Defendant pled guilty to two counts of attempted murder and was sentenced to two concurrent sentences of 31 years. He subsequently filed a motion to withdraw guilty plea and on appeal argued that post-plea counsel failed to comply with SCR 604(d). The appellate court reversed and remanded, concluding that the certificate did not comply with Supreme Court Rules because counsel did not certify that she examined the report of proceedings and failed to certify that she consulted with the defendant. The appellate court remanded for the filing of a new post-plea motion, a new hearing on the motion, and compliance with SCR 604(d). (LAVIN and COGHLAN, concurring)
Defendant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder and unlawful possession of a firearm, arguing that the juvenile court erred when it transferred his case to adult court, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney allowed a biased juror to serve on his jury, that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the trial court failed to properly consider his youth and its attendant circumstances at sentencing. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the trial court properly weighed the factors before transferring his case to adult court, that defendant could not show any prejudice regarding his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. The court also explained that the trial court was not required to discuss each sentencing factor on the record and that it had sufficient evidence of the defendant’s youth and “made more than a passing mention of them.” (HOLDRIDGE and McDADE, concurring)
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s request for compassionate release under 18 USC section 3582(c)(1), where record showed that: (1) defendant had been sentenced to 262-month sentence on heroin-related offenses; and (2) defendant asserted that his asthma, obesity and hypertension put him at extra risk of contracting COVID-19 while in prison, that his sentence was excessive in light of current legal standards, and that he had taken classes that demonstrated his rehabilitation. Defendant failed to present medical evidence indicating that his combination of medical conditions placed him at greater risk of contracting COVID-19 while in prison. Defendant similarly failed to present data establishing that his completion of prison courses reliably put him and other prisoners on path to law-abiding life. Moreover, record was unclear that defendant would receive lower sentencing under current legal standards, where his sentence was based on finding that he was career offender under sentencing guidelines. Ct. further noted that defendant’s arguments, when considered collectively, would still not constitute extraordinary and compelling reason to grant compassionate release.
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s request for compassionate release under 18 USC section 3582(c)(1), where basis for said request was defendant’s contention that Dist. Ct. had committed legal error at his sentencing by treating his Illinois prior conviction for delivery of cocaine as “serious drug felony” that made him eligible for enhanced minimum sentence of 10 years under 21 USC section 841(b)(1)(B). Under Thacker, 4 F.4th 569, alleged legal errors are not addressable under compassionate release provisions, especially where defendant had other avenues of potential relief under section 2255. Moreover, although defendant raised for first time other arguments to support his request for compassionate release, he could not pursue them because he had failed to first raise them with Bureau of Prisons, as required under 18 USC section 3582(c)(1)(A). Ct. also observed that government could raise failure to exhaust administrative remedies defense for first time in Ct. of Appeals, where government had no opportunity to raise it in Dist. Ct.
In prosecution on armed bank robbery, drug distribution and firearm charges, defendant waived any appeal on Dist. Ct.’s denial of his motion to sever his robbery and drug offense charges, where defendant failed to renew his motion to sever at close of evidence in instant joint trial. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in admitting defendant’s text messages that contained defendant’s drug dealing conversations that occurred both before and after charged bank robbery offense, where said evidence was admissible to show defendant’s motive to commit robbery. Ct. rejected defendant’s argument that said evidence constituted improper propensity evidence and noted that text messages could have admitted into evidence in separate trial on charged drug offenses. Too, Dist. Ct. did not err in admitting testimony of police agent, who testified in dual capacity as expert on drug code language and as fact witness, where nature of government questioning clarified that agent was basing his testimony on his expertise, and where Dist. Ct. gave instruction that clarified difference between agent’s expert testimony and his fact testimony. Record also contained sufficient evidence to support defendant’s convictions on all charged offenses. Ct. rejected defendant’s argument that his sentencing guideline range was inaccurate because Dist. Ct. had improperly double-counted guns that formed basis for his brandishing firearm in furtherance of bank robbery offense and carrying firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking crime.
