Criminal Law

Defendant was charged with one count of criminal sexual assault. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that he was denied due process when the investigating officer, in response to a question from a juror during the grand jury testimony, implied that the defendant had confessed. The circuit court granted the defendant’s motion and the State appealed. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the grand jury testimony created the false inference that the defendant had confessed, the State had a duty to correct the false testimony, the testimony likely swayed the outcome of the grand jury, and the defendant was not required to establish that the State acted intentionally in presenting deceptive or inaccurate evidence. (HUTCHINSON and JORGENSEN, concurring)

Defendant was found to be a sexually dangerous person and was committed to the guardianship and custody of the director of the Department of Corrections under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act. Defendant was granted conditional release from institutional care and filed a petition requesting that the Department be compelled to provide financial assistance to cover his treatment costs and living expenses. The circuit court granted the petition over the Department’s objection. The appellate court affirmed and the supreme court granted the department’s petition for leave to appeal. The supreme court affirmed the judgments of the lower courts, finding that the circuit court reached the proper conclusion in holding that it had the authority under the Act to order the department to contribute financial assistance to the defendant while he was on conditional release. (ANNE M. BURKE, THEIS, MICHAEL J. BURKE, OVERSTREET, and CARTER, concurring. HOLDER WHITE took no part in the decision.)

Defendant was found guilty by a jury of first-degree murder and armed robbery. After the jury returned its verdict, defendant requested that the circuit court poll the jury. Eleven of the 12 jurors confirmed that the signed verdict accurately reflected their verdict. The circuit court dismissed the jury without polling the twelfth juror, which constituted clear and obvious error. The defendant forfeited the issue by raising it for the first time on appeal. The appellate court held that the error in polling constituted a structural error that called into question the integrity of the judicial process and reversed under the second prong of the plain error rule. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s judgment, finding that the polling error did not rise to the level of structural error requiring a reversal of the defendant’s conviction because a jury poll is not an essential element of a fair trial (describing it instead as an “important, nonessential process”). The court further explained that the forfeited error must instead be analyzed for prejudice under the first-prong error standards, which had not been invoked by the defendant. (ANNE M. BURKE, THEIS, NEVILLE, MICHAEL J. BURKE, and CARTER, concurring. HOLDER WHITE took no part in the decision.)

Defendant filed a motion in the circuit court seeking leave to file a second successive post-conviction petition challenging his conviction for murder. Defendant argued that newly discovered evidence showed that the police officers who interrogated him had engaged in a pattern and practice of police brutality and that his confession was a result of police coercion. The circuit court denied the petition, finding he failed to establish both the cause and prejudice required by section 122-1(f) of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, however, it rejected the rule adopted by the appellate court regarding cause and instead affirmed on the basis that the defendant’s allegations of coercion were directly contradicted by his sworn trial testimony so that the defendant failed to make a showing of prejudice. (THEIS, MICHAEL J. BURKE, OVERSTREET, and CARTER, concurring. NEVILLE and HOLDER WHITE took no part in the decision.)

Defendant was sentenced as a Class X offender to 25 years for the Class I felony possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver under the requirements of section 5-4.5-95 of the Unified Code of Corrections in effect at the time of sentence. In prior proceedings, the appellate court reversed and remanded for the filing of a valid SCR 604(d) certificate. Defendant then filed an amended motion to reconsider the sentence based on a revised section 5-4.5-95 that had been changed to narrow the types of felonies that were eligible for Class X sentencing. The trial court denied the motion and defendant appealed. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new sentencing hearing, finding that the revised amended version of the statute should have been applied by the trial court. (McLAREN and HUDSON concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of unlawful possession of a weapon with a revoked FOID card and sentenced to two years in prison with one year of mandatory supervised release. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence found during a traffic stop, that the State failed to prove that she was reckless in not knowing that her FOID card had been revoked, or, in the alternative, that the trial court erred when it barred defendant from presenting evidence that she was not aware of the revocation. The appellate court affirmed, finding that defendant did not file a timely post-trial motion and, as a result, her arguments raised on appeal were forfeited. The appellate court further found that while the traffic stop was “unusual” there was no evidence presented that it was racially motivated, that a defendant could be convicted of possession with a revoked FOID card even if the card was valid on its face, and that the trial court did not commit a “clear or obvious” error in its interpretation of the statute. (HARRIS and CAVANAGH, concurring)

The circuit court granted a motion to suppress evidence and the State filed a certificate of impairment, arguing that recreational legalization of marijuana did not change the rule that the odor of burnt cannabis provides probable cause for officers to search a vehicle. The appellate court affirmed, finding that under the circumstances of the case the smell of burnt cannabis alone, coupled with a statement that someone had previously smoked marijuana in the vehicle, did not provide the officer with probable cause to search the vehicle. (HETTEL and PETERSON, concurring)

Defendant was charged and convicted of the first-degree murder of his wife and sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court should have barred statements he made to the police and that the trial court made evidentiary errors when it allowed the admission of statements made by the victim to her friends. The appellate court affirmed, finding that even though police withheld information regarding an arrest warrant it did not affect the validity of defendant’s Miranda waiver or make the interrogation fundamentally unfair. The appellate court further held that the victim's statements to friends were non-hearsay and non-testimonial and that there were no evidentiary errors in admitting them. (PUCINSKI and WALKER, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and unlawful possession of methamphetamine precursor.  Defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement that allowed him to participate in a drug court program; however, he was dismissed from the program and sentenced to concurrent terms of 12 years’ imprisonment per his plea agreement. Defendant appealed arguing that his sentences were void because he was not properly admonished under SCR 605(c). The appellate court held that his sentences were not void, but remanded so that defendant could be properly admonished and given the opportunity to file a post plea motion under SCR 604(d). (HOLDRIDGE and PETERSON, concurring)

In 2002, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW), which the circuit court merged into a single count and sentenced him to probation. The court later used the conviction as the predicate offense to convict the defendant for unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF). In 2019, pursuant to Defendant’s section 2-1401 petition the court vacated defendant’s conviction on one of the counts of AUUW and then “transferred” the sentence from that count to the previously unsentenced count. The question in the present appeal was whether the circuit court exceeded the scope of a nun pro tunc order when it transferred the sentence from one count to the other count and then used the newly sentenced count as the predicate offense to sustain a UUWF conviction. The appellate court answered this question in the affirmative. (LAMPKIN and REYES, concurring)