Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder. Appellate defense counsel filed agreed motion for summary remand, after circuit court had summarily dismissed Defendant's pro se postconviction petition. Motion stated that counsel had received affidavit of investigator for Public Defender's (PD) office stating that PD told her that she helped Assistant State's Attorney write the State's closing argument for Defendant's trial.Defendant made a substantial showing that (PD) had a per se conflict of interest that disqualified the two assistant PDs who represented Defendant at his jury trial, and one of those assistant PDs, who investigator told about PD's conduct after verdict but before posttrial motion was filed but did not advise court nor seek new trial on this basis, labored under an actual conflict of interest. Thus, Defendant is entitled to a 3rd-stage evidentiary hearing on his conflict of interest claim. (LYTTON and WRIGHT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated criminal sexual assault and criminal sexual assault, and sentenced to 14 years. Section 116-4 of Code of Criminal Procedure is mandatory; it mandates that a law enforcement agency securely retain any forensic evidence in the case, and mandates that it must be retained until the defendant has completed his sentence, including the period of mandatory supervised release (MSR). State's 2007 destruction of all forensic evidence in this case was in violation of section 116-4 of the Code. State's failure to comply must result in vacatur of a defendant's conviction. (McDADE, concurring; SCHMIDT, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Probation order admonished Defendant of the statutory requirement that he register as a sex offender, and notified him that he had to register within 3 days, which was a collateral consequence of his conviction. This advisory language did not create an order by which Defendant can now challenge the constitutionality of the Sex Offender Registration Act. The registration requirement applied to Defendant with or without the language in probation order. Appellate court is without jurisdiction to consider constitutionality of the Act in this appeal. (LYTTON and McDADE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated robbery. Officer, responding to a report of a robbery at a store, where the suspect reportedly fled down an alley,saw Defendant, who matched the suspect's general description. Officer handcuffed and searched Defendant but found no weapons; he found cigarettes in his pocket and gloves sticking out of his sweatshirt. Court denied motion to suppress, finding that officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop and frisk. Court found that officers exceeded the scope of a Terry frisk when they recovered the cigarettes, but found that the cigarettes and any money found on Defendant would inevitably have been discovered. Officer, after watching store's surveillance video which showed that robber's clothing matched Defendant's clothing. Officer then had probable cause to arrest Defendant, and a search incident to arrest would have uncovered the cigarettes and money. (HUTCHINSON and JORGENSEN, concurring.)

Police arrested Defendant for possessing a firearm, although they did not know if he possessed it legally. Police then learned of his criminal record and charged him with multiple counts of possessing a firearm by a felon and possession of a defaced firearm. Court denied Defendant's motion to quash and suppress, and he was convicted. Counsel was ineffective in failing to argue his possession alone did not give police probable cause to arrest. Had the arrest been quashed, gun and criminal record would have been suppressed and State could not have proven him guilty. Defendant was prejudiced by his attorney's failure to argue that police did not have probable cause to arrest when they did not know whether he possessed the gun legally. (WALKER, concurring; PIERCE, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of being an armed habitual criminal. Defendant failed to show prejudice from defense counsel's decision not to object to Defendant's absence during the juror challenge process. Defendant did not show that the chosen jurors were not impartial. Defendant's 1996 conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon is vacated as void, as he was convicted under subsection 24-1(A)(4) of the Criminal Code which has been held unconstitutional. Defendant put forth this challenge in an appellate brief, which was an appropriate pleading, and appellate court has jurisdiction over the parties and the case. (HOFFMAN and ROCHFORD, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of robbery. Defense and prosecution presented competing versions of events at trial. Defendant contended that the situation was merely a misunderstanding. Defendant made a substantial showing that trial counsel's failure to investigate alleged victim, and failure to cross-examine her on her background, was ineffective assistance. Victim's credibility was critical to the State's case, and evidence as to her pending fraud and bribery charges would reasonably tend to show that her testimony might be influenced by interest bias, or a motive to testify falsely. (ELLIS and BURKE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of home invasion, attempted 1st-degree murder, and aggravated discharge of a firearm. Section 103-2.1(b-5) of Code of Criminal Procedure is not facially unconstitutional, and did not violate equal protection. Court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress his unrecorded statements to police. That statute previously applied only to various homicide offenses under amended, effective 1/1/2014, to include additional offenses, with application to these offenses rolled out over a period of time. Legislative history reflects a legitimate concern about the ability of law enforcement agencies to comply with the amendment if the additional offenses were all added at once. Legislators believed that, with implementation rolled out over a period of years, agencies would be better able to afford and provide necessary equipment. The rollout was rationally related to the goal to ease the burden on law enforcement agencies. (HUTCHINSON and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)