Defendant pleaded guilty to driving while license revoked and, based on his criminal history, was sentenced to nine years in prison as a Class X offender under section 5-4.5-95(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections. During post-plea proceedings, defendant moved for reconsideration of his sentence, which was denied. He appealed arguing that he was entitled to benefit from amendments to section 5-4.5-95(b) that took effect after his sentencing but before the court ruled on his post-plea motion and that made the statute inapplicable in his case. Defendant also argued that post-plea counsel did not comply with the requirements of SCR 604(d). The appellate court affirmed, finding that defendant was not entitled to retroactive application of the amended version of section 5-4.5-95(b) under the doctrine of invited error because his counsel requested to proceed with reconsideration of defendant’s sentence as if the amendments were inapplicable to defendant. The appellate court further concluded that post-plea counsel was not ineffective because defendant was sentenced before the amendments went into effect and, as a result, he was not entitled to have the new version of the statement applied in his case. The appellate court finally concluded that defendant was afforded a “full and fair” opportunity to present his post-plea claims and that no additional post-plea proceedings were warranted. (DOHERTY and LANNERD, concurring)
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition that challenged his murder conviction on ground that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file motion to suppress his confession, where defendant argued that police violated his Miranda rights, under circumstances where he asked for attorney at time of his arrest, but four hours later, police took him to interview room and read him his Miranda rights, after which he confessed to murder. No U.S. Supreme Ct. case law has applied Miranda beyond context of custodial interrogation to permit accused to request attorney at time of arrest, so as to cut off questioning long before any attempt is made to question him. As such, defendant could not show that state court ruling that rejected his Miranda argument was contrary to, or involved unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by U.S. Supreme Ct.. Moreover, because law is uncertain as to when one may invoke Miranda outside context of custodial interrogation, failure of defendant’s counsel to seek suppression of defendant’s confession based on his request for attorney four hours prior to any initial custodial interrogation was, by itself, not enough to demonstrate deficient performance by trial counsel.
The State appealed from a circuit court order dismissing the charges against the defendant, arguing that it did not violate the anti-shuttling provision of section 3-8-9 of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers because defendant’s action of seeking credit against his bond caused his release and return to custody in the state of Iowa. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that defendant was returned prior to trial to the state of Iowa through no fault of his own and that the charges against him were required to be dismissed with prejudice under the interstate agreement. (HOLDRIDGE and BRENNAN, concurring)
Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant on charges of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of firearm as felon, where said sentence on felon in possession charge was based in part on enhancement under section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) of USSG on ground that defendant possessed handgun “in connection with” charged cocaine conspiracy. While defendant objected to imposition of enhancement because jury had found him not guilty on charge of possession of firearm in furtherance of said cocaine conspiracy, Ct. of Appeals held that: (1) Dist. Ct. could use acquitted conduct to enhance defendant’s sentence; and (2) Dist. Ct. could properly impose enhancement, where Dist. Ct. found that defendant had volunteered to provide security for another individual for prospective drug deal and brought loaded firearm for said purpose.
Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 30-month term of incarceration, after revoking defendant’s term of supervised release based on his commission of drug distribution offense, and where defendant’s sentence for supervised release violation was made consecutive to 120-month sentence for drug distribution offense that was imposed by different Dist. Ct. judge. Defendant’s 30-month term of incarceration was within applicable 30 to 37-month guideline range, and Ct. of Appeals rejected defendant’s argument that he should receive no additional time for supervised release offense because judge that sentenced him to drug distribution offense already considered fact that he had committed drug distribution offense while on supervised release. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly find that additional sentence was appropriate given defendant’s criminal history and circumstances surrounding supervised release violation, and Dist. Ct. properly considered factors contained in section 3583(e) and 3553(a) when imposing sentence for supervised release violation.
