Criminal Law

Defendant was charged with two counts of possessing a weapon by a felon, obstructing justice, and driving while license suspended. Defendant waived his right to a jury trial and was found guilty on all counts after a bench trial. Defendant appealed arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence and considering defendant’s 2003 felony conviction to impeach his credibility, that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to sever the charges. The appellate court agreed that the trial court erred when it considered defendant’s prior felony conviction and reversed defendant’s convictions for possession of a weapon by a felon and remanded for a new trial solely on those charges. The court affirmed defendant’s convictions for obstructing justice and driving while license suspended. (KNECHT and TURNER, concurring)

On remand from the appellate court, the circuit could held a new resentencing hearing for defendant, a juvenile defendant, and sentenced him to 35 years for first-degree murder. Defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that the trial court improperly applied the mitigating factors for juvenile offenders and that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel. The appellate court affirmed, finding the sentence was not excessive and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. (KNECHT and STEIGMANN, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence where she was subjected to a custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings and that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The appellate court affirmed, finding that a reasonable person would have believed that they could terminate the encounter at any time and, as a result, the defendant was not in custody (but expressing concerns about the conducting of a “reenactment” involving medical professionals) (KNECHT, concurring and DOHERTY, specially concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder on the theory of accountability and sentenced to natural life in prison. Defendant, who was a minor at the time of the offense, filed a pro se post-conviction petition, resulting in a new sentencing hearing where the parties agreed to a 23-year sentence, but the judge instead imposed a 28-year sentence. Defendant appealed from that sentence arguing that the judge abused his discretion when he rejected the agreement of the parties. The appellate court agreed finding that the trial court abused its discretion when it disregarded evidence of the defendant’s rehabilitation and failing to properly consider mitigating and aggravating factors. (PUCINSKI, concurring and COGHLAN, dissenting)

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted robbery and sentenced to a total of 75 years for offenses that occurred when he was 20 years old. The appellate court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal and affirmed the summary dismissal of his initial pro se post-conviction petition. In this case, defendant appealed the circuit court’s denial of his motion for leave to file a first successive post-conviction petition, arguing that he made a prima facie showing that his sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause as applied to him. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a second stage hearing, finding that key parts of the record were insufficient and that remanding for the appointment of post-conviction counsel would allow for the development of a more complete record. The court also found that the petition established a prima facie showing where the available record established that the circuit court did not take defendant’s age and other factors into account during sentencing. (MIKVA, specially concurring and MITCHELL, dissenting)

Defendant was convicted by a jury of being an armed habitual criminal and sentenced to 12 years. Defendant appealed, arguing that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the requisite predicate adult convictions necessary to sustain his conviction where he was only 17 years old when the predicate offenses were committed, that the trial court erred by permitting the State to introduce course-of-investigation testimony regarding a nearby shooting, and that defendant’s 12-year sentence was excessive. The appellate court reduced defendant’s armed habitual criminal conviction to the lesser included offense of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon and remanded for resentencing. (MIKVA, concurring and MITCHELL, dissenting)