Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of aggravated kidnapping, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, 3 counts of child pornography, and 1 count of possession of child pornography, and sentenced to 4 consecutive 30-year sentences. Defendant had kidnapped a 3-year-old girl while she was playing in front of the apartment building where she lived. Within 2 days, police identified Defendant as a suspect and located in his car, pursuant to search warrant, a cell phone, GPS, and media player. Record supports reasonable inference that the phone was in the car during commission of offenses. Probable cause existed to search Defendant's cell phone for GPS data, and for police to examine video files on cell phone, and that images cyber-crimes forensic analyst found of the victim being sexually assaulted were in plain view.Officers' actions in searching cell phone were taken in good faith. (ZENOFF, concurring; BIRKETT, specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder, and was sentenced to natural life in prison; jury found the murder was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. State gave timely written and proper notice of its intent to seek increased sentence based on Defendant's behavior indicative of wanton cruelty before trial, submitted that fact to jury as an aggravating factor, and proved that fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant failed to meet his burden of overcoming presumption of trial court's impartiality. No error or display of bias by court clarifying comments made by prosecutor. (HOLDRIDGE and SCHMIDT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of obstructing a peace officer's performance of authorized acts. Evidence was insufficient to establish that officer was engaged in an authorized act, as required to support conviction. Defendant had pulled into parking lot of gas station to check his tires. When, at 12:45 a.m., police officer pulled up behind Defendant's vehicle, Defendant turned vehicle on and began making a 3-point turn. Officer then demanded that he provide his drivers license and insurance card. Officer prohibited Defendant from opening door to his vehicle to get insurance card from trunk. Officer testified that he did not observe Defendant doing anything of a suspicious nature. Officer did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Defendant was committing a crime. (HALL and LAMPKIN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of robbery and sentenced as a Class X offender to 9 years. Defendant was age 17 at time he committed burglary, which was one of his predicate offenses. A 2014 amendment to section 5-120 of Juvenile Court Act vested juvenile court with exclusive jurisdiction over a defendant who, like Defendant here, was 17 years old when he committed burglary. Defendant's prior burglary conviction is not an offense now classified in Illinois as a Class 2 or greater Class felony and thus is not a qualifying offense for Class X sentencing. Defendant's Class X sentence is vacated; remanded for resentencing as a Class 2 offender. (CONNORS and GRIFFIN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of armed robbery and aggravated robbery.Circuit court did not fail to exercise its judicial discretion in finding Defendant fit to stand trial. Court did not commit plain error in setting case for trial without conducting a fitness hearing. Record shows that neither the parties nor the trial court had a bona fide doubt of Defendant's fitness. The act of granting a defendant's motion for a fitness examination cannot, by itself, be construed as a definitive showing that the court found a bona fide doubt of the defendant's fitness. (A. BURKE, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, KARMEIER, THEIS, and NEVILLE, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 11/23/20.) Defendant, age 17 at time of offenses, was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm; he was sentenced to aggregate term of 66 years. During trial, 2 jurors learned outside fo court that Defendant's father had tried to have 2 of the State's key witnesses killed so they would be unable to testify. Defendant met his burden to show that the outside information 2 jurors in the case were exposed to related to issues in the case, so there was a "probability" of prejudice to Defendant.This information likely appeared to the 2 jurors to be an overt attempt to influence the outcome in Defendant's favor. Thus, a presumption of prejudice arose that cannot be viewed as harmless, and thus a new trial is warranted. (CUNNINGHAM and CONNORS, concurring.)