Criminal Law

This case presents question as to whether trial court committed reversible error in considering and then ultimately granting state’s motion to dismiss defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief that had progressed to second-stage of proceedings, where: (1) State‘s motion to dismiss had been pending for two years; and (2) trial court failed to provide defendant with any notice that trial court would consider State’s motion to dismiss at scheduled hearing or provide defendant with any opportunity to contest motion to dismiss at said hearing. Appellate Court, while acknowledging that trial court had erred in ruling on said motion, nevertheless found that any error was harmless, since defendant’s petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel was without merit. In his petition for leave to appeal, defendant argued that Appellate Court’s decision conflicted with other cases holding that instant procedural due process violation during second-stage proceeding required reversal for new post-conviction proceeding regardless of merits of post-conviction petition.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly dismissed defendant’s pro se second petition for post-conviction relief, even though defendant argued that his natural life sentence on murder charge violated 8th Amendment under Miller, 567 U.S. 460, and proportionate penalties clause of Illinois Constitution, where, according to defendant, he was only 19 at time he committed his crime and his mind was similar to juvenile brain. While defendant noted that he could not have raised instant issue in his first post-conviction petition because U.S. Supreme Court decision in Miller was handed down six years after his first petition for post-conviction relief had been resolved, Appellate Court found that defendant had failed to provide evidence indicating how his own immaturity or individual circumstances would provide compelling reason to allow him to file successive post-conviction petition.

This case presents question as to whether trial court, in finding defendant guilty in bench trial on charge of violating armed habitual criminal statute, improperly relied on assertions about effects of police training on ability to identify faces seen for few seconds from 150 feet away. Appellate Court, in reversing defendant’s conviction and remanding for new trial, found that defendant was not afforded fair and impartial trial because trial court improperly relied upon unsupported assertions about effects of police training on ability to identify faces, and that trial court’s comments showed improper underlying presumption that police officers are trustworthy. (Dissent filed.)

This case presents question as to whether trial court, in instant prosecution on charges of unlawful possession of weapon by felon, properly admitted video of foot chase of defendant that was partially caught on body camera of police officer under circumstances where audio included hearsay statements from officer regarding where he saw gun during said foot chase. Appellate Court, in reversing defendant’s conviction and remanding matter for new trial, found that Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act, which provides that recordings of body camera may be used as evidence, did not allow for admission of body-worn camera video without evidentiary limitation, and that statements made in video were inadmissible hearsay. Moreover. Appellate Court observed that because evidence regarding defendant’s possession of gun essentially consisted of said officer’s testimony, instant error was not harmless. (Dissent filed.) In its petition for leave to appeal, State argued that audio portion of body-worn camera video need not comply with rules against hearsay, and that, in any event, instant audiovisual recording did not constitute hearsay evidence. Alternatively, State asserted that any error was harmless, where recording duplicated officer’s live testimony at trial.

This case presents question as to whether defendant was properly convicted of possessing child pornography, where said pornography consisted of “collages” that combined non-pornographic images of actual children that defendant had cut from parenting magazines with images of adult male genitalia that defendant had cut from adult magazines. While defendant argued that his handmade collages could not qualify as child pornography under Illinois child pornography statute because his collages were generated from otherwise lawful magazine images of children and adults who had never interacted with each other, Appellate Court, in affirming defendant’s possession of child pornography conviction, found that any images of real identifiable children that were combined with images of genitalia fell within coverage of 720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(a)(1)(ii). Appellate Court also affirmed defendant’s aggravated criminal sexual abuse conviction, arising out of allegations that defendant had placed his penis in anus of grandchild and had transmitted semen into grandchild’s anus, where, along with defendant’s statement that his penis and semen had touched grandchild’s buttocks, grandchild testified to instances where defendant’s penis made contact with and penetrated his anus, as well as grandchild statement that he had to wipe semen off his buttocks. Fact that there were variances between grandchild’s version of events and defendant’s statement did not, according to Appellate Court, establish corpus delicti rule violation.

This case presents question as to whether there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction on charge of aggravated battery, where victim, i.e., county jail guard who was pushed by defendant, never testified that he felt insulted or provoked by defendant’s actions, but actually testified that he knew defendant was not mad at him personally, but rather was upset after returning from court. Appellate Court, in affirming defendant’s conviction, found that: (1) it was not necessary for victim to testify that he was insulted or provoked; (2) defendant’s contact with victim was not accidental or incidental; and (3) jury could reasonably infer that defendant’s act of defiance to county jail guard was insulting to guard and his authority.