prosecution in criminal court 14 years after his offense did not present limitations issues, as there is no statute of limitations for 1st degree murder. Defendant's allegation that sentencing court failed to consider the characteristics of youth is not rebutted by the record and is thus assumed to be true. Court imposed a discretionary sentence of natural life, but as court failed to consider characteristics of youth and finding of permanent incorrigibility, Defendant made a substantial showing that his sentence violated the 8th amendment. (HOLDRIDGE and SCHMIDT, concurring.)

After remand from prior appeal of orders terminating Respondent's parental rights, her appointed trial counsel renewed his motion to withdraw as her attorney. Court denied that motion and held hearing, granting State's petitions to terminate Respondent's parental rights as to her 2 children.   Court had previously terminated her parental rights as to her 4 oldest children. Counsel's motion to withdraw failed to comply with Rule 13(c)(2), as it failed to advise Respondent to file a supplemental appearance within 21 days to avoid risk of being defaulted; and as Respondent did not receive adequate notice of motion and counsel did not serve her with written motion to withdraw before presenting it to trial court. (ZENOFF and HUDSON, concurring.)

Consolidated appeal of cases involving children with the same mother (who voluntarily surrendered her parental rights) but two different fathers. By finding that father (Michael) failed to show a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to his child's welfare, court's finding that he was an unfit parent, and that child's best interests would be served by allowing her to remain with her maternal grandmother, was not against manifest weight of evidence.  State failed to present sufficient evidence of father's (Shalyn's) unfitness, as his incarceration, which should last less than a year, is not enough, given the other factors, upon which to base a determination of unfitness. (STEIGMANN and DeARMOND, concurring.)

 Defendant, age 17 at time of offense, was convicted, after jury trial, of intentional 1^st degree murder committed by personally discharging a firearm, and was sentenced to 53 years, including 25-year firearm enhancement. As his testimony was affirmatively damaging to the State’s case, the State properly impeached witness’ testimony by examining him regarding certain prior inconsistent statement related to Defendant’s location at the scene and by presenting those prior inconsistent statements through detective’s testimony. Defendant’s 53-year sentence is a de facto life sentence, and court erred in failing to consider Defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics in imposing that sentence.   (MIKVA, concurring; PIERCE, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that respondent mother was an unfit parent and that it was in the best interests of her 2 minor children that her parental rights be terminated. Children and their severely disabled 9-year-old sibling, who was severely malnourished and not being cared for, were living under horrendous conditions. Children have been placed together in the care of a relative and have developed a bond with their foster mother and have continued interaction with their other siblings. Mother was inconsistent with visitation and refused to participate in most services. (ZENOFF and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)

Court found Respondent mother to be an unfit parent and terminated her parental rights to her 2 children. Court did not abuse its discretion in allowing GAL's exhibits to be admitted into evidence at the unfitness hearing, as they were certified records that contained credible evidence of the children's neglect. (HUTCHINSON and HUDSON, concurring.)