Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of residential burglary and theft. State did not charge Defendant with "remaining" burglary, but with burglary by unauthorized entry, which it did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt.Although Defendant's act of removing property from his friends' dwelling rendered his entry into the dwelling without authority, the limited authority doctrine still required State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt Defendant's intent to commit a theft or felony at the time of entry. No evidence showed that Defendant possessed the requisite criminal intent at the time he entered his friends' home. (HARRIS and HOLDER WHITE, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with 1 count of armed violence and 1 count of aggravated battery (great bodily harm) and 1 count of aggravated batter (public way). Charges alleged that Defendant kicked the victim 2 times in the head on a public way in front of a bar. There was sufficient evidence to conclude that Defendant made physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with an individual. The fact that victim was already unconscious at time of assault did not mean that conduct could not be of an insulting or provoking nature. Evidence was sufficient for jury to conclude that contact took place on or about a public way. Even if the kicking occurred in the parking lot, instead of the sidewalk or the street, this is sufficient to be "about" a public way. Prosecutor showed jury photographs of victim's injuries during opening statement, when photos had not yet been offered into evidence. No ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object. (CAVANAGH, concurring; TURNER, specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of multiple counts of aggravated domestic battery and domestic battery of his girlfriend. Jury was properly instructed pursuant to IPI Criminal Nos. 1.01, 3.13, and 3.14, including limiting instruction. Propensity instruction properly referred to "offenses", as more than one "offense" was committed.  No ineffective assistance of counsel in not offering tailored jury instructions, or in not objecting to officer's testimony that Defendant wanted a lawyer, as that was a matter of trial strategy; and evidence of guilt was overwhelming. (ZENOFF, concurring; HUDSON, specially concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 10/30/20.) Defendant, age 17 at time of offenses, was convicted, after bench trial, of 1st degree murder, aggravated battery with a firearm, and aggravated discharge fo a firearm and sentenced to total 44 years, which is a de facto life sentence. Court failed to give full consideration of the factors described in U.S. Supreme Court's Miller v. Alabama decision. The Illinois Supreme Court's 2019 People v. Buffer decision, decided more than 2 years after Defendant was sentenced, capped a juvenile defendant's sentence to 40 years unless the sentencing court specifically finds that the defendant is beyond rehabilitation. This change in the law since the time of Defendant's sentencing hearing necessitates that Defendant receive a new sentencing hearing. Defendant's sentence violates the Eighth Amendment. (GORDON and REYES, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of the offense of being an armed habitual criminal (AHC) and sentenced to 12 years. Defendant's statement in PSI (presentence investigation report) and counsel's posttrial motions both raised the issue of Defendant not being afforded the opportunity to testify to his exculpatory account of events. Although Defendant did not expressly accuse trial counsel fo ineffective assistance, his allegations are reasonably read as a claim that counsel deprived him of his right to testify by not properly consulting with him. Remanded for court to conduct a Krankel inquiry into these allegations.  Defendant has not shown a reversible double enhancement. Court did not act improperly in referring to Defendant's prior convictions, including the burglaries underlying his AHC offense, in finding that he should not receive the minimum 6-year sentence; court is required to weigh Defendant's criminal history as it relates to his rehabilitative potential. (GRIFFIN and CONNORS, concurring.)

Defendant pled guilty to 1st degree murder and attempted 1st degree murder. Defendant counsel was ineffective in failing to advise him of the immigration consequences of his plea. As 1st degree murder is an "aggravated felony" for purposes of federal immigration law, he was subjected to mandatory expedited removal from the U.S. The statutory certainty of the immigration consequences of a murder conviction were succinct, clear, and explicit, and would have been a rational reason to reject a plea.Defendant thus made a substantial showing of prejudice. Defendant was ordered removable after his 1985 and 1987 criminal convictions, but for 20 years he was not removed, although he was in custody for months in 1995. Defendant made a substantial showing that his right to constitutionally effective plea counsel was violated. (WALKER and PIERCE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder, home invasion, and robbery and received total 54 years. Given severity of victim's injuries, testimony as to his demeanor while the victim spoke, and the consistency of his statement that "Gilbert" (Defendant's first name) beat him, court properly found that victim's statements were admissible as spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule.  Evidence of the parties' abusive relationship leading up to time of offenses was relevant for providing context as to why Defendant entered victim's residence and beat him. Jury was not required to accept the defense theory that victim suffered from dementia. There was no clear evidence that another person's actions directly caused victim's death. State's expert testified that the assault set off the deterioration of victim's health a theory sufficient to establish causation.Evidence was sufficient to find Defendant guilty of the offenses. (LAVIN and COBBS, concurring.)

Defendant, age 15 at time of offenses, was convicted of attempted 1st degree murder, aggravated battery with a firearm, and aggravated discharge of a firearm and was sentenced to 18 years. Defendant was not denied a fair trial when court allowed 2 witnesses to testify that they believed defense counsel, not another person, was the investigator who interviewed 1 of those witnesses. Testimony was relevant to that witness' credibility and his testimony as to the shooting.Prosecutor's comments about that witness' credibility were invited by defense counsel's closing argument.The 2016 amendment to section 5-130 of the Juvenile Court Act, which raised the age of excluded jurisdiction from 15 to 16 years old, became effective after the conviction but before Defendant's sentencing. Remanded to determine whether Defendant should be sentenced as an adult, if the State files the required petition to request a hearing for adult sentencing. (MIKVA and CONNORS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of 3 counts of aggravated domestic battery and 1 count of aggravated battery. Defendant's trial counsel labored under a per se conflict of interest where the victim in his case hired Defendant's attorney to represent her and testified against Defendant at trial. Defendant's trial counsel never brought the conflict to the court's attention, and there is no evidence that Defendant was informed of how that conflict could affect his representation.As the record does not indicate that Defendant knowingly waived the conflict, reversal and a new trial are required. (HARRIS and GRIFFIN, concurring.)