Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder, aggravated kidnapping, and attempted armed robbery on a theory of accountability, and sentenced to 28 years and 14 years, to run concurrently. The victim had, the night before, won several thousand dollars in a game of dice he had been playing with Defendant and others.  Court erred in dismissing Defendant's motion for leave to file a 2nd successive postconviction petition. Court did not follow the procedure set forth under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Circuit court must render a determination based on whether each individual claim contained within the petition meets the cause-and-prejudice test. Court failed to render a determination based on whether Defendant's polygraph examination claim met the cause-and-prejudice test, and without such determination, the successive petition cannot be deemed "filed" under the Act. Court erred when it advanced petition in its entirety to 2nd stage proceedings without making a cause-and-prejudice determination. (LAMPKIN and MARTIN, concurring.)

Defendant, age 18 at time of offenses, was convicted of 1st degree murder and attempted murder and was sentenced to aggregate minimum sentence of 66 years. Defendant's motion for leave to file successive postconviction petition sufficiently alleged that Defendant could establish the existence of facts personal to him that warranted consideration fo the Miller v. Alabama factors in fashioning an appropriate sentence and that the failure to do so made his 66-year sentence unconstitutional as applied to him under the proportionate penalties clause. Defendant's motion contained sufficient specificity to require that the matter be advanced to 2nd stage, when he will have opportunity to substantiate his claim further. (ROCHFORD and MARTIN, concurring.)

Defendant and codefendant were charged in 102-count indictment with charges stemming from a home invasion. Defendant's case was severed from that of his codefendant. Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 4 counts of 1st degree murder and 2 counts of home invasion. The admission of Defendant's post-invocation conduct following detective's improper question was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the nature of such evidence did not deny him a fair trial and where the remaining properly admitted evidence overwhelmingly established his guilt. Even if witness's prior consistent statement was prematurely admitted during State's direct examination of him, the cross-examination would have permitted the admission of such testimony on redirect examination. The prior consistent statement was admissible to rebut a charge that his trial testimony was motivated by his desire to protect himself from being prosecuted and by his desire to protect his brother. One conviction for home invasion must be vacated, under the one-act, one-crime rule, where there was a single entry into the apartment. (REYES and MARTIN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder by personally discharging a firearm proximately causing death and of 2 counts of armed robbery with a firearm. Court admitted defense expert testimony on eyewitness identifications, and expert testified to various factors that could affect weight of identification testimony. Although court barred expert from testifying as to exonerations, he testified that hiss opinions were derived from experiments and "confirmed in real crimes with real witnesses outside the laboratory." Court did not bar defense from sufficiently explaining basis of experts opinions so that jury could evaluate or weigh his opinions appropriately. Court did not abuse its discretion in balancing the defense's interest in fully explaining basis for expert's opinions against State's interest in not having prejudicial factor of exonerations in other cases put before jury. (MIKVA and ODEN JOHNSON, concurring.)

Defendant filed motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Given strong circumstantial evidence indicating that Defendant did place his motion in the prison mail system on or before the deadline for filing it, circuit court improperly refused to allow Defendant an opportunity to supplement the record with the requisite certification. Court questioned Defendant, who was pro se, only as to when his motion was filed and did not ask him when he placed his motion in the mail.Remanded for limited purpose of allowing Defendant to supply the necessary certification establishing that his motion was timely filed. Mailbox rule will not be applied where, although circumstances may indicate that a filing was placed int he mail on or before its due date, there is no certification evidencing proof of timely mailing as required in Supreme Court Rule 12(b).  (HARRIS and ODEN JOHNSON, concurring.)

Defendant, age 19 at time of offense, pled guilty to murder of a homeless man beaten to death by Defendant and 2 codefendants. Court sentenced Defendant to 32 years. No case precedent extends the Miller v. Alabama decision to an offender who was not a juvenile or sentenced to a natural or de facto life sentence. No case precedent has concluded that a nonlife sentence for a nonjuvenile offender violated the proportionate penalties clause on the basis of the defendant's developing brain. Defendant did not raise an arguable claim that his guilty plea was involuntary.  (DeARMOND and HOLDER WHITE, concurring.)

Court entered order terminating parental rights of Respondent father after a contested adoption proceeding permitting Petitioners (biological mother of child and her husband) to adopt the minor child. Record contains sufficient evidence supporting court's finding that father failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility toward minor both prior to and after he was incarcerated for a domestic battery case involving strangulation of a woman other than minor's mother.  Evidence supported court's finding of depravity, The evidence sufficiently established a course of conduct of sufficient duration and repetition to establish a moral deficiency coupled with an inability or unwillingness to conform to accepted morality, including violent conduct including strangulation of other women and a man, and verbal and physical abuse of minor's mother. (WELCH and BARBERIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of solicitation of a sexual act. State submitted as exhibits the ad for escort services (created by detective) to which Defendant responded and text messages exchanged between Defendant and law enforcement officers. Defendant was proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Evidence was overwhelming that Defendant intended to pay money in exchange for a sex act. The offense of solicitation is completed when the principal offense is commanded, encouraged, or requested with the intent that it be committed. The fact that the evidence did not show that Defendant showed the undercover deputy money or that the officers never recovered any money is immaterial. (HUTCHINSON and HUDSON, concurring.)

Court dismissed Defendant's postconviction petition at 2nd stage.  Court allowed postconviction counsel to withdraw because Defendant intended to hire a new attorney, not because of counsel's determination that Defendant's claims lacked merit. Thus, counsel's withdrawal did not extinguish Defendant's right to reasonable assistance under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. The right to appointed counsel attaches at the 2nd stage. A defendant is entitled to reasonable assistance of counsel even when he lacks the statutory right to appointed counsel. Defendant's retained attorneys' failure to obtain a properly notarized affidavit from witness was fatal to his actual-innocence claim, thus showing that they did not provide him reasonable assistance. Witness's signature "under penalty of perjury" was not sufficient to advance petition to the 3rd stage. Record does not indicate retained attorneys made any effort, other than a cursory search, to locate witness and have him execute a proper affidavit.  (BRIDGES and BRENNAN, concurring.)