Criminal Law

This case present question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss his indictment on speedy-trial grounds, even though his case was not brought to trial within 120-day speedy-trial term. Record showed that defendant’s trial was continued pursuant to administrative order entered by circuit court, which had implemented Illinois Supreme Court order tolling running of speedy-trial term in response to COVID-19 pandemic. Appellate Court, in affirming defendant’s conviction on charge of domestic battery, found that Illinois Supreme Court had authority to allow for tolling of speedy-trial term in response to extraordinary circumstances associated with COVID-19 that existed at time when said tolling orders were entered.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied State’s motion to compel defendant to provide password for his cell phone that was otherwise properly seized by police pursuant to search warrant. Trial court found that 5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prevented defendant from being compelled to provide passcode to his cell phone. Appellate Court, in reversing trial court, found that compelling defendant to provide access to his cell phone was neither testimonial nor incriminating for 5th Amendment purposes, and that foregone conclusion exception to 5th Amendment also applied. In his petition for leave to appeal, defendant argued that Appellate Court lacked jurisdiction to consider State’s appeal of trial court’s order, where trial court’s order did not bar any evidence from trial and prohibited only one means by which it could enforce search warrant. He also maintained that Appellate Court’s analysis of privilege against self-incrimination conflicted with decision in Spicer, 2019 IL App (3d) 170814.

This case presents question as to whether record supported defendant’s conviction on charge of possession of defaced firearm, even though defendant claimed that State failed to prove him guilty beyond reasonable doubt that he knew that serial number on firearm was defaced. Appellate Court, in affirming defendant’s conviction, found that State need only prove beyond reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly possessed defaced firearm and not that he knew firearm was defaced.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant’s petition for certificate of innocence, even though State had successfully moved to vacate defendant’s murder and armed robbery convictions and then nolle prosequi said charges pursuant to section 2-1401 of Code. Although defendant claimed that he “did not, by my own conduct, voluntarily cause or bring about my conviction,” and State Attorney’s Office advised trial court that it would not oppose defendant’s petition, trial court found that defendant could not obtain certificate of innocence because he had previously pleaded guilty to instant charges. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court, found that defendant who has pleaded guilty to charged offenses has actually “caused or [brought] about his or her conviction.” Moreover, trial court could properly conclude that defendant’s alternative contention that his confession was result of police coercion was not credible. (Dissent filed.)

Appellate Court found that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction on defendant’s direct appeal that challenged his sentencing on second degree murder charges and aggravated battery with firearm charge, under circumstances where: (1) defendant timely filed post-judgment motion to reconsider said sentences under Rule 604(d); (2) trial court denied said motion to reconsider; and (3) defendant failed to file any notice of appeal within 30 days after denial of his motion to reconsider. Fact that defendant had filed motion for rehearing of his motion to reconsider his sentences within 30-day period for filing notice of appeal did not stay time for filing notice of appeal. In his petition for leave to appeal, defendant argued that his direct appeal was timely under Feldman, 409 Ill.App.3d 1124, where it was filed within 30 days of trial court’s denial of his motion for rehearing of his motion to reconsider.

This case presents question as to whether pro se defendant timely filed his notice of appeal from trial court’s order denying his pro se request for leave to file second successive post-conviction petition, where said notice was file-stamped 18 days beyond 30-day deadline for filing said notice. Defendant conceded that he did not file proper certification of mailing pursuant to section 1-109 of Code, but argued that his notice was nevertheless timely because legible postmark on envelope indicated that he mailed notice prior to expiration of deadline. Appellate Court, in finding that said notice was untimely, held that postmark could not be used in lieu of section 1-109 certificate to establish timeliness of defendant’s notice of appeal.