Criminal Law

State did not prove Defendant  guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of violating law prohibiting a felon from knowingly possessing a firearm "on or about his person or on his land or in his own abode or fixed place of business." Evidence showed that officer found a gun near one of the passengers in the 3rd row of a minivan that Defendant was driving. Officer testified that he did not see Defendant physically possess the weapon or attempt to discard it, and his fingerprints were not retrieved from it. State, which did not contend that Defendant was in actual possession of the firearm, did not present sufficient evidence to support theory of constructive possession of it. (A. BURKE, NEVILLE, and OVERSTREET, concurring; M. BURKE and GARMAN, dissenting.

(Court opinion corrected 4/15/21.) Defendant, age 17 at time of offense, was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder of his friend's parents, and sentenced to 2 concurrent terms of natural life imprisonment. Defendant was not handcuffed, booked, fingerprinted, or photographed at any point during his encounters with police. No indicia of formal arrest exists, and his trip to police station was not demonstrative of custody. Another man was an eyewitness to and participant in the murders, and pled guilty and was sentenced to 40 years in exchange for his testimony as to details of the murder and coverup, including Defendant's role in the conspiracy. Court engaged in an adequate and exhaustive review and consideration of Defendant's youth and its attendant circumstances, statutory factors applicable to juveniles, and voluminous information in mitigation. Court found that Defendant's conduct showed irretrievable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond rehabilitation. (PIERCE, concurring; WALKER, specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. A rational factfinder could have found that Defendant knowingly possessed the firearm. Actual possession analysis is appropriate because trial court's determination of credibility of officer who testified that the bag (which contained nothing other than a firearm) was around Defendant's shoulder. Based on that testimony, Defendant exercised immediate dominion and control over the bag, and it is rational to infer that Defendant knew the bag's content. Defendant secreted the bag from officers' view as they approached, walked away, and failed to obey officer's initial orders to stop. Court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. (LAVIN ad PUCINSKI, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of 2 counts of attempted 1st degree murder and 1 count of aggravated battery. Court did not violate Defendant's due process rights in allowing him to be shackled during bench trial. Defendant invited the error when defense counsel instructed court to proceed with bench trial despite the fact that Defendant was in shackles. Defendant makes no persuasive argument that defense counsel was without authpority to so advise trial court. The right to be tried without shackles is governed only by Rule 430, which rule does not require trial courts to deliver any admonishments to defendants. (GORDON and LAMPKIN, concurring.) 

Defendant, a high school track coach, was convicted, after bench trial, of sexual exploitation of a child. State failed to prove Defendant guilty, as the undisputed facts do not meet statutory description of "virtual presence." Snapchat did not create the illusory environment of presence that the legislature had in mind by its use of the term "virtual presence". The minor student (a member of the high school track team) received somewhat risque photos of Defendant via the Snapchat app. The photos showed portions of Defendant's breasts but not the nipples.  Snapchat app was not a stand-in for physical presence. Minor testified that there was no conversation between himself and Defendant when she sent him the pictures, and they did not discuss the pictures after he received them. Digital photographs do not necessarily create an "environment" that mimics physical presence. (HARRIS, concurring; DeARMOND, specially concurring.)

Court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Court did not assist the State in presenting evidence necessary to meet its burden, as State had no burden of proof and was not required to present any evidence. It was Defendant's burden to show the necessity of the withdrawal of his guilty plea. Court's purpose in sua sponte calling a witness appeared to be to determine the truth of Defendant's allegations rather than to advocate for either party. (McDADE and WRIGHT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of a murder that occurred in 1985. In 2016, Defendant filed motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, alleging that 2 detectives who were associates of police commander Jon Burge, improperly influenced a witness to falsely identify Defendant as the murderer. Defendant supported his motion with reports of those 2 detectives' participation in the officers' criminal activities at Area 2 police headquarters in Chicago. Defendant has shown cause for failing to raise the claim earlier, as the extent of the criminal activities of officers working with Burge mostly came to light after Defendant's trial and after the 1995 dismissal of his postconviction petition. Defendant suffered prejudice from suppression of evidence, known to police at the time of his trial, as to the 2 detectives' history of misconduct in using beatings and threats to obtain wrongful convictions in several cases. Defendant sufficiently alleged facts supporting findings of cause and prejudice. (HYMAN and COGHLAN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of 2 counts of aggravated domestic battery and 2 counts of violation of order of protection. Court did not err in admitting 2 disks containing hundreds of jail calls, 6 of which State published at trial. Defendant was present when State published the 6 jail calls during trial, and thus does not implicate his right to present a defense, right to counsel, or right to testify. Nothing in record shows that trial court considered the unpublished calls. (PIERCE and COGHLAN, concurring.)