Criminal Law

Defendant appealed from an order dismissing his post-conviction petition at the second stage of proceedings. Defendant argued, in part, that he received ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel where his counsel miscalculated the deadline to file a post-conviction petition by one day. The appellate court declined to automatically remand the matter for further second stage proceedings due to counsel’s mistake and instead considered the merits of defendant’s post-conviction claims and, finding that they lacked merit, affirmed his conviction. (HARRIS and STEIGMANN, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of disorderly conduct for knowingly making a false complaint to a public safety agency and appealed, arguing that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court reversed, explaining that a conviction under section 26-1(a)(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires both that the defendant knowingly transmitted or caused to be transmitted information to a public safety agency and that the defendant knew the transmission could lead to an emergency response, and that under the facts of the case, it could not be determined that defendant was consciously aware that it was “practically certain” that his call to a co-worker regarding the presence of armed individuals would result in someone called a public safety agency. (JORGENSEN and KENNEDY, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder, home invasion, armed robbery, residential burglary, and aggravated battery with a firearm. After appellate proceedings, the case was remanded for re-sentencing and defendant was re-sentenced to a total of 46 years in prison. Defendant appealed from that sentence, arguing that it constituted a de facto life sentence as it was applied to him and that it was unconstitutional because the trial court did not find he was “permanently incorrigible.” The appellate court affirmed, finding that the sentence was not an abuse of discretion and did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights where the record supported the trial court’s consideration of the defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics at the time of sentencing. (BOIE and MOORE, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of armed robbery with a firearm and sentenced to 45 years in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that the State failed to convict him beyond a reasonable doubt where no firearm was recovered, that the trial court erred when it improperly admitted evidence of other crimes and refused to excuse a juror who formerly worked with a State witness, that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing defendant’s request for standby counsel, that the trial court exhibited bias, and that his 45-year sentence was an excessive “trial tax.” The appellate court affirmed, finding, among other things, that while the trial court used language that could be construed as “racist and offensive,” the comments were made outside the presence of the jury and were not a material factor in the defendant’s conviction and that, when viewing the entire proceedings, the trial court’s comments and conduct did not indicate a bias or prejudice against defendant. (McBRIDE and BURKE, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of one count of creation of child pornography, one count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, and one count of possession of child pornography and sentenced to concurrent sentences totaling 25 years. Defendant appealed, arguing that his conviction for possession of child pornography violated the one-act, one-crime doctrine because it was based on the same act as his conviction for creation of child pornography. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the conviction did not violate the one-act, one-crime doctrine because there were intervening events between the recording of the videos at issue, which supported the conclusion that they were multiple acts and not a single act and that defendant’s actions indicated an intent to retain possession of the videos after they were made. (McBRIDE and REYES, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of three counts of predatory sexual assault of a child and sentenced to three terms of 10 years to be served consecutively. Defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency as to count II and arguing that an interview of the victim should not have been admitted in evidence pursuant to section 115-10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Defendant also argued that the trial court improperly relied on its personal knowledge and evidence outside of the record. The State conceded that the evidence pertaining to count II was not sufficient to sustain a conviction for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, reduced the conviction on count II to aggravated criminal sexual abuse, and remanded for resentencing. The appellate court affirmed the remaining judgment. (CAVANAGH and STEIGMANN, concurring)

Defendant appealed from the denial of his petition for leave to file a successive post-conviction petitioner, arguing that he presented a colorable claim of actual innocence and established cause and prejudice as to his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The appellate court initially affirmed, but the Supreme Court entered a supervisory order asking the court to consider the effect of People v. Robinson on the issue of the claim for actual innocence. After reconsideration, the appellate court concluded that Robinson did not change its initial conclusion that defendant failed to present a colorable claim of actual innocence and affirmed for a second time. (HYMAN and C.A. WALKER, concurring)