Criminal Law

This case presents question as to whether record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction on charge of nonconsensual dissemination of sexual images, under circumstances where defendant searched victim’s cell phone for private sexual images, found photographs of victim’s genitals and used victim’s cell phone to send said photographs to his cell phone without victim’s consent. Appellate Court held that evidence was insufficient to prove that defendant disseminated victim’s photographs within meaning of 720 ILCS section 11-23.5(b), since defendant sent photographs to himself, as opposed to third-party. Appellate Court further found that evidence was insufficient to prove that victim was identifiable from photographs or information displayed in connection with photographs. Appellate Court, though, found that evidence was sufficient to support conviction on disorderly conduct charge.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant’s motion seeking leave to file successive post-conviction petition that challenged his first-degree murder conviction on grounds that State had withheld favorable evidence in violation of Brady. Essence of Brady claim stemmed from basement files found at Chicago Police Department facility that contained report that included summaries of statements made by several State’s witnesses, which defendant asserted contained material evidence that could have impeached key State’s witness and would have suggested that another individual had committed charged offense. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court, found that statements in report would not have exculpated defendant nor establish that only one individual committed charged offense. Moreover, Appellate Court further found that contents of report were not material to defendant’s guilt or innocence, and that evidence overwhelmingly supported defendant’s guilty verdict.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly dismissed as untimely defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief. Record showed that defendant had filed notice of appeal from trial court’s denial of her motion to withdraw her guilty plea and to vacate her sentence. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court’s dismissal, held that: (1) defendant's filing of instant notice of appeal constituted filing of direct appeal for purposes of section 122-1(c) of Post-Conviction Hearing Act; (2) relevant filing period for defendant=s post-conviction petition expired six months from date she had to file any petition for leave to appeal; and (3) defendant filed instant post-conviction petition three years after date of her conviction, which was beyond said six-month period. In her petition for leave to appeal, defendant argued that her post-conviction petition was timely since she could not have perfected any direct appeal under circumstance of her case.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant’s request to file successive post-conviction petition that alleged claim of actual innocence that was supported by three affidavits. Appellate Court, in reversing trial court, found that at leave to file stage of case defendant could pursue actual innocence claim under Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, and that defendant presented colorable claim of actual innocence. In its petition for leave to appeal, State argued that because defendant had pleaded guilty to charged offense, Appellate Court applied wrong standard for evaluating actual innocence claims, where heightened standard set forth in Reed, 2020 IL 124910 applied to circumstances of this case.

This case present question as to whether appointed post-conviction counsel failed to fulfill his duty of reasonable assistance under Post-Conviction Hearing Act by neglecting to plead essential element of claim that counsel added in amending defendant’s pro se post-conviction petition. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court’s dismissal of defendant’s post-conviction petition, found that requirement of reasonable post-conviction representation extends only to defendant’s original claims brought prior to appointment or retention of counsel. As such, defendant had no legal basis to object to appointed counsel’s treatment of claim not originally raised by defendant. Appellate Court further rejected defendant’s claim that Rule 651(c) required some level of representation by appointed counsel in presentation of new claims. (Summary Order entered December 23, 2021.)

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly dismissed at second stage of proceedings defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief that alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate defendant’s mental health history in support of his defense. Appellate Court, in reversing trial court and remanding matter back to trial court for third-stage evidentiary hearing, noted that prior Appellate Court panel had made observation that defendant’s medical records that documented his prior suicide attempt could have corroborated his testimony at trial that he was trying to commit suicide when he fired gun in direction of police officers. Moreover, Appellate Court found that defendant had satisfied both prongs of Strickland for purposes of pursuing ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly dismissed defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief, even though defendant argued that his appointed post-conviction counsel rendered unreasonable assistance by failing to comply with requirements under Rule 651(c) when she chose to stand on defendant’s pro se petition. Defendant raised sentencing issue that formed basis of ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his post-conviction petition, and record showed that same sentencing issue had previously been rejected by Appellate Court on two occasions. As such, Appellate Court, in affirming instant dismissal, rejected defendant’s claim that appointed counsel had ethical duty to withdraw as counsel if she believed that his claim in his post-conviction petition was without merit, as opposed to merely standing on his pro se petition. Moreover, Appellate Court found that counsel had both options of withdrawing as counsel or standing on defendant’s pleadings if she believed that defendant's claim was without merit.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant’s petition to revoke previously imposed fines under section 5-9-2 of Corrections Code. Appellate Court rejected defendant’s claim that trial court erred in ruling on his petition before 30 days had elapsed from date he filed instant petition and noted that fact that ruling was made prior to State filing any response did not constitute due process violation with respect to defendant. Appellate Court further found that denial of defendant’s petition was proper, since: (1) section 5-9-2 applies only to discretionary penal fines; and (2) none of fines at issue in his petition were discretionary.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly excluded statements made by individual in “rap video” that detailed shooting at issue in defendant’s felony murder trial. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court’s exclusion of said evidence, found that trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding statements made in video, where video was made solely for entertainment purposes and was not akin to prior statement made by witness. Defendant also raised in his petition for leave to appeal claim that: (1) one juror, who indicated that her relationship with victim’s mother would not affect her ability to be fair and impartial, suffered from implied bias and should have been removed; and (2) record did not support his convictions for mob action and felony murder predicated on mob action, where, according to defendant, there was no evidence that he played any role in generation of melee that formed basis of mob action charge either before or after he came upon brawl and fired gun at victim.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly granted defendant’s motion to preclude State in retrial on murder charge from presenting evidence alleging that defendant fired gun that caused victim’s death, where jury in first trial found in special interrogatory that State had failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that defendant had fired gun that caused victim’s death. Appellate Court, in considering State’s appeal of trial court’s order pursuant to Rule 604(a)(1), reversed trial court and held that doctrine of direct estoppel did not apply, where jury’s response to special interrogatory applied only to sentence enhancement issue and not general verdict of defendant’s guilt. In his petition for leave to appeal, defendant argued that state could not appeal trial court’s order under Rule 604(a)(1), and that estoppel applied to jury’s response to special interrogatory.