Court denied Defendant's Rule 472 motion to correct the calculation of pretrial credit. Defendant had entered into a fully negotiated plea agreement that expressly provided that he would receive credit for 172 days of time served. Record does not establish whether Defendant himself agreed to a sentence that excluded the additional credit for time served. (McLAREN and BRENNAN, concurring.)
Dist. Ct. did not err in imposing sentence on charge of bribing federal official that included enhancement under section 2C1.1(b)(3) of USSG for bribery offense that involved public official in high-level decision making or sensitive position. Instant offense concerned defendant’s bribes to prison guard to smuggle contraband into prison on behalf of defendant and other prisoners. Ct. rejected defendant’s contention that instant non-supervisory prison guard did not qualify as official in sensitive position for purposes of imposing instant enhancement. Ct. also rejected defendant’s claim that enhancement applied only to bribes made for purpose of influencing official public act, as opposed to bribes that facilitated criminal activity.
Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendants to 230-month terms of incarceration on conspiracy in violation of Hobbs Act charge, even though defendants had received lower sentence on said charge at original sentencing hearing, but then were given new sentencing hearing after conviction on another charge had been vacated on direct appeal. Ct. rejected defendants’ argument that they were entitled to new sentencing hearing because Dist. Ct. had failed to explain why same section 3553(a) factors and same evidence produced higher sentence on conspiracy charge, since: (1) new sentence fell at almost same spot on applicable Guideline range as prior sentence; and (2) there is no authority to support defendants’ argument that Dist. Ct. had to give them same sentence on conspiracy charge at re-sentencing or explain difference, especially where vacatur of conviction on other charge altered sentencing calculus. Moreover, although Dist. Ct. erred during sentencing by applying preponderance of evidence standard, as opposed to reasonable doubt standard to find that defendant had actually conspired to commit each offense that was object of charged conspiracy, any error was harmless, because Dist. Ct. made clear that it would have imposed same sentence on each defendant even if higher reasonable doubt standard applied.
Dist. Ct. did not commit plain error in sentencing defendant to 10-year term of incarceration on charge of conspiring to traffic minor, under circumstances where both defendant and govt. had recommended said sentence. While govt. had breached plea agreement by failing to mention to Dist. Ct. prior to sentencing that defendant had cooperated with govt. on other matters, said failure did not require new sentence hearing before different Dist. Ct. judge, since: (1) under plain error standard, defendant was required to show that he would have received lower sentence if govt. had mentioned his cooperation; and (2) defendant failed to make required showing, where instant sentence was already substantially below applicable guidelines, where defendant’s counsel apprised Dist. Ct. of defendant’s cooperation, where Dist. Ct. would not have accepted 10-year sentence recommendation without taking defendant’s cooperation into account, and where Dist. Ct. imposed precise sentence that defendant had asked for. Ct. further noted that plea agreement would bar defendant from arguing anything less than 10-year sentence at any new sentencing hearing, and all that defendant could hope for at new sentencing hearing was chance that Dist. Ct. would sua sponte make decision to sentence defendant to lower sentence that was already far beneath guideline range.
Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction on charge of attempted transportation of minor across state lines with intent that 15-year old victim engage in prostitution, where: (1) defendant met victim in Indiana gas station, subsequently took out Backpage ad offering victim’s sexual services to Wisconsin clients and stayed with victim in Illinois border-town hotel; (2) cell-phone data indicated defendant’s and victim’s movements in both Wisconsin and Illinois, as well as existence of phone and text messages from Wisconsin individuals responding to said ad; and (3) victim made statements in medical records confirming that she had sexual encounters with clients, as well as defendant. Also, although victim did not testify at trial, admission of her redacted statements to nurse regarding number of sexual encounters with “unknown” males and with defendant during time she spent with defendant did not violate Confrontation Clause, where: (1) victim’s sexual assault examination by nurse served both medical and investigative purpose; (2) govt. redacted defendant’s name from said statements; (3) remaining statements concerned victim’s description of what happened to her during time she spent with defendant; and (4) said statements were highly relevant to determine best course of medical treatment, and thus were not testimonial in nature. Dist. Ct. also did not err in admitting recorded jail call between defendant and third-party, during which defendant stated that he was “pimping” girl to whom he had given cocaine, since jury could properly conclude that defendant was referring to victim in charged offense.
Defendants, age 17 at time of offenses, were convicted, after separate jury trials, of 1st degree murder, arson, and burglary, and sentenced to natural life in prison for murder and a concurrent 7-year sentence for burglary and a consecutive 30-year sentence for arson. When convictions stem from a single course of events within a short time span, a trial court should, when resentencing a juvenile Defendant pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court's 2012 Miller v. Alabama decision, resentence the aggregate sentences. Trial court's finding that a life sentence was not appropriate for these Defendants is in conflict with the de facto life sentences that it gave, in light of recent case law. Trial court did not make a finding of permanent incorrigibility, irretrievable depravity, or irreparable corruption, but implicitly found Defendants had the capacity for rehabilitation by the time of their release date. Reversed and remanded with directions to conduct a resentencing hearing promptly before a different judge. (HALL and LAMPKIN, concurring.)
Court entered an "interim decorum order" to manage trial publicity and the media to ensure that Defendant police officer, charged with shooting death of 17-year-old Laquan McDonald, received a fair trial. Court ordered certain documents to remain under seal. Three months after entry of order, and 2 months after appeal was filed, trial court ordered the 18 remaining sealed documents to be released with some redactions. Appellate court lacks jurisdiction to consider appellants' claim as to their motion to join in another journalist's motion to intervene and to vacate. Trial court did not err in delaying release of the disputed documents or in releasing them as redacted. Trial court had jurisdiction in September 2019 to modify its prior interim order of May 2019 to permit release of the 18 documents. (HALL and LAVIN, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of unlawful possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. Court erred in finding that State's explanation for striking an African-American potential juror was race-neutral and valid. State's explanation that juror was dismissed for personality reasons lacked the clarity, legitimacy, and specificity required by U.S. Supreme Court's 1986 Kentucky v. Batson decision. State's explanation that he was also dismissed because of his "criminal contacts", without any showing that he had been charged or convicted of any crime, was insufficient to rebut Defendant's prima facie showing that it excluded him based on race. (HOLDRIDGE and McDADE, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st-degree murder and aggravated arson. Defendant initially denied knowing about an apartment fire that killed his mother-in-law, but eventually told detectives that he had intentionally knocked a lit cigarette onto vodka-sodden newspapers because he wanted to get her insurance proceeds. Court properly denied Defendant's petition for certificate of innocence. Court's determination that his inculpatory statements were voluntary was not against manifest weight of evidence, and Defendant was proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.(ZENOFF and HUDSON, concurring.)
Defendant, age 19 at time of offense, was convicted of 1st degree murder and attempted armed robbery in shooting death, and sentenced to 50 years. Record does not show that court considered the specific mitigating factors related to Defendant's youth and developing brain at time of his offense, such as his drug addiction. Further proceedings will allow court to determine whether his individual characteristics at time of offense rendered him functionally younger than 19, so that tenets of U.S. Supreme Court's 2012 decision in Miller v. Alabama apply to him. Defendant established cause and prejudice and should have been granted leave to file successive postconviction petition on his claim pursuant to proportionate penalties clause of Illinois Constitution. (DELORT and ROCHFORD, concurring.)