Criminal Law

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant’s request to file successive post-conviction petition that challenged his 50-year sentence for murder that was imposed under circumstances where defendant, who was 16 years old at time of charged offenses, entered into negotiated plea agreement that called for said sentence, as well as concurrent sentences of 15 years for residential burglary and 30 years for armed robbery. While defendant alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective because his 50-year sentence violated his due process rights under Miller, Appellate Court found that while mandatory life sentence for juvenile offenders violates Eight Amendment under Miller, holding in Miller does not apply in instant case, where defendant’s sentence resulted from fully negotiated plea. As such, defendant had waived any constitutional challenge to his sentence.

This case presents question as to whether defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective in defendant’s trial on charges of armed robbery and aggravated robbery for failing to have DNA swab tested for presence of victim’s DNA, where said swab was taken from gun allegedly used in charged offenses. Appellate Court, in reversing defendant’s conviction on armed robbery, found that: (1) trial counsel was deficient in failing to have DNA swab tested, where he mistakenly believed that no swab had been collected; and (2) negative DNA result would have created strong probability of different result at any re-trial, since negative result would have either cast doubt that defendant was perpetrator of robbery or create strong chance that defendant was carrying BB-gun during robbery, which could have mandated acquittal on armed robbery charge and have generated conviction only on lesser offense of aggravated robbery. In its petition for leave to appeal, State argued that Appellate Court’s ruling created impermissible automatic rule that allows defendants to establish prejudice in ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on nothing more than assumption that yet-to-be-performed DNA test would come out in his or her favor. (Dissent filed.)

This case presents question as to whether record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction for residential burglary, where fingerprint expert testified that print left on headphone case found at scene of crime matched defendant’s fingerprint. Appellate Court, in reversing defendant’s conviction, found that expert’s opinion was insufficient to support defendant’s conviction because expert never mentioned utilizing verification step of ACE-V method in his fingerprint analysis. In its petition for leave to appeal, State argued that: (1) because testing method used by expert was not contested by defendant at trial, it should not have impacted Appellate Court’s review of sufficiency of evidence; and (2) Appellate Court erred in consulting materials outside record and in ultimately disregarding expert’s opinion in reliance on extrajudicial materials.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief that alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to suppress defendant’s videotaped inculpatory statement to murder charge that was given to detectives prior to entry of defendant’s guilty plea, under circumstances where defendant’s guilty plea was subsequently withdrawn, and where said statement was admitted into evidence at subsequent trial. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court, found that admission of defendant’s statement in subsequent trial did not violate Rule 402(f), which bars admission of statements made during plea discussions, since defendant’s statement was not made during “plea discussions,” where statement was made after defendant agreed to enter guilty plea, but prior to initial entry of his guilty plea. In his petition for leave to appeal, defendant argues that Appellate Court’s decision gave too narrow interpretation of Rule 402(f) and will make defendants reluctant to make confessions and will impede plea process. (Dissent filed.)

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly granted defendant’s motion to suppress audio and video recording of drug transaction that was generated by confidential informant, where: (1) police obtained permission to record different individual without said individual’s permission or knowledge; and (2) informant illegally recorded his conversation with defendant, where defendant had no knowledge that said conversation was being recorded, and where police had not sought permission to record any conversation with defendant. Both parties agreed that audio portion of recording should be suppressed under eavesdropping statute, but Appellate Court found that video portion of conversation and informant’s personal knowledge of drug transaction was admissible, since neither informant’s personal knowledge of drug transaction nor video recording resulted from any illegal eavesdropping. (Dissent filed.)