Criminal Law

Defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement where he pled guilty to non-firearm first-degree felony murder and was sentenced to 20 years in prison. Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which was denied, and he appealed. On appeal, defendant raised various issues concerning ineffective assistance of counsel and requested remand so that a Krankel hearing could be conducted. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the trial court did not have an obligation to conduct a Krankel hearing as his complains of ineffectiveness were not sufficient to warrant a hearing. (CAVANAGH and ZENOFF, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, armed robbery, and home invasion. He initially was sentenced to death, which was later commuted to natural life imprisonment. Defendant appealed from denial of leave to file his second successive post-conviction petition, arguing that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to present an allegedly exculpatory witness and that the State used perjured testimony. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that defendant failed to establish the requisite cause and prejudice for leave to file his post-conviction petition. (PUCINSKI and COGHLAN, concurring)

Defendant submitted a claim to the Illinois Torture Inquiry and Relief Commission alleging this his convictions in two underlying cases resulted from torture over the course of more than 30 hours in police custody and that the inculpatory statements he made were coerced and should be suppressed. The TIRC found sufficient evidence to refer the matter for judicial review and the circuit court, after conducting an evidentiary hearing, found that the defendant fabricated his claims. The appellate court reversed and remanded, concluding that the trial court did not apply the proper initial inquiry and finding that the defendant met his burden of establishing that newly established evidence would have altered the result of the suppression hearing. (HYMAN, concurring and specially concurring and LAVIN, specially concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of five counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and sentenced to five consecutive terms of 27 years in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that the State’s evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on count III and that his sentence for count V violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. The appellate court affirmed, finding no error in the proceedings. (DOHERTY and LANNERD, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of aggravated domestic battery, domestic battery, and aggravated battery following a jury trial. On appeal, defendant argued that his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial were violated due to procedures implemented by the circuit court following the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic. Defendant also argued that the admonishments he was given when he elected to represent himself were insufficient and that the trial court erred in refusing to tender a self-defense instruction to the jury. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the delays in the case as well as the tolling of the speedy trial period were in compliance with the supreme court’s orders, that defendant was properly admonished, and that the evidence did not support the requested instruction. (TURNER and HARRIS, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and sentenced to nine years in prison. He appealed, arguing that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence recovered during a traffic stop and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his trial court did not challenge the reliability of a positive canine alert for cocaine inside of his vehicle. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the evidence did not support a conclusion that the officers unreasonably delayed the length of the traffic stop and that trial counsel’s representation was not insufficient where objecting to the evidence lacked merit. (STEIGMANN and DOHERTY, concurring)

Defendant appealed from his convictions and sentences on two counts of the offense of threatening a public official, arguing that the statements leading to his arrest and conviction did not contain specific facts indicative of a unique threat. The appellate court affirmed, finding that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the statements contained specific facts indicative of a unique threat of harm where defendant’s comments were specific about the type of harm he intended to inflict and how he intended to inflict it. (WELCH and VAUGHAN, concurring)