This case presents question as to whether battery that took place on stoop located immediately upon threshold of apartment door, within privately owned apartment complex, allowed State to charge defendant with Class 3 felony because said battery occurred in “public place of accommodation.” Appellate Court, in affirming defendant’s Class 3 felony conviction for aggravate battery, found that said stoop was public place of accommodation because members of public could approach apartment door and stand on stoop, and because area where offense occurred was accessible to public. In his petition for leave to appeal, defendant argued that Appellate Court held too broad of definition of public place of accommodation and undermined constitutionality of increased penalty associated with location-based aggravated battery.
Defendant appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion for leave to file a successive post-conviction petition that argued his 48-year sentence for first-degree murder was unconstitutional because he was 18 years old at the time of the offense. The appellate court affirmed, finding that defendant waived all non-jurisdictional errors, including constitutional errors, when he entered a voluntary plea of guilty. (HOWSE and BURKE, concurring)
Defendant, who was 21 years old at the time of the offense, was convicted of first-degree murder, aggravated kidnapping, armed robbery, and attempted armed robbery and was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 40 years for first-degree murder and 10 years each for the other offenses. Defendant appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion for leave to file a successive post-conviction petition and argued on appeal that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment and proportionate penalties clause. The appellate court affirmed, noting that under current Illinois Supreme Court precedent a 40-year sentence is not a de facto life sentence and, as a result, defendant could not satisfy the cause prong of the cause-and-prejudice test for bringing a successive post-conviction petition. The appellate court further found that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to juvenile sentencing protections when he was 21 years old at the time of the offense. (GORDON and ELLIS, concurring)
Defendant, who was 17 years old at the time of the offense, appealed from the trial court denial of his motion to file a successive post-conviction petition arguing that his 35-year sentence for first-degree murder and home invasion violated the Eighth Amendment and proportionate penalties clause. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal, finding that defendant was correctly admonished regarding the sentencing range for his offenses and that defendant had not identified an “objective impediment” to raising his sentencing claims earlier, either on direct appeal or in his initial post-conviction petition. The court further found that the trial court took into consideration defendant’s youth and attendant characteristics in sentencing and, as a result, could not establish prejudice. (KNECHT and HOLDER WHITE, concurring)
Defendant pled guilty to aggravated DUI and was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. Six years after his conviction, defendant filed a pro se petition to revoke the fines assessed in conjunction with his conviction under section 5-9-2 of the Corrections Code. The trial court denied the petition and defendant appealed. On appeal, the court considered whether the trial court was required to wait 30 days before denying the petition to revoke fines sua sponte and whether certain fines defendant sought to revoke were properly subject to the petition. The appellate court answered both questions in the negative and affirmed the order of the trial court. (McLAREN and ZENOFF, concurring)
Defendant was found guilty of being an armed habitual criminal and unlawful use of a weapon and sentenced to eight years. On direct appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred when it granted defendant’s demand for a speedy trial over defense counsel’s objections and that he was denied a fair trial as a result of hearsay statements that were improperly admitted into evidence. The appellate court affirmed, finding that it was not an error for the trial court to grant defendant’s demand for a speedy trial even when defense counsel represented a need for additional time to prepare for trial so long as the trial court ensured the defendant understood the consequences of his request and where the record showed defendant was well represented at trial. The appellate court further held the complained-of testimony was properly admitted. (LAVIN and COBBS, concurring)
Defendant appealed from first stage dismissal of his pro se postconviction petition arguing that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition for being untimely and that his conviction stated the gist of a constitutional claim that defendant’s plea counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a motion challenging the warrant to search defendant’s resident. The appellate court affirmed, finding that while the dismissal on timeliness grounds was an error, the defendant waived his claim that plea counsel was ineffective when he pled guilty. Justice Hutchinson dissented and contended that the petition should have advanced to a second stage analysis. (BRENNAN, concurring and HUTCHINSON, dissenting)
Defendant waived his appeal, alleging that Dist. Ct. improperly conducted his guilty plea hearing by telephone conference pursuant to CARES Act, where defendant had signed plea agreement waiving his appellate rights. Instant waiver covered any pre-trial rulings by Dist. Ct., and instant appeal, which raised issue as to whether Dist. Ct. properly applied CARES Act to defendant’s case, concerned pre-trial order that was covered by waiver. Also, absent plea agreement, defendant waived issue in instant case, where defendant had unequivocally agreed to conduct plea hearing by telephone on two occasions.
In prosecution on federal racketeering and narcotics laws, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying Hispanic defendants’ Batson challenge to prosecutor’s use of two peremptory challenges to prospective Hispanic jurors under circumstances, where prosecutor allowed only one Hispanic juror on jury, and where venire contained only five Hispanic members. One juror was upset with many government actions taken as to immigration and mental health areas, while other juror expressed opinion that justice system was flawed. Dist. Ct. could properly find that prosecutor’s explanation for said peremptory challenges, i.e., that said jurors reflected distain for government, was ethnic-neutral and believable, and that defendants had failed to show that said explanation was pretext for bias against Hispanics or that prosecutor was inconsistent in allowing non-Hispanic individuals on jury who had expressed similar distain for government. Also, record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s finding that one defendant was responsible for 2009 murder that was related to gang activities associated with charged offenses, where jury could find through circumstantial evidence that defendant had admitted to others that he had shot victim. Fact that no physical or forensic evidence linked defendant to shooting did not require different result. Also, record supported jury’s verdict that other defendant had committed 2013 murder that was related to charged RICO offenses, where defendant told others that robbery of third-party/murder of another individual coming to third-party’s aid was related to fact that third-party had moved into gang’s territory.
Defendant appealed from his conviction following a bench trial for nonconsensual dissemination of sexual images, a Class 4 felony, arguing the State failed to prove that he disseminated images when he sent them to himself and no one else. He also disputed that the person in the images was identifiable. The appellate court agreed, finding, in part, that dissemination required distribution by the defendant of the photos to another person. The court further found the evidence was sufficient to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of disorderly conduct. and used its authority under SCR 615(b)(3) to reduce defendant's conviction to disorderly conduct and remanded for resentencing. (SCHOSTOK and HUDSON, concurring)
