Criminal Law

(Modified upon denial of rehearing 10/19/20.) Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated battery to a peace officer Court erred in refusing to give jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of resisting a peace officer. At least some evidence in record supports a possible conviction for resisting and acquittal for aggravated battery. To support a conviction for an offense with the mens rea of knowledge, it is not enough that the Defendant knowingly commits the alleged action (here, kicking); instead, Defendant must commit the action with knowledge that the particular result (here, either insulting or provoking contact, or resisting) will follow. Circumstances permit a rational jury to enter a verdict on the lesser-included offense of obstructing a peace officer, and to conclude that evidence was insufficient to show that Defendant knew his kicking would make contact of an insulting or provoking nature. (WALKER, concurring; PIERCE, dissenting.)

Defendant, age 22 at time of offense, was convicted of 1st degree murder and attempted 1st degree murder and sentenced, in 1995, to a total of 85 years. Court erred in dismissing his postconviction petition. Petition alleges that he was a drug addict since age 9 (and this is confirmed in hospital records), that he was using drugs every day at time of offense, and that he was attempting to rob a drug house when the offenses occurred. Record did not show that court consider attributes of young adulthood or these attributes in light of Defendant's lifelong drug addiction. Sentencing occurred long before the statements and findings of later courts as to considerations of youth and its attendant characteristics. (HALL and REYES, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of aggravated battery and sentenced to 30 months of felony probation. Charges stemmed from altercation between Defendant, a cab driver, and a group of passengers who had been drinking. Court dismissed Defendant's postconviction petiton at 2nd stage. Petition alleged ineffective assistance of counsel as counsel failed to call Defendant's dentist in support of his claim of self-defense. Counsel's Rule 651(c) certificate explained that an affidavit from Defendant's dentist was not attached to petition because dentist refused to sign one.  Unknown whether dentist would testify that Defendant's injured teeth could be the result of an injury at time of incident. Defendant did not make a substantial showing of a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's decision not to call the dentist, the outcome would have been different. (HALL and REYES, concurring.)

Defendant, age 15 at time of offenses, was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st-degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm, and sentenced to total 61 years. This is a de facto life sentence. Trial court believed that it had limited, if any, room for discretion in fashioning Defendant's sentence.Sentencing scheme now affords sentencing courts discretion to apply firearm enhancement. A life sentence for a juvenile is appropriate only where that defendant is the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irretrievable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond rehabilitation. This sentencing court did not have at its disposal current modifications to sentencing parameters. Remanded for resentencing. (BIRKETT and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of vehicular hijacking and sentenced as a Class X offender to 17 years. State's offer to agree to a sentencing cap of 20 years if he waived his right to jury was not inherently coercive and did not render his jury waiver invalid. Record clearly shows that Defendant was well aware his case would be decided by a judge rather than a jury. Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to jury trial. (HUDSON and BRENNAN, concurring.) 

(Court opinion corrected 10/14/20.) Defendant, age 19 at time of offenses, was convicted, after bench trial, of residential burglary of a 69-year old woman and then murdering her, and was sentenced to 55 years for murder, to be served with a 15-year concurrent term for residential burglary. Court properly denied Defendant leave to file successive postconviction petition. Defendant did not establish prejudice as he was an adult at the time he committed and acted as the principal in committing the offenses. Court considered relevant factors as to his youth and its attendant characteristics. Sentence did not violate proportionate penalties clause. (FITZGERALD SMITH and PUCINSKI, concurring.)

Defendant, age 16 at time of offense but 17 years old when he was arrested and questioned by police, was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st-degree murder and sentenced to 43 years. Sentencing hearing did not comply with 8th amendment. Defendant was misled when he asked if his case could be transferred to adult court and detective stated that transfer was "always a possibility", although the law requires transfer to adult criminal court of murder cases with 16-year-old defendants. Court's credibility and factual findings were not against manifest weight of evidence. Under totality of circumstances, Defendant's statement was voluntary and court properly denied his motion to suppress. Sentence is a de facto life sentence. Court did not explicitly determine that Defendant's conduct showed irretrievable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond possibility of rehabilitation. Sentence vacated; remanded for resentencing. (SCHOSTOK and HUDSON, concurring.)