Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder and was sentenced to 60 years. Court did not err in denying Defendant's motion in limine to exclude testimony from paramedic that victim's body displayed signs of rigor mortis when he examined it at the scene, arguing that he was not an expert. Paramedic's statement that body was suffering from "obvious" rigor mortis could be considered a lay opinion. Trial court has discretion to determine what fact, if any, is being asserted by implication through a statement. Court did not abuse its discretion by overruling Defendant's hearsay objection to witness's statements in text messages. Rulings on motions in limine are always subject to reconsideration during trial, and trial courts have discretion to reexamine their prior rulings on motions in limine when full context of evidence at issue becomes more clear at trial. State permissibly argued reasonable inferences to be drawn from evidence presented as to time of death. (CAVANAGH and HARRIS, concurring.)

Defendant, age 17 at time of offenses, was sentenced to 18 months' adult probation, after guilty pleas to 2 charges of aggravated battery in a public place and 1 charge of unlawful restraint. Just under 3 months prior to expiration of term of probation, State sought and was granted leave to file its 3rd petition for violation of probation (VOP). Trial court, without determining whether Defendant violated conditions of his probation, extended the term. One year later, court made probable cause findings for new charges, and State was thereafter granted leave to file a new petition for VOP.The court's continuing and indefinite extensions of probation sentence term, without hearing and determination of a violation, was clear error, and denial of due process. Once the date of a probation term expires and there is an assertion that conditions have been satisfied, absent proof of any alleged violations, petition for VOP can have no continuing tolling effect. The prior unsupported petition for VOP could neither toll the probation term nor as basis for court's probation revocation and imposition of 10-year jail term. (FITZGERALD SMITH and HOWSE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of 3 counts of 1st degree murder for the deaths of 3 persons in whose home had been a houseguest for about a month. No ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to file a motion to suppress Defendant's custodial statement to police. The substantial break in time, which the detectives suggested and which came after the issuance of Miranda warnings but before any meaningful postwarning interrogation, served as a proper curative measure because it allowed Defendant to distinguish the 2 contexts. The fact that Defendant made an unwarned statement does not warrant a presumption of compulsion and does not invalidate subsequent administration of Miranda warnings following by a knowing and voluntary waiver of those rights. Motion to suppress statement would be without merit or woudl otherwise run contrary to trial counsel's trial strategy. (McBRIDE, concurring and specially concurring; ELLIS, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

In 2017, Defendant, age 20 at time of offenses, filed 2nd successive postconviction petition, alleging (as he had in his 2010 petition) that his confession to 1991 murder was physically coerced by detectives. Defendant, after his 2010 petition was denied, found new evidence to corroborate his allegations of abuse, in affidavits from others attesting to similar abuse from the same 2 detectives. Defendant showed cause for his failure to present 3 affidavits, and the evidence of a 4th person who was exonerated upon filing a federal civil-rights complaint, in his prior petitions. These tell of a pattern of abuse very similar to Defendant's own, and meet the standard of documenting abuse similar enough to the abuse alleged to conclude that officers acted in conformity with pattern and practice of behavior.  He did not possess and could not reasonably have been expected to obtain, evidence of the pattern and practice of abuse by these 2 detectives.  Court erred in denying Defendant leave to file his 2nd successive postconviction petition. Leave to file Brady v. Maryland claim, that State failed to disclose evidence of a pattern-and-practice of abuse by these detectives, was properly denied, as Defendant cannot show prejudice, and knowledge of the alleged pattern of abuse cannot be imputed to the prosecutors. (McBRIDE and GORDON, concurring.)

Defendant was charged by information with 2 counts of forgery, alleging that he made 2 false paychecks with intent to defraud Dairy Queen (his wife's employer) and "financial institutions. Court erred in denying State's motion to compel production of cell phone passcode. Evidence established with reasonable particularity that Defendant had possession or control of the phone, and thus has possession or control of the passcode required to access and utilize the phone. A passcode is self-authenticating when the passcode provides entry to the phone. Thus, the foregone conclusion doctrine is satisfied, rendering the act of producing the passcode non-testimonial and outside the protection of the 5th amendment privilege against self-incrimination. As State made commitment to the trial court that it will not use evidence of Defendant's act of production of the passcode at trial, State will be required to prove Defendant's knowledge of the phone's contents through other means. (DeARMOND and TURNER, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder; and jury made a separate finding that Defendant personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused the victim's death. Defendant unambiguously asserted his right to counsel when, immediately after intense custodial questioning as to whether Defendant shot the victim or knew the victim, Defendant replied, "Can I call my lawyer?" Court's apparent belief that te assertion was ambiguous because it was conveyed in the form of a question was erroneous as a matter of law. Defendant's request for counsel was not scrupulously honored, and detective's follow-up question was inappropriate. Defendant's response, "or call my momma and then call my lawyer" was an invocation of right to counsel. Court erred in not suppressing Defendant's statement. When detectives asked whether Defendant was asserting his right to remain silent, and Defendant stated that he previously told police what he knew, Defendant did not initiate further discussion s with detectives or "undo" his previous assertion of right to counsel. After repeated denials of guilt, 29 hours after invoking his right to counsel, Defendant confessed to committing the crime. Error in admitting Defendant's confession was not harmless, where it contained incriminating evidence not directly established by any other means. (ROCHFORD and MARTIN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of residential burglary. Because destruction of original surveillance video was not by State's purposeful design, court did not err in admitting 2 nonconsecutive iPhone clips of the surveillance footage where a witness testified to their accuracy compared to original surveillance footage. State presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove that Defendant committed residential burglary beyond a reasonable doubt. Court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to 6 1/2 years. (WHARTON, specially concurring; CATES, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual abuse of 2 minors who were members of the musical group which he founded and of which he was manager. Evidence shows that Defendants conduct toward victims was part of his grander scheme to use his position as manager to engage in sex acts with teenagers who joined the group hoping for a successful music career. No error in joining the charges against the Defendant as to his various sexual acts with each victim. Court properly allowed each victim's testimony in each other's cases to show motive, intent, knowledge, and propensity. No abuse of discretion in admission of evidence as to other incidents that occurred after the charged offenses. (MIKVA and ODEN JOHNSON, concurring.)