Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 60-month term of incarceration on charge of unlawful possession of ammunition, even though defendant argued that Dist. Ct. miscalculated his sentencing range by finding that one of his two prior convictions for aggravated battery qualified as crime of violence. While defendant argued that said conviction did not qualify as crime of violence, because he was convicted under 720 ILCS section 5/12-4(b), according to presentence report that indicated that Dept. of Corrections had stated that defendant was convicted under section 12-4(b), Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant was actually convicted under section 12-4(a), which defendant agreed was crime of violence, where court-certified record of conviction, as well as separate reports from Chicago Police Department and Illinois State Police, indicated that defendant was convicted under section 12-4(a). As such, there was no need for Dist. Ct. to further investigate nature of defendant’s unlawful conduct arising out of said conviction.

Record supported defendant’s conviction on RICO charge arising out of scheme to use defendant’s and others’ positions as police officers to steal drugs and guns from pushers and to extort money from them. While defendant surmised that jury did not fully understand elements of RICO charge, defendant did not challenge sufficiency of indictment, did not object to any jury instructions or request additional instructions to help jurors understand different concepts, and did not object to prosecutor’s closing arguments about what was needed to be proved. Ct. also rejected defendant’s contention that record failed to support his theft of money belonging to United States conviction, where defendant claimed that govt. was required to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he was aware that money he stole belonged to U.S. government.

Dist. Ct. did nor err in dismissing as time-barred defendant’s habeas petition that was filed more than one year after defendant’s conviction of sexual assault of defendant’s son had become final. While defendant attempted to overcome instant one-year time bar by claiming that he was actually innocent of sexual assault charge based upon his son’s recantation of his allegations against defendant, Dist. Ct. properly applied probabilistic standard to find that reasonable juror was likely to find that son’s original testimony was credible, where son gave inconsistent statements in his explanation for 3-year delay in generating recantation affidavit, and where son’s possible motives to falsely recant were consistent with expert testimony. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant did not meet threshold requirement that no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find defendant guilty beyond reasonable doubt in light of son’s recantation.

Record failed to support defendant’s guilty plea to charge of production of child pornography. While images involving minor victim showed that defendant himself was engaging in sexually explicit conduct, said images did not constitute child pornography, since images did not show minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct herself. As such, defendant was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea as to said charge. However, record did support defendant’s plea with respect to charge of possession of child pornography, where defendant’s conviction on said charge was based primarily on his possession of videos and images that he did not create, and where defendant’s counsel conceded existence of factual basis for said charge. Moreover, Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that his entire plea agreement was invalid given parties’ mutual mistake regarding nature of production of child production charge, where instant production of child pornography and possession of child pornography charges were not interdependent.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs-applicant and Illinois State Rifle Association’s action, alleging that Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry Act was unconstitutional as violative of Second Amendment as applied to State’s denial of plaintiff-applicant’s second application for said license, where record showed that applicant had two criminal convictions, including one for unlawful use of firearm and had multiple gun-related arrests. As such, State’s individualized determination that applicant’s criminal history rendered him too dangerous to carry concealed firearm in public survived intermediate scrutiny. Ct. of Appeals further found that plaintiff-Rifle Association lacked standing to sue on its own behalf, when it did not allege injury to itself or request any relief. Moreover, Rifle Association lacked standing to sue on behalf of its members when it failed to either identify any member or explain how its members would have standing to sue in their own right. Ct. of Appeals also rejected applicant’s contention that Firearm Concealed Carry Act created de facto lifetime ban on his right to carry concealed firearm in public for self-defense.