Defendant, age 21 at time of offense, entered open guilty plea to armed robbery, and was sentenced to 18 years. His 2 codefendants entered fully negotiated pleas to armed robbery in exchange for 14-year sentences. Because their pleas were fully negotiated, court did not have benefit of PSIs, and thus did not have a fully understanding of the facts of their case. Thus, court could not meaningfully compare their sentences to Defendant’s sentence. (ZENOFF and BRENNAN, concurring.)
Section 2-702(g)(3) of Code of Civil Procedure requires a petitioner seeking a certificate of innocence to prove innocence only of the offense as it was charged and prosecuted in the underlying criminal proceeding. (A. BURKE, THEIS, and NEVILLE, concurring; M. BURKE, GARMAN, and OVERSTREET, specially concurring.)
Defendant was convicted of unlawful restraint. Circuit court may consider standing as the sole basis for the summary dismissal of a postconviction petition at the first stage. Circuit court, in determining Defendant's standing, did not violate the Act by taking judicial notice of the DOC's website to ascertain his status as a prisoner at time he filed petition. Defendant's obligation to register under the Violent Offender Act was a collateral consequence of the unlawful restraint conviction and thus did not confer standing to challenge that conviction. Defendant's pro se petition did not allege sufficient facts relevant to standing to advance the petition to the 2nd stage.(A. BURKE, GARMAN, THEIS, and NEVILLE, concurring; CARTER and OVERSTREET, dissenting.)
Defendant pled guilty to aggravated battery. Defendant appealed, arguing that his guilty plea was involuntary because he was taking unprescribed psychotropic medication, he wished to be released from prison to take care of his son, and he was innocent. These are not arguable bases for challenging voluntariness of Defendant's plea. Appellate court has jurisdiction over Defendant's appeal. The appeal presents no issue of arguable merit, and motion to withdraw, filed by counsel from Office of the State Appellate Defendant, is granted. (JORGENSEN, concurring; McLAREN, dissenting.)
Defendant, proceeding pro se, was convicted, after jury trial , of aggravated battery and sentenced to 7 years. Defendant insisted on self-representation at times but vacillated between that and being represented by counsel, each time intending to thwart the trial or sentencing. As Defendant requested and received representation for sentencing, and later requested and was granted the right to represent himself, it was incumbent upon trial court to substantially comply with Rule 401, and to readmonish Defendant about proceeding pro se at sentencing. As court failed to do so, it cannot be determined whether Defendant provided a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel. This omission requires remand for a new sentencing hearing. (HOLDER WHITE and STEIGMANN, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Police officer, responding to a call about a possible altercation, saw a pill bottle on front passenger area where Defendant had been sitting. Court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress a pill bottle, which had no prescription label but contained a plastic baggie and Xanax pills. Although police seized bottle without a warrant, the seizure was valid under the plain-view doctrine because the bottle's incriminating nature was immediately apparent. Officer had probable cause to believe that Defendant lacked a prescription for the pills and thus was committing a crime. (McLAREN and BIRKETT, concurring.)
Defendant was tried by jury for 1st degree murder of one victim and attempted armed robbery of another victim. After jury returned its signed verdict forms of guilty, defense counsel asked the trial court to poll the jury. Eleven of the jurors were polled and answered "yes", that this was and is their verdict. The twelfth juror was not polled, but trial court dismissed the jury. Leaving out of the poll of the jury even one juror calls into question the integrity of the judicial process and is 2nd-prong plain error. Reversed and remanded for new trial. (WALKER, concurring; COGHLAN, dissenting.)
In prosecution on drug distribution charges arising out of seizure of drugs during traffic stop, Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress seizure of drugs, where, even though stop was permissible at outset, record showed that officer impermissibly prolonged stop by over six minutes at start of stop by questioning defendant at length about subjects going well beyond legal justification for said stop in effort to investigate possible additional crimes. Record showed that: (1) arresting officer received tip from other officer that he needed to follow defendant's vehicle with intent to catch him in traffic violation to provide pretext for roadside stop because defendant was driving suspiciously; (2) arresting officer eventually pulled defendant over on charge of driving too closely to another vehicle; (3) arresting officer improperly used first six minutes of stop to question defendant about his state of residence, employment, travel history, travel plans, vehicle history and registration information; (4) arresting officer already had answers to some of said topics prior to instant stop; (5) arresting officer directed defendant to drive to different location, where he asked for first time questions about defendant's insurance; (6) arresting officer eventually issued warning ticket over 30 minutes after initial stop and then told defendant that he could not leave because he suspected that defendant was transporting drugs; and (7) dog arrived 10 minutes later and alerted to presence of drugs in vehicle. Fact that defendant gave inconsistent answers after initial delay did not require different result. (Dissent filed.)
Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of being an armed habitual criminal, armed violence, and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.Defendant's postconviction petition states an arguable claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on the failure to call an eyewitness at trial. Defendant had informed trial counsel that this witness would testify on his behalf that the drugs and gun allegedly found in his apartment were actually found in the gangway.(FITZGERALD SMITH and PUCINSKI, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of being an armed habitual criminal. Arrest stemmed from an officer's recover of a handgun from Defendant's pants pocket after an anonymous tip that an African-American "male with a red shirt" on a certain street corner "had a gun on his person". Defendant claimed that his postconviction counsel failed to render reasonable assistance, alleging that counsel should have included whether the clothes Defendant was wearing when arrested were documented on a jail inventory sheet or in an arrest photo and whether they were available to trial counsel. Record lacks any indication about postconviction counsel's efforts to obtain these documents and clothes. Trial court's order of 2nd-stage dismissal of postconviction petition is vacated; remanded for further 2nd-stage proceedings so postconviction counsel may further amend and support the petition. (REYES and MARTIN, concurring.)
