Criminal Law

Defendant, age 18 at time of offense, was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder. Defendant filed motion to suppress a statement he made to detectives after his arrest, alleging his mental deficiencies prevented him from making a legally sufficient decision to waive his Miranda rights. Court denied Defendant's motion, but acknowledged Defendant had a below-average intelligence. Defense counsel stated on the record her belief that Defendant was going to testify, and waived his right to have the court ask prospective jurors if they understood and accepted the principle that a defendant's failure to testify cannot be held against him .As a matter of trial strategy, defense counsel changed course midtrial and advised Defendant not to testify, which he relied upon in electing not to testify. Defense counsel, faced with the unforeseen favorable testimony from State's witnesses, properly reconsidered the risk associated with having Defendant testify in reaching her decision. This decision was not so unsound or unreasonable that she deprived Defendant of his 6th amendment right to counsel. (HARRIS and HOLDER WHITE, concurring.)

Defendant was charged in information with violation of an order of protection (VOOP). Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of VOOP. Although judgment of dissolution incorporated the marital settlement agreement (MSA), it did not incorporate the letter of agreement because that letter was not attached to judgment of dissolution. Letter agreement stated that simultaneous with entry of judgment of dissolution, the OP shall be dismissed and/or vacated ab initio. Neither State nor criminal court judge were bound by the parties' agreement in a civil matter when determining whether a criminal matter should be dismissed. Thus, criminal court properly ruledthat letter of agreement had no effect on State's ability to prosecute Defendant for VOOP.  Circuit court order is rendered void only where court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, which was not the case here. A court cannot invalidate an earlier OP ab initio. There was sufficient evidence to support criminal court's finding that Defendant was served with or had knowledge of the contents of the OP, and to find Defe3ndant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of VOOP. (SCHOSTOK and BIRKETT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of possessing 0.2 gram of MDMA, known as ecstasy. Trial judge prejudicially misremembered the testimony when he found Defendant confessed that he knew the bag police found held narcotics. Defendant stated that contained in a plastic bag was "just some dust." State offered no evidence to support judge's finding that "dust" is a street term for the drug commonly known as ecstacy. The judge is not at liberty to take judicial notice of the meaning of slang expression. A retrial would violate bar against double jeopardy. Thus, conviction reversed without remand. (PUCINSKI and COGHLAN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, on 1 count of being an armed habitual criminal (AHC) and on 3 counts of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF). Defendant thus cannot make a showing that he was "innocent" of the offenses charged in the indictment. A finding at the criminal trial that Defendant was guilty of 1 or more charges precludes the award of a certificate of innocence. Defendant was innocent of AHC as that offense was charged, as 1 of the 2 predicate offenses on which the charge rested was an AUUW (aggravated unlawful use of a weapon) charge later deemed by the Illinois Supreme Court to be "facially unconstitutional". The finding that Defendant was guilty on the UUWF charge did not rest on a predicate offense that was found unconstitutional. The only reason the UUWF conviction was vacated by appellate court was that, at the time the first came before appellate court, Defendant was also convicted of AHC based on the same underlying action of gun possession, and a defendant can only be punished once for a single act. (HARRIS, concurring; ODEN JOHNSON, dissenting.)

Defendant pled guilty to 1st degree murder of 1 victim and aggravated battery for the shooting of another victim. Pursuant to plea agreement, after bargaining was completed and a plea deal had been reached, Defendant gave a detailed videotaped statement confessing to the crimes. Defendant later filed several motions to vacate his guilty plea, which court granted. At stipulated bench trial, Defendant's statement was admitted into evidence, and Defendant was convicted of 1st degree murder with firearm enhancement. Had Defendant performed his cooperation obligations under the plea agreement, he would have been permitted to withdraw his plea and enter a new plea to charges that did not include the firearm enhancement. The deal was still available to Defendant at the time he breached the agreement by withdrawing his guilty plea. Defendant's providing of the statement was not a condition precedent of the deal, but was a fulfillment of a term of the deal. Statement was admissible at trial and was not barred pursuant to Rule 402(f). (A. BURKE, GARMAN, THEIS, NEVILLE, and OVERSTREET, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of aggravated domestic battery, home invasion, and possession of a stolen or converted motor vehicle. Court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence as to contents of messages allegedly sent by Defendant to victim via Facebook Messenger. State presented sufficient circumstantial evidence properly authenticating the 2 Facebook Messenger messages; the victim testified that while she and Defendant were dating, Defendant messaged her via Facebook messenger multiple times under the same username.. State provided evidence that both messages contained unique information not widely known to persons other than Defendant and victim.   State proved Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of possession of a stolen or converted motor vehicle. State was only required to prove that Defendant knew the car was either stolen or converted, and evidence proved that Defendant knew he either stole the vehicle or converted it, and that he knowingly and wrongfully deprived victim of her vehicle for several days. (A. BURKE, GARMAN, THEIS, NEVILLE, M. BURKE, and OVERSTREET, concurring.)

The Sexually Dangerous Persons Act was amended in 2013 to include the required element of a substantial probability to reoffend within the statutory defnition of a sexually dangerous person. This amendment thus eliminated the requirement that the circuit court must make an explicit finding that the respondent is substantially probable to commit sex offenses in the future if not confined. The Act, as amended, incorporates the finding of a substantial probability to reoffend into the definition of a sexually dangerous person. (A. BURKE, GARMAN, THEIS, NEVILLE, M. BURKE, and OVERSTREET, concurring.)