Criminal Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon, arguing that the circuit court erred in declining to give a non-pattern jury instruction pursuant to section 10-30 of the Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act and in admitting body camera footage showing marijuana belonging to defendant’s co-arrestee. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the proposed jury instruction was not an accurate statement of the law because it did not instruct the jury to consider whether the failure to activate the body camera was reasonably justified and, even if it had, any error was harmless, and that the admission of the video evidence, while improper, was harmless error. (THEIS, HOLDER WHITE, and CUNNINGHAM, concurring and NEVILLE, dissenting. ROCHFORD and O’BRIEN took no part in the decision)

The Illinois Supreme Court considered whether the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel when his counsel agreed to a process that allowed the parties to exercise jury challenges at sidebar conferences that were held off the record and outside of the defendant’s presence. The appellate court rejected his claim and upheld his armed habitual criminal conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that absent evidence counsel failed to represent defendant’s interests at the sidebars there was no basis for the court to conclude that the counsel’s performance was deficient. (OVERSTREET, concurring and NEVILLE, O’BRIEN, and HOLDER WHITE, specially concurring. CUNNINGHAM and ROCHFORD took no part in the decision)

Defendant was charged with four counts of first-degree murder and ultimately was found guilty after a jury trial of two counts based on a theory of accountability. He was sentenced to 41 years in prison. Defendant argued on direct appeal that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress a videotaped confession because police failed to honor the exercise of his right to remain silent and because the statement was not voluntary. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that defendant clearly and unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent and that questioning by police should have ceased in response to defendant’s exercise of his rights and that defendant was not properly given Miranda warnings prior to a subsequent interrogation. (MIKVA and ODEN JOHNSON, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of 10 counts of child pornography and 10 counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and was sentenced to 450 years in prison. On direct appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to quash the search warrants and suppress evidence, that the indictment failed to set for the nature of the child pornography offense, and that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the police officers’ reliance on the search warrant was in good faith, that the language of the indictment closely followed the language of the statute and, as result, caused no prejudice, and that the evidence supported the conclusion that a rational trier of fact could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (DeARMOND and DOHERTY, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty after a stipulated bench trial of driving under the influence of alcohol, failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident, and operating an uninsured motor vehicle. The appellate court affirmed defendant’s conviction for failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident but reversed the conviction for operating an uninsured motor vehicle. The Supreme Court granted defendant’s petition for leave to appeal and he argued that the State failed to prove him guilty of failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident beyond a reasonable doubt and that the stipulated bench trial was tantamount to a guilty plea so the trial court erred when it did not admonish him pursuant to SCR 402(a). The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the evidence was sufficient to support the guilty verdict and that the stipulated bench trial was not tantamount to a guilty plea because there were genuine questions of fact for the trial court to decide so it was not required to provide SCR 402(a) admonishments. (THEIS, NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, concurring. CUNNINGHAM, ROCHFORD, and O’BRIEN took no part in the decision.)

The Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion dismissing the appeal because it could not reach a four-judge concurrence. (CUNNINGHAM and ROCHFORD, took no part.)