Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after his 1st trial, of aggravated possession of a stolen motor vehicle that was inoperable and left parked on the streets of Chicago. On remand, Defendant was convicted after a jury trial, of aggravated possession of a stolen vehicle. Record contains some evidence that Defendant made a mistake of fact in relying on Defendant's co-worker's legitimate purchase of the vehicle from the owner's husband, and some evidence is all the law requires before giving the jury instruction as to a mistake of fact. Defendant's knowledge of the vehicle's status as stolen was the principal issue at trial. The owner's husband must have committed perjury at one trial or the other, as his testimony at 1 trial completely contradicted his testimony at the other. Record contained more than some evidence that any reliance on the vehicle owner's husband for facts was a mistake. (REYES and MARTIN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of 1st-degree murder for the death of his mother, and sentenced him to 40 years. Appellate court reversed and remanded for new trial because trial court erred in granting State's request to take mother's emergency evidence deposition without satisfying Rule 414, and erred in ruling the deposition admissible at trial. Court properly denied Defendant's motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. No double jeopardy bar to retrial after a successful appeal based on trial error, even where the appeal focuses on prosecutorial misconduct. Evidence fails to show that prosecutor intended to goad either a mistrial or a successful appeal. (PIERCE and COGHLAN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of 1 counts of home invasion, 2 counts of armed robbery, and 2 counts of aggravated robbery. No ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to make evidentiary objections to questions that elicited hearsay answers tending to show his possession of a firearm, as no showing that this failure to make objections prejudiced Defendant.  Aggravated robbery convictions are vacated under the one-act, one-crime rule as they are based on the same physical acts as the armed robbery convictions. (JORGENSEN and BRENNAN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder.Court erred by dismissing Defendant's postconviction petition at the 2nd stage. When determining what evidence is admissible at a 3rd-stage evidentiary hearing and how the trial court should evaluate that evidence using the same rules as to admissibility of evidence at sentencing hearings. Hearsay evidence is not per se inadmissible because it fails to meet the reliability criteria that would be required for admissibility at trial, and the trial court has discretion to accept, in 3rd-stage evidentiary hearings, to admit questionable evidence and then disregard it if it is unreliable.(KNECHT and DeARMOND, concurring.)

Defendant pled guilty to 6 counts of aggravated battery and 6 counts of armed violence for the stabbing or shooting of 6 children at their home. On remand, he was sentenced to 80 years. Defendant's de facto life sentence is not unconstitutional because the new parole statute statute and day-for-day good conduct credit statute afford him meaningful opportunities for release before he served a de facto life sentence. As he never had a right to be sentenced for no more than 40 years, the application of the new parole statute to Defendant does not violate ex post facto clause of U.S. Constitution or the Statute on Statutes. (BOIE and MOORE, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with violating armed habitual criminal section of the Criminal Code. Court rejected plea offer of 6 years to be served at 85%. Jury found Defendant guilty of being an armed habitual criminal and he was sentenced to 9 years with no more than a 15% reduction for good behavior. Defendant's 2002 conviction for delivery of narcotics, committed at age 17, does not qualify as the kind of conviction that can support a later conviction on a charge of being an armed habitual criminal.(HYMAN and COGHLAN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of 1 count of aggravated domestic battery and 2 counts of domestic battery. No violation of right to speedy trial, as Defendant failed to assert his right to a speedy trial on any occasion after once stating that he wished to demand trial. Less than 2 months later, Defendant completely repudiated any demand, and never again demanded trial.  There is ample evidence in record to support convictions. Defendant's 2003 felony case is properly deemed an element of the Class 2 offense of unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon. The underlying felony serves as an element describing the stand-alone Class 2 felony offense. As a predicate, Defendant committed a Class 1 felony drug offense, and that qualified each of the later 2004 and 2009 felony cases to be prosecuted and sentenced as Class 2 felony offenses. Court did not err in sentencing Defendant as a Class X offender. (HUDSON and BRENNAN, concurring.)

Defendant pled guilty to 1st degree murder.Postplea counsel, who filed a facially valid Rule 604(d) certificate, was not required, under Rule 604(d), to add to Defendant's pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea a claim that the record rebutted. Motion claimed that his trial counsel misled him and that he did not understand that the 15-year enhancement was "on top of" the 23-year sentence. The record shows that Defendant was well aware of and agreed to a plea deal that called for the imposition of a 23-year sentence for murder plus a mandatory consecutive sentence of 15 years. (HUTCHINSON and BIRKETT, concurring.)