Criminal Law

Defendant, then age 15, shot and killed a 48-year-old man while he and a codefendant were attempting to carjack his vehicle to commit a drive-by shooting of a rival gang member. Defendant entered a fully negotiated plea to 1 charge of murder and 1 charge of attempted aggravated vehicular hijacking in exchange for agreed sentence of 30 years for murder and a concurrent sentence of 15 years for attempted aggravated vehicular hijacking. Thirteen years later, Defendant filed postconviction petition claiming that his plea was involuntary on 3 grounds. Court advanced to the 3rd stage claim that his plea was involuntary as trial counsel misadvised him that he would be eligible for good conduct credit that would only require him to serve 15 years, or half of his sentence. Court properly dismissed that claim, after evidentiary hearing. Trial counsel adamantly denied that he misinformed Defendant that he would be eligible for day-for-day good conduct credit. Defendant's claim was inconsistent with his inaction upon learning, upon arrival at IDOC, that he would be required to serve the entire 30 years.  (MARTIN, concurring; GORDON, concurring in part and dissenting in part.) 

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st-degree murder. Jury answered a special interrogatory by finding that State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant personally discharged the firearm that proximately caused the victim's death. Court sentenced Defendant to 35 years but, given jury's answer to special interrogatory, did not impose a sentencing enhancement for personally discharging a firearm that proximately caused the victim's death. Defendant made a substantial showing of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence that his codefendant actually committed the charged offense.  (HUDSON and BIRKETT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 2 counts of aggravated battery. Court erred when it admitted, as substantive evidence under section 115-10.1 of Code of Criminal Procedure, a witness's prior inconsistent statement. When witness denied making the statement at issue, his denial concluded the matter, and the prior statement could not be used as substantive evidence. Court erred when it admitted, under section 115-12 of the Code, a police detective's testimony describing the witness's prior photographic identification of Defendant. This admission of detective's testimony permitted State to bypass requirements of section 115-10.1 and admit as substantive evidence witness's prior statement to police. Evidence was not overwhelming, increasing the likelihood the erroneous admissions prejudiced Defendant. (ZENOFF and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder, and sentenced to 75 years. Defendant was 25 at time of offenses, but evidence at his sentencing hearing showed that due to an intellectual disability, he had the cognitive ability of an 11-year-old.  Defendant cannot show prejudice from his attorneys' failure to argue for admission of a witness' statement to Defendant's and testimony as to victim's reputation, and thus no ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Court did not err in refusing to instruct jury on 2nd-degree murder, as no circumstances present to support claim of self-defense. An argument of ineffective assistance of counsel was not necessary to arguments counsel raised in support of motion for new trial. Psychiatrist testified that Defendant's mental illnesses can be treated and that, with appropriate treatment, Defendant can be rehabilitated. Sentence was not excessive, and does not violate proportionate penalties clause of Illinois Constitution. Defendant has not sought appropriate treatment outside of an institutional setting, and thus court was not required to find that Defendant had any rehabilitative potential. (WELCH and CATES, concurring.)

Court denied motion of Defendant, age 19 at time of offenses, to withdraw his guilty plea to armed robbery while armed with a dangerous weapon other than a firearm. Defendant argued that court accepted guilty plea without adequate factual basis for the dangerous-weapon element. Defendant is precluded from challenging his guilty plea because he expressly invited and acquiesced in the claimed error. Defendant stopped jury trial after several witnesses, including the victim, had testified, and he asked to reopen plea negotiations, when the evidence amply supported charge of armed robbery with a firearm. (ZENOFF and HUDSON, concurring.)

Illinois State Police obtained warrants to seize and search a personal computer owned by Defendant, a Peoria police officer, including a warrant authorizing law enforcement to search the computer for digital evidence of 2 unrelated incidents: the aggravated criminal sexual assault of a named victim and the unauthorized video recording and live video transmission of an unnamed victim. Defendant was tried and acquitted of the alleged sexual assault before the unauthorized video recording was investigated. After acquittal and without seeking a new warrant, Peoria police department acquired and searched a copy of computer's hard drive, finding evidence of the unauthorized video recording; and also finding child pornography, which was not mentioned in the warrant. The warrant authorizing the search of Defendant's computer date diminished his expectation of privacy in the types of files described int he warrant. Any postacquittal search of the same data, directed toward finding further evidence of the sexual assault, would have exceeded the scope of the warrant. Data search by Police Department's computer forensics examiner was within the scope of the warrant as it was reasonably directed at uncovering evidence of unauthorized video recording, which was alleged in the warrant. The search was reasonable under the 4th amendment and resulted in the lawful discovery of child pornography in plain view. Trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress the digital images supporting convictions of child pornography is affirmed. (A. BURKE, GARMAN, THEIS, OVERSTREET, and CARTER, concurring; NEVILLE, dissenting.)

Defendant, age 19 and 2 months at time of offense, was convicted, after jury trial, of 2 counts of 1st degree murder and 2 counts of aggravated kidnapping based on his participation int eh 1993 abductions and shooting deaths of a 15-year-old victim and an 18-year-old victim. Defendant was sentenced to a mandatory natural life term for the murder convictions and 60 years for each aggravated kidnapping conviction, to run consecutively to the life term. Appellate court erroneously help that Defendant's sentence of natural life violated proportionate penalties clause of Illinois Constitution as applied to him without a developed evidentiary record or factual findings on the as-applied constitutional challenge.  Remanded for 2nd-stage postconviction proceedings. Vacatur of appellate court's judgment as to actual innocence is warranted in light of intervening Illinois Supreme Court decisions in 2016 and 2020 which reviewed 2nd-stage dismissal of actual innocence claims premised on recantation. (GARMAN, THEIS, and NEVILLE, concurring; A. BURKE, concurring in part and dissenting in part; M. BURKE and OVERSTREET, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)