Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 84-month term of incarceration on charge of unlawful possession of firearm by felon, even though pre-sentence report indicated that applicable guidelines called for sentence between 46 and 57 months’ incarceration. Dist. Ct., in referring to section 3553(a) factors, adequately explained that defendant’s conduct in discharging gun while fleeing in automobile through residential neighborhood, hiding in residence and engaging police in multi-hour standoff, was broader than conduct that supported enhancements and two-level adjustment that factored into defendant’s sentence guideline range. Moreover, record showed that defendant engaged in post-arrest plan to dissuade witnesses from testifying on behalf of govt. that included expressing willingness to kill those who testified against him. As such, instant sentence was not subjectively unreasonable. Ct. rejected defendant’s argument that Dist. Ct. overestimated seriousness of his criminal past.

In prosecution on charge of unlawful possession of firearm by felon, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress firearm seized by private security guard at public housing project, under circumstances where: (1) security guard subdued defendant in public housing laundry room; and (2) security guard called Chicago Police Dept. after recovering firearm from defendant during said encounter. While Dist. Ct. found that security guard had no reasonable cause to stop or search defendant, Fourth Amendment was not applicable, where security guard was not agent of police, but rather was only employee of private entity that had contract to provide security services to housing authority. As such, in absence of evidence establishing that security guard was government agent, security guard was not state actor who was subject to Fourth Amendment.

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 29-year term of incarceration on various drug and racketeering charges, where said sentence was based on provisions of First Step Act, even though said offense and defendant’s original sentence of 50 years occurred prior to enactment of First Step Act. Record showed that Ct. of Appeals had vacated on unrelated grounds defendant’s original sentence, and that Dist. Ct. had not imposed instant 20-year sentence by enactment date of First Step Act. Section 403(b) of First Step Act states that it applies to offenses committed prior to its enactment date if “sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such date of enactment,” and Dist. Ct. could properly find that sentencing provisions of First Step Act applied to instant case, since: (1) defendant was awaiting his new sentence at time of enactment date; and (2) there is nothing in text of First Step Act that suggested that Congress intended to create exception to ordinary effect of vacatur of sentence. (Dissent filed.)

Defendant is entitled to limited remand concerning Dist. Ct.’s imposition of 250-month term of incarceration, where Ct. of Appeals found that defendant was entitled to benefit of section 401 of First Step Act, since defendant’s conviction on conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine occurred prior to enactment date of First Step Act, and since defendant was still awaiting new sentencing hearing at time of Act’s enactment date. Fact that defendant’s original sentence had been imposed and vacated prior to Act’s enactment date did not support govt.’s argument that First Step Act did not apply. However, record suggested that Dist. Ct. would have imposed same sentence regardless of whether section 401 of First Step Act applied. Accordingly, Ct. of Appeals retained jurisdiction of instant appeal and directed Dist. Ct. to determine whether it is inclined to impose same sentence. Moreover, if Dist. Ct. informs Ct. of Appeals that it is not inclined to re-sentence defendant, Ct. of Appeals will consider whether instant sentence is reasonable